EKENE-DILI CHUKWU LTD. V. 1. MRS. G.I AKINBOBOYE CHIEF MAGISTRATE COURT NO. 1 LAGOS 2. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION. (CA/L/247/85) [1987] 1 (19 January 1987);

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  • EKENE-DILI CHUKWU LTD. V. 1. MRS. G.I AKINBOBOYE CHIEF MAGISTRATE COURT NO. 1 LAGOS 2. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION. (CA/L/247/85) [1987] 1 (19 January 1987);

EKENE-DILI CHUKWU LTD.

V.

1. MRS. G.I AKINBOBOYE

CHIEF MAGISTRATE COURT NO. 1 LAGOS

2. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION.

COURT OF APPEAL

                                                                                                                                           (LAGOS STATE DIVISION)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               CA/L/247/85

PHILLIP NNAEMEKA-AGU, J.C.A. (Presided)

UTHMAN MOHAMMED, J.C.A (Read the Lead Judgement)

IDRIS LEGBO KUTIGI, J.C.A.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               MONDAY, 19TH JANUARY, 1987.

 

 

Issues:

  1. Does the jurisdiction conferred on the National Industrial Court under Section 15(1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1976, include criminal jurisdiction or is it wholly civil?
  2. Whether the charge as framed against the Appellants comes within the purview  of the criminal jurisdiction of the Magistrates Courts of the Lagos State.

Facts:

                             The Appellant, a Company incorporated in Nigeria under the Companies Decree, in the course of its business had a trade dispute in its organization. The dispute was taken before the Industrial Arbitration Panel which was set up under the provisions of S.9(3) of the Trade Disputes Act (1976) as amended by the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act 1977. The appellant failed to comply with the award and in consequence the Attorney General for the Federation framed the following charge against the appellants:

                                                “CHARGE NO. A/98/85

                             THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION

                                                                VS.

                             EKENE DILI CHUKWU (NIGERIA) LIMITED

                               That you EKENE DILI CHUKWU (NIGERIA) LIMITED LAGOS being a body corporate under the Nigerian Companies Act 1968 in May, 1984 in Lagos failed to comply with an award of the Industrial Arbitration Panel, Lagos Nigeria as confirmed by the Minister charged with responsibility for matters relating to the welfare of Labour Pursuant to section 9(3) of 1976 Trade Disputes Act No.7 as amended by Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act 1977, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S.9(4) of 1976 as amended by the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act 1974 No.54 Sgd. Mrs. F.O. Olatunji Senior State Counsel Grade 1 for Attorney General of the Federation. Federal Ministry of Justice, Old Secretariat Marina, Lagos.”

                             The charge was brought before the first respondent for her determination. After service, the appellant filed this application before the trial court for an order of prohibition challenging the jurisdiction of the first respondent to try the offence in the charge.

                             The Lagos High Court Judge, Onalaja J. ruled that the Chief Magistrate had jurisdiction to try the accused, even though all industrial disputes are within the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court. He ruled that the National Industrial Court had no criminal jurisdiction whatsoever.

                             The company appealed to the Court of Appeal contending that the jurisdiction conferred on the National Industrial Court by virtue of Section 15(1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1976 embraced both civil and criminal causes or matters connected with trade disputes.

                             The Respondent however countered that that court had no criminal jurisdiction so much so when it could not even try a charge  of contempt committed whether on the face of or outside it.  

Held [Dismissing the Appeal]

  1. The true intendment of sections 15, 26 and 37 of the Trade Disputes Act 1976 is that the National Industrial Court shall be a tribunal for setting and making awards in industrial disputes and not for trial of criminal offences.
  2. The legislature did not intend to clothe the National Industrial Court with Criminal jurisdiction when it provided that the Court, unlike all Courts of summary jurisdiction, should not try contempt issues by itself.
  3. The legislature wants all the offences committed in violation of the order of any of the bodies mentioned in the Trade Disputes Act 1976 (as amended by the Act of 1977) to be tried summarily.
  4. Sec. 12(2) Interpretation Act 1964 provides that a contravention of a provision of a subsidiary instrument may be prosecuted in a summary manner.
  5. By virtue of the Provisions of S.1(2) and S.277 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the first respondent who is a Chief Magistrate has jurisdiction to Adjudicate on the charge framed against the appellant.

