JUDGMENT
(DELIVERED BY BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, JCA):
This is an appeal against the ruling of the Federal High Court Yola Division in Suit No. FHC/YL/CS/4/2014: Ijandir Isaac Samuel Yarai V. Modibbo Adama University of Technology Yola delivered on 25/5/2015 by B. B. Aliyu J., in which the suit of the Appellant as Plaintiff was dismissed as having been statute barred by virtue of the operation of the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act LFN 2004  
The Apppellant as Plaintiff had on 26/8/2014 instituted an action by means of a writ of summons before the court below claiming several declarations and an order directng the Respondent as Defendant to release forthwith the Appellant’s statement of result for his onward mobilisation for the National Youth Service Corps Programme. The parties filed and exchanged pleadings together with written statements on oath of their respective sole witness coupled with copies of documents they each intend to rely upon at the trial in line with the requirements of the Rules of the Court below. See pages 3 – 47, 104 – 112 of the Record of Appeal for the Appellant’s writ of summons, statement of claim, reply to statement of defence, written statement on oath of his sole witness and copies of documents intended to be relied upon by him at the trial; see pages 56 – 64, 74 – 93 of the record of appeal for the Respondent’s statement of defence, written statement on oath of its sole witness and copies of documents intended to be relied uopn by it at te trial. 
At the close of pleadings, however, the Respondent as Defendant/Applicant on 25/11/2014 filed a Notice of preliminary objection challenging the competence of the Appellant’s suit on the sole ground that by virtue of Section 2 (a) of the  Public Officers (Protection) Act Laws of the Federation 2004, the action was statute barred having not been commenced within three months of the cause of action and praying the court below to decline jurisdiction and to dismiss the Appellant’s suit for being incompetent. The parties joined issues on the preliminary objection by way of filing and exchange of written addresses. On 23/4/2015, the court below heard the preliminary objection and in a considered ruling delivered on 25/5/2015 it upheld the preliminary objection and consequently dismissed the Appellant’s suit for being statute barred. See pages 65 – 66, 67 – 73, 98 – 103 and 149 – 167 of the record of appeal.     

The Appellant was disastisfied with the said ruling of the court below dismissing his suit and had promptly appealed against the said ruling to this court vide a Notice of appeal filed on 21/8/2015 on four grounds of appeal. The record of appeal was transmitted to this court on 19/11/2015 but deemed on 14/4/2016. The Appellant’s brief was filed on 16/2/2016 but deemed on 14/4/2016. The Respondent’s brief was filed 23/3/2016 but also deemed on 14/4/2016. The Appellant’s reply brief was filed on 4/4/2016 but deemed on 14/4/2016. However, on 23/3/2016 the Respondent filed a Notice of preliminary objection challenging the competence of the appeal.
At the hearing of the appeal on 14/4/2016, Miss Rabi Buba appearing with T. U. Danjuma Esq, and A. A Hamma Esq, for the Appellant adopted through T. U. Danjuma Esq, the Appellant’s brief and Appellant’s reply brief as their argument in opposition to the prelimainary objection and in support of the appeal and urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objection and to allow the appeal on the merit and to grant the reliefs sought in the Notice of appeal. On their part, Yahaya Mohammed Esq, Senior State counsel, Federal Ministry of Justice, Yola Office appearing with U. F. Ahmed Esq, State counsel for the Respondent adopted the Respondent’s brief as their argument in support of the preliminary objection, of  which ground one was withdrawn, and in opposition to the appeal and urged the court to uphold the preliminary objection and to strike out the appeal for being incompetent or to dismiss same for lacking in merit.
In the Appellant’s brief, the following three issues were distilled as arising for determination in this appeal, namely: 

ISSUES
1.    Whether or not the Appellant’s right to fair hearing was breached by the Respondent by its purported expulsion of the Appellant without according the Appellant a right of representation, in view of the provision of Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
2.    Whether or not the trial Court was right to hold that the Respondent is protected/covered by the provisions of Sections 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
3.    Whether or not the trial Court was right to hold that the Cause of action arose in 2010 in view of the negotiation and concerted efforts of the Appellant to get wrong reverted by the Respondent.
In the Respondent’s brief, the following three issues were distilled as arising for determination in this appeal, namely: 
1.    Whether or not the Appellant’s right to fair hearing could be determined when the Appellant failed to initiate his case within the 3 months period allowed by statute; Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004? (Distilled from Grounds1 and 2)
2.    Whether the trial Court was right to have dismissed the Appellant suit by holding that it is statute – barred
3.    Whether or not the period of negotiation will stop prevent the period of     limitation from running?
I have given due consideration to the facts and circumstances of this appeal, particularly the facts in the pleadings of the Appellant and sole ground for the preliminary objection to the competence of  the Appellant’s suit and the ruling of  the court below. I have also considered the submissions of counsel in their respective briefs and I am of the view that the real isssues for determination  in this appeal are the three apt issues as concisely distilled in the Respondent’s brief and which consideration would in my view involve a consideration of the three issues as distilled in the Appellant’s brief.  Consequently, the three isssues for determination as distilled by the Respondent’s counsel are hereby set down as the three issues for determination in this appeal, namely: 

1.    Whether or not the Appellant’s right to fair hearing could be determined when the Appellant failed to initiate his case within the 3 months period allowed by statute; Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004? (Distilled from Grounds1 and 2)
2.    Whether the trial Court was right to have dismissed the Appellant suit by holding that it is statute – barred
3.    Whether or not the period of negotiation will stop prevent the period of     limitation from running?
But first, there is the notice of preliminary objection of the Respondent challenging the competence of this appeal and it behoves this court to first consider and resolve it one way or the other, it being a challenge to the competence of the appeal and in law without a competent appeal there is nothing before the court on which to dissipitate any energy and time of both the parties and their counsel on the one hand and the court on the other hand considering and determining an incompetent appeal on the merit when it ought to be terminated in limine by way of its being struck out without much ado. See Adami V. Okoli (1977) 7 SC 571. See alos Olarenwaju V. BON Ltd. (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 364) 622; Peter Odofin & Anor V. Chief Agu & Anor (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 229) 230; Odunze V. Nwosu (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1050) 1; Adewunmi V. Okefade (2010) 3 SCNJ 368.
 I proceed to consider the preliminary objection challenging the competence of this appeal anon. 

RULING ON PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
By a Notice of preliminary objection filed on 23/3/2016, the Respondent is challenging the competence of this appeal on the grounds that the record of appeal was transmitted out of time without the leave of this court and also that the three issues for determination as distilled by the Appellant’s counsel were incompetent and thus rendered the appeal itself incompetent. 
At the hearing of this appeal, the Respondent’s counsel had, consequent upon the regularisation of the record of appeal by this court on the application of the Appellant’s counsel to that effect, withdrawn the first ground for the preliminary objection as having been overtaken by events. The application to withdraw the first ground of obejcetion was not objected to by the Appellant’s counsel. Consequently, the first ground of the preliminary objection having been withdrawn it is hereby struck out. 
I now proceed to a consideration of the second ground for the preliminary objection. 
Learned counsel to the Respondent submitted that the questions which calls for determination of a vital point that when described one way or the other affects the fate of the appeal and urged the Court to strike out the Appellant’s three issues for determination and consequently to strike out the appeal for being incompetent. Counsel relied on FRN. V. Anache & Ors; In Re:Olafosoye (2004) 1 SCM 36 @ 62; Mbachu V. Anambra – Imo River Basin Development Authority, Owerri (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 342) 1482 @ 1497.