Nigerian Cases Referred to in the Judgement:

                     Mandara v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1984) 4S.C.8

                     Sofekun v. Akinyemi (1980) 5-7 S.C.1

Nigerian Statutes Referred in the Judgement:

                     Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law 1981, Lagos State

                     Criminal Procedure Act Secs 1(2); 277

                     Federal High Court Act 1973, Sec 7(1) (2)

                     Interpretation Act 1964, Sec 12 (2)

                     Trade Disputes Act 1976, Secs, 15(1), 14(1), 26(4), 37

                     Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act 1977, Sect 9(4)

Appeal:

                     This was an appeal from the ruling of Onalaja J. which was against the Appellant. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

History of the Case:

                     Court of Appeal:

                       Division of the Court of Appeal to which appeal was brought:

                      Court of Appeal, Lagos

Names of Justices that sat on the appeal Nnaemeka-Agu, J.C.A. (Presided), Uthman      Mohammed, J.C.A. (Read the Lead Judgement), Idris Legbo Kutigi, J.C.A.

                      Appeal No.: CA/L/247/85

                      Date of Judgment: 19th January 1987

                     High Court:

                        Name of the High Court: High Court, Lagos

                                        Name of the Judge: Onalaja, J.

                                        Date of Judgement: 31st October 1985

Counsel:

                     M.E. Olunwa- for Appellant

                     F. Nwadialo, SAN- for Respondent,

MOHAMMED, J.C.A. (Delivering the Lead Judgement): This is an appeal against the ruling of Onalaja J. in which the learned trial Judge declared that the first respondent did not lack jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in case no. A/98/85- Attorney General of the Federation v. Ekene Dili Chukwu (Nigeria) Ltd., brought her for trial.

                     The issues raised in this appeal are two: Firstly, does the jurisdiction conferred on the National Industrial Court, under section 15(1) of the Trade Disputes Act, 1976, include criminal jurisdiction, or is it wholly civil? Courts of the Lagos State as are conferred by the Lagos State Magistrates’ Courts Law (Cap 82 of 1973 Laws of Lagos State) as amended.

                     The facts of this case were that the appellant, a company incorporated in Nigeria under the Companies Decree, in the course of its business had a trade dispute in its Organisation. The dispute in its organization. The dispute was taken before the Industrial Arbitration Panel which was set up under the provisions of S9(3) of the Trade Disputes Act (1976) as amended by the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act 1977. The appellant failed to comply with the award and in consequence the Attorney General for the Federation framed the following charge against the appellants:

                                                                        “CHARGE NO. A/98/85

                                                        THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION

                                                                                        V.

                                                        EKENE DILI CHUKWU (NIGERIA) LIMITED

                        That you EKENE DILI CHUKWU (NIGERIA) LIMITED LAGOS being a body corporate under the Nigerian Companies Act 1968 in May, 1984 in Lagos failed to comply with an award of the Industrial Arbitration Panel, Lagos Nigeria as confirmed by the Minster charged with responsibility for matters relating to the welfare of Labour Pursuant to Section 9(3) of 1976 Trade Disputes Act No.7 as amended by Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act 1977, and thereby committed an offence punishable under s.9(4) of 1976 as amended by the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act Act 1974 No. 54 Sgd. Mrs.F.O Olatunji Senior State Counsel Grade 1 for Attorney General of the Federation. Federal Ministry of Justice, Old Secretariat Marina Lagos.”

The charge was brought before the first respondent for her determination. After service, the appellant filed this application before the trial court for an order of prohibition challenging the jurisdiction of the first respondent to try the offence in the charge.

The learned counsel for the appellant, in his brief of argument in support of this appeal that the learned trial judge having rightly held that the enforcement of the award and the failure to comply with it is a matter connected with Trade Disputes Decree No.7 of 1976 and went further to hold that the National Industrial Court has exclusive Jurisdiction to any other Court to try matters connected with a Trade Dispute ought to have given effect to the express, clear and unambiguous provision of section 15(1) of the Trade Disputes Decree No. 7 of 1976. The learned counsel for the appellant is referring to a finding made by the learned trial Judge in his ruling where he said as follows:

   “I hold that the enforcement of the award and the failure to comply with an award is a    matter connected with trade disputes and by S.37(2) failure shall amount to a breach of contract , hold(sic) that the National Industrial Court has exclusive jurisdiction to any other court to try matters connected with a trade dispute.”