Learned counsel to the Respondent submitted that the contention of the Respondent in its preliminary objection particulars of ground two number 1 – 4 are inconsequential as whosoever is reading same would arrive at the rightful conclusion/opinion that it is a question submitted for determination as such failure to put the question mark will not alter the intendment of the issues so submitted and urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objection. 
I have taken time to review the submissions of counsel to the parties on this ground of objection.  It does appear that the Appellant’s counsel did not consider this ground of objection of any adverse consequences on the competent of the appeal to be afforded any serious argument and thus made very little reference to it in one or two sentences in the Appellant’s reply brief, where he described it as inconsequential. 

However, the law is as aptly submitted by the Respondent’s counsel, and with which submission I am in complete agreement, that an issue for determination properly so called in an appeal is a question arising from one or more of the grounds of appeal which is on a vital point on the issues as joined between the parties in the appeal and which when decided one way or the other would affect the fate of the appeal, whether for good or for bad I may add. See FRN V. Anache & 3 Ors; In Re: Olafosoye (2004) 1 SCM 36 @ p. 62.
My lords. with the absence of any salient response by the Appellant’s counsel to the submissions of the Respondent’s counsel on the second ground of obejction, I take it as well settled and also conceeded to by the Appellant that an issue for determination in an appeal is as aptly defined or described by the Respondent’s counsel and shall be applied in my consideration of the competence or otherwise of the three issues as distilled by the Appellant’s counsel in this appeal. 
With the above uncontested position of the law borne in my mind, the only question to resolve in the second ground of preliminary objection is namely this: Are the three issues for determination as distilled by the Appellant’s counsel from the four grounds of appeal incompetent and thus rendered the appeal as merely amounting to an academic exercise? 

Th sole contention of the Respondent’s counsel would appear to be that the three issues for determination as distilled by the Appellant’s counsel are incompetent because they lack the question mark signs and which had thus rendered or made them mere “story telling” and the appeal a mere academic exercise. The Respondent’s counsel had sought in aid the decision in Mbachu V. Anambra – Imo Rivers Basin Development Authority, Owerri (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 342) 1482 @ p 1497, where Ogbuagu JSC, had stated inter alia thus: 
                      “All the other issues of the appellant, with respect, are most irrlevant to the crux of the instant appeal. They amount to “story telling” or academic exercise. Issues 1 and 2 have no question marks (?). Therfore, I ignore/discountenance them as non issues in all the circumstances of the case”

In that appeal, the Appellant had formulated six issues for determination. In his contribution to the leading judgment, Mohammed JSC, had observed thus: 
                       “Although six issues were distilled in the Appellant’s brief of argument from the grounds of appeal filed by the Appellant, all the issues were framed at large because only issue six really complained against the judgment of the Court of Appeal”
                    Now to some pertinent observations on the above lucid judgment of the Supreme Court. Firstly, it is to be noted that the said appeal was heard and determined on the merit by the Supreme Court. Secondly, and most importantly in my view, out of the six issues for determination only issue six carried a question mark (?) as can be seen in the law report. Yet, His lordsip, Ogbuagu JSC, who delivered the leading judgment still considered issues three and five and found them, not imcompetent but, grossly misconceived when he stated thus: 
                                    “Now coming to the crux of this matter, the appellant contends that the Respondent was in breach of its contract of employment with him. With respect, this contention and all the arguments proferred in respect thereof under issues nos. 3 and 5 of the Appellant’s brief are grossly misconceived”

                    My lords the above view of their eminent lordships of the Supreme Court in that appeal, that all the other five issues for determination save isssue six were either framed at large or grossly misconceived, does not in my humble understanding give rise to the construction or interpretation being canvassed by the Respondent in the instant appeal to mean that any issue for determination which does not carry the question mark (?) is incompetent. Indeed, in that appeal issues three and five which did not carry any question marks were still considered by His lordship, Ogbuagu JSC, and found to be grossly misconceived, while Mohammed JSC, considered issues one – five, which did not not carry any question marks, to have been framed at large. I am therefore, unable to see or indeed fathom the rationale behind the Respondent’s vehement contention that in law an issue for determination merely found to be either grossly misconceived or framed at large is tantamount to being found incompetent. 

                    It has long been a pervasive though very indolent, with due respect, practice for counsel to rely on judgments of the courts out of context to suit their fancies and arguments without taking time to read through the entire judgment with a view to clearly understanding its purport and decisions reached therein. In my thinking, and I believe I am right, it is such hollow appreciation of the illuminating judgments of their Lordships in that appeal that had led to the second ground for the preliminary objection challenging the competence of this appeal. 
                    In my view, therefore, there can be nothing more farther from the truth than to contend as did the Respondent’s counsel in this appeal that the three issues as distilled by the Appellant’s counsel, though with due respect very clumsy in my view, amounted to mere “story telling” and an academic exercise. I do not think so and in my view they are neither mere story telling, academic exercise nor framed at large to be considered on their merit. I cannot however, at this stage in this judgment without considering these issues for whatever they may be worth on the merit, decide if they are grossly misconceived or not. 

In whatever way, they are looked at, these three issues as distilled by the Appelant’s counsel are competent. In my finding and I so hold they are based on the crux of the matter between the parties in this appeal and flowing from the four grounds of appeal filed by the Apellant against the judgment of the court below.  It is in this sense only that I am now minded to take a second critical look at the attitude of Appellant’s counsel when he with a mere wave of the hand discountenanced the second ground of the preliminary objection as being inconsequential and concisely submitted in the Appellant’s reply brief thus:

       “Whoever is reading same would arrive at the rightful conclusion/opinion that it is a question submitted for determination, as such the failure to put the question mark will not alter the intendment of the issues so submitted”

                    I agree, though I thought I should hasten to point it out at once that it  is desirable that an issue for determination should carry a question mark.             

                    At any rate, and more importantly, the issue of question mark as raised by the Appellant in this appeal for the settled purposes of terminating as it were in limine the entire appeal is, to say the least and with due respect, taking the issue of technicality too far in our jurisprudence. I consider the lack of question mark, an omission solely by Appellant’s counsel and not by the Appellant, the litigant, as at most a mere human or typographical error which had in no way, misled the Respondent, as it was also not so argued. Interestingly, the Respondent’s counsel had, in the alternative to the Appellant’s counsel three issues for determination, distilled his own very apt three issues for determination, which I had already adopted and set down as the three issues for determination in this appeal. This issue as raised by the Respondent’s counsel therefore, in my view is not and cannot be an issue of competence or jurisdiction as could affect the competence of an appeal form being heard on the merit. It is akin to taking the issue of competence and jurisdiction a bit too far and reducing it, as it appears, to such a triffling level. 

                    A court of law, I must hasten to observe, does not concern itself with triffles but with substance and justice of the case which are weightier matters. The long accepted attitude of the courts is as enscapulated in the old age Latin Maxim: “de minimis non curat lex”, meaning the court does not concern itself with triffles. Indeed and assuredly, at all times and in all cases, it is the bourden duty of the courts to do, prefer and administer substantial justice over and far above mere technicality. See Nneji & Ors V. Chukwu & Ors (1988) NWLR (Pt. 81) 84. See also National Employers Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd V. Vehay (1973) 1 All NLR 170; Dr Okonjo V. Mudiaga Odje & Ors (1985) 10 SC 267; Afolabi V. Adekunle (1983) 8 SC 98; Onyema Oke & Ors V. Amos Eke & Ors (1982) 12 SC 218; Obadiaru V. Uyigue & Anor (1986) 3 SC 39; Nofia Surakatu V. Nigerian Housing Development Society Ltd. (1981) 4 SWC 26; Ojora V. Odunsi (1964) NMLR 12; Ojikutu V. Odeli (1954) 14 WACA 640; Jeric Nigeria Ltd. V. Union Bank of Nig. Plc (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 691) 477; Adegbuyi V. APC & Ors. (2013) LPELR  22799(CA). 
                    In Nneji & Ors v. Chukwu & Ors (supra), Wali JSC, had captured succinctly the real essence of rendering substantial justice at all time and in all cases thus: 

      “The attitude of this court has always been that whenever it is possible to determine a case on its merit, the court should not cling to mere legal technicalities to refuse a complainant (be it the Appellant or the Respondent) the opportunity of being heard.......”
                    I therefore, consider the issue of lack of question marks on issues one, two and three  as distilled by the Appellant’s counsel in the instant appeal as amounting to no more than mere technicality, a term which was aptly defined so admirably in Nneji & Ors V. Chukwu & Ors (supra) by Oputa JSC, thus: 

                                  “ I will at any time and any where cast my lot for truth and justice than for mere forml objection .....What is a technicality? A technical error is one committed in the course of a trial but withou prejudice to a party. It is an error which is purely abstract and harmless for pratical purposes. ‘Technical’ relates to details rather than principle” 

                    My lords, need I say anything more on this issue as touching on the mere technicality of the second ground of the preliminary objection in this appeal? I think I dare not but simply to bow to the wisdom ingarined in the words above and so I bow! 
                    In the circumsatnces therefore, I hold that the second ground of preliminary objection lacks merit and is hereby overruled and consequently the Noitice of preliminary objection filed by the Respondent on 23/3/2016 is hereby dismissed. The coast now seems clear for me to proceed to consider the merit of this appeal and I so do anon!
 
JUDGMENT 
                    I had earlier in this judgment adopted and set down the three issues for determination as distilled by the Respondent’s counsel as the three issues for determination in this appeal. Let me now consider these three issues for determination. I shall consider them ad seriatim commencing with the first issue. 

ISSUE NO. 1
Whether or not the Appellant’s right to fair hearing could be determined when the Appellant failed to initiate his case within the 3 months period allowed by statute; Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004? 
Learned counsel to the Appellant submitted that the right to fair hearing is a constitutionally guaranteed right under Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and contended that the Constitution makes it a fundamental right as such our Courts are enjoined to uphold 

the principles of fair hearing, which right entails that Courts and administrative tribunals must not only give equal treatment and opportunity to all parties but must also hear both sides on all material issues in the case before reaching a decision which may be prejudicial to any party in the case.   Counsel relied on Ovunda V. Woko (2011) 17 NWLR (pt. 1277) SC 522 @ 555 – 6; Aiyetan V. Nifor (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) P. 48 @ 58; Garba V. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550, 603; Adigun V. A. G, Oyo State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) P. 678 @ 682.
Learned counsel to the Appellant submitted that litigation on Constitutional Provisions touching on fundamental rights cannot be statute barred and contended that any action or act which is contrary to the Provisions of the Constitution, can be challenged at any time and cannot be statute barred. Counsel relied on Obi Akejule V. Delta State Government (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1170) P. 29 @ 299.

Learned counsel to the Respondent submitted that where a statute provides for the commencement of an action within a given time or period no proceeding can be commenced after the period prescribed by the statute has elapsed and contended that any action instituted after the period is statute barred and the right of the Plaintiff/Appellant to commence the action is said to be extinguished by operation of  Law. Counsel relied on Osun state Government V. Dalami (Nig) Ltd (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1017) P. 74 C.A; A. C. B. Plc V. N. T. S. (Nig) Ltd (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt.853) P. 142 @ 158 -159; Globe Fishing Industries Ltd V. Coker (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 60) P. 265 @ 278 – 279; Obeya Memorial Hospital Ltd V. A. G. Federation (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) P. 325; Lawan Sanda V. Kukawa Local Government (1991) 3 SCNJ (Pt. 35) P.41.

                    Learned counsel to the Appellant is his reply brief submitted that litigation on Constitutional fundamental rights provisions cannot be statute barred. Counsel relied on Obi Ajekule V. Delta State Government (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1170) P. 292; Hassan V. Aliyu (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) P, 547 @ 622; A. G. Rivers V. A. G. Bayelsa (2013) 3 NWLR (PT. 1340) P. 123; Obeya Memorial Hospital Ltd V. A. G. FED. (1987) 3 NWLR (PT. 60) P. 325; Mobil Oil Plc V. D.E.N.R. Ltd (2004 1 NWLR (Pt. 853) P. 142 @ 158 – 159
                    In considering the first issue for determination, two pertinent questions must be answered namely; 

1.    At the stage the court below dismissed the Appellant’s suit was the right     to fair hearing between the Appellant and the Respondent in issue? 

2.    Does time run against allegation of breach of any of the funadmantal rights of the citizen, including the right to fair hearing as guaranteed under Section 36 of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended? 

                  On the first question, having calmly read through the record of appeal, particularly the pleadings, the submissions of counsel and the ruling of the court below, I am minded to agree with the Respondent’s counsel submission that the issue of the alleged breach of right to fair hearing of the Appellant by the Respondent was not an issue for determination in the preliminary objection challenging the competence of the Appellant’s suit and that the court below confined its consideration to only the issue whether or not the Appellant’s suit was statute barred.

                    The law is well settled that where there is a challenge to the competence of a suit, it touches on the jurisdiction of the court itself and must first be considered and determined one way or the other by the court. It follows therefore, unless and until the issue of jurisdiction is resolved the court would be acting in vain to proceed to consider the merit or otherwise of the suit as it can only do so if the issue of jurisdiction is resolved in favour of the Plaintiff’s suit. In this vein, the Respondent’s counsel was right on point when he contended, and quite rightly too in my view, that all the submissions of the Appellant’s counsel dealing with the alleged breach of the Appellant’s right to fair hearing by the Respondent, which is the subject matter of the Appellant’s suit which was terminated in limine before a hearing on the merit, are premature, irrelevant and grossly misconceived as they have no place in this appeal and I so hold.  The first question is therefore, answered in the negative against the Appellant.

                    Curiously however, it would appear that the Respondent’s counsel in  his haste and zeal to close the first issue for determination ended up not responding to the salient issue also canvassed by the Appellant’s counsel under the first issue as to whether in law time does run against an allegation of breach of the right to fair hearing. As uncontested as this salient issue has become in this appeal due to the absence of any submission to the contrary by the Respondent’s counsel, I feel duty bound in law as a court of law to still consider it on the merit. 
                    In the Appellant’s brief, reliance was placed on two decisions of the Supreme Court  namely; Aiyetan V. N.I.F.O.R (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 48 and Adigun V. AG. Oyo State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) 678 to contend that due to the fundamental nature of the right to fair hearing as guaranteed under Section 36 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 as amended, time does not run against an allegagtion of its breach such as the claim of the Appellant against the Respondent. On the other side of the scale there was, as I had earlier noted, no submissions of law on the part of the Respondent’s counsel.
                    Be that as it may, I have taken time to read through the law reports of these two decisions and regrettably, but with due respct to Appellant’s counsel, they did not make any such pronouncement of law as was canvassed by the Appellant’s counsel in this appeal. However, I bear in mind that the Appellant’s suit was initiated by means of a writ of summons and not by way of an originating application pursuant to the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 for the enforcement or securing of the Appellant’s right to fair hearing against the Respondent. 

                    An indepth research on this aspect of the law in the preparartion for the writing of this judgment revealed to me that the law is that whilst a claim for declaration touching on the right to fair  hearing initiated by way of a writ of summons is not strictu senso an application for the enforcement of fundamental right and thus not protected by the succinct provision of Order 3 of the Fundamantal Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, which came into force on 11/12/2009 to oust the operation of any statute of limitation, of