The learned counsel for the appellant then referred to the provisions of S.14(1) of the Trade Disputes Act, 1976 and submitted that it was not in dispute that the charge framed before the first respondent arose as a result of the award made by the Industrial Arbitration Panel under S.9(1) of the Decree. Counsel submitted further and said that the combined effect of sections 14(1), of the Trade Disputes. Decree 1976 was to confer on the National Industrial Court with the jurisdiction and powers on any award made by the Industrial Arbitration Panel and matters connected there with.

                             Counsel distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Alhaji Zanner Bukar Umoru Mandara v. The Attorney General of the Federation (1984) 4 S.C.8 with the case in hand. In that case the Supreme Court held that the legislature in establishing the Federal High Court made a distinction between its civil and criminal jurisdictions. See Section 7(1)(2) of Federal High Court Act of 1973. The appellant’s counsel, in this appeal, argued that there was no such distinction made on the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court to deal with trade disputes matters. For the foregoing it is the counsel’s view that the jurisdiction conferred on the National Industrial Court by virtue of Section 15(1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1976 embraces both civil and criminal causes or matters connected with trade disputes.

                             The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Nwadialo for the respondents submitted that S.14(1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1976 merely sets out the areas in which jurisdiction may be conferred but does not define the content of that jurisdiction. Also Section 15(1) confers jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court as follows:

                             15(1) The Court shall, to the exclusion of any other Court, have jurisdiction-

  1. to make awards for the purpose of settling trade disputes; and
  2. to determine questions as to the interpretation of
  1. any collective agreement;
  2. any award made by arbitration.
  3. tribunal or by the Court under part 1 of this Decree;
  4. The terms of settlement of any trade dispute as recorded in any memorandum under S.6of this Decree.

                             The learned Senior advocate submitted further that a trade dispute lies between workers and employers or between workers and workers (See S.37 (1)(b) of the 1976 Act). None of the parties is under trial and at the end of its adjudication; the National Industrial Court makes an award. It does not convict and pass sentence or acquit. The award should center on one or the other features of a trade dispute i.e. it must be connected with “the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment and physical condition of work of any person.” Mr. Nwadialo also submitted that in the trade dispute no party is charged with or prosecuted for any crime and as such  there could not be any criminal proceedings connected with the making of an award by the tribunal. That the National Industrial Court or Industrial Arbitration Panel has no criminal jurisdiction is supported by S.26(4) of the Trade Disputes Act 1976 whereby contempt  committed before either of them sitting is summarily triable before a High Court and punishable by a fine of N200 or to imprisonment for three months.

                             I have reproduced the submissions of both counsel in respect of the main issue for this appeal. Can a charge as framed against the appellant and Court? In finding an answer to this question both counsel have referred me to S.15 (1) which provided the jurisdiction of that Court. It is difficult to interpret any criminal jurisdiction in the wordings and meaning of S.15 (1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1976. It is a very important point, as Mr. Nwadialo has submitted in his briefthat if the legislature did intend to clothe the National Industrial Court with criminal jurisdiction why was a charge for contempt which is criminal be made triable by the High Court. If the exclusive jurisdiction given to the National Industrial Court covered both civil and criminal why couldn’t the court try the contempt issues by itself as is the case with all Courts of summary jurisdiction?

                             The learned trial Judge analyzed, in great detail, the provisions of sections 9, 14, 15 and 37 of the Trade Disputes Act 1976 and also the amendment made to the act by Decree 54 of 1977. He also referred to the definitions of the word “offence” and “criminal” under the Criminal Code and the Magistrates Court Law, cap 82, respectively. I think it is pertinent to reproduce the penal provisions which was enacted as an amendment to Trade Disputes Act of 1976. Under S.9 (4) of the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act 1977 it has been provided as follows:

   “9(4) Any person who fails to comply with an award of a tribunal as confirmed by the commissioner pursuant to this section shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction-

  1. In the case of an individual to a fine of N200 or imprisonment for six months; and
  2. In the case of a body corporate to a fine of N2,000”

                             The charge framed against the appellant was based on information disclosing the offence mentioned above. The argument of the appellant’s counsel is that only the National Industrial Court has exclusive jurisdiction to try the offence framed in the charge. Mr. Olunwa also raised a lot of dust on the learned Judges finding where he said, in his judgement, that failure to comply with an award was a matter connected with trade dispute, and since S. 14(1) of the Act has given the National Industrial Court jurisdiction in respect of all matters connected with trade disputes only that court could adjudicate on the charge.

                             Mr. Nwadialo however had referred to the provisions of S.26(4) of the Act in his brief of argument. That section provides that any person who commits an act of contempt, whether the act is or is not committed in  the presence of the members of any such body as aforesaid sitting in the exercise of its functions under the Act, shall be liable on summary conviction before a High Court to a fine of N200 or to imprisonment for three months. The learned Senior Advocate argued that if the legislature really wanted the National Industrial Court or the Industrial Arbitration Panel to have criminal jurisdiction the contempt case would not be taken before the high court for trial.

                             I believe that the legislature wants the legislature wants all the offences committed in violation of the order of any of the bodies mentioned in the Trade Dispute Act 1976 (as amended by the Act of 1977) to be tried summarily. In addition to the provisions of S.26 (4) of the Act, I also referred to S.12(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1964 which provided that a contravention of a provision of a subsidiary instrument may be prosecuted in a summary manner.

                             Under S.1(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act “summary trial” is defined as any trial by a magistrate and a trial by a Judge in which the accused has not been committed for trial after a preliminary inquiry. S.277 of the C.P.A. also provides as follows:

                             “277. The provisions of this part shall apply to offences triable summarily, that is to say:

  1. to all trials in the High Court other than on information and
  2. to all trials in the High Court in respect of offences for which it is provided that a trial can be had in the High Court otherwise than on information and for which no special procedure is provided, and
  3. to all trials in any magistrate’s Court to the extent of the jurisdiction of the magistrate adjudicating, and
  4. for all offences declared by any written law to be triable summarily or on summary conviction or in a summary manner or by a magistrate”. (italics mine)

Following the above provisions it is without any doubt that the first respondent who is a Chief Magistrate has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the charge framed against the appellant. I also agree with Mr. Nwadialo that the National Industrial Court and the Industrial Arbitration Panel have no criminal jurisdiction. In the case of Sofekun v. Akinyemi (1980)5-7S.C.1 Fatayi Williams C.J.N. (as he then was) had this to say:

“Moreover, because of the mandatory provisions of the sub-section, it seems to me that once a person is accused of a criminal offence he must be tried in a “Court of Law where the complaints of his accusers can be ventilated in public and where he would be sure of getting a fair hearing as set out in subsection (4) to (10) of Secton 22 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. No other tribunal, investigating panel, or committee will do”     

I also agree with the learned trial Judge that the first respondent has been clothed with jurisdiction to try the offence disclosed in the charge by the enhancement of the Chief Magistrate’s jurisdiction in Lagos State to impose a fine of N4, 000.00. See the Administration of Justice Miscellaneous Provisions Law 1981 of Lagos State which amended S.18 of the Magistrate’s Courts Law, cap 82.

This appeal therefore fails. The ruling of Onalaja J. delivered on 31st October, 1985 is hereby affirmed. I make no order as to costs.

NNAEMEKA-AGU, J.C.A. (Presiding): I entirely agree. I am of the view that the true intendment of sections 15, 26 and 37 of the Trade Disputes Act of 1976 is that the National Industrial Court shall be a tribunal for settling and making awards in industrial disputes and not for trial of criminal offences. I therefore agree with my brother Mohammed, J.C.A. that this appeal fails and is dismissed. I also make no order as to costs.

KUTIGI, J.C.A: I agree with the lead judgment of my learned brother, Mohammed, J.C.A. that the first respondent has jurisdiction to try the offence charged in the information brought before her. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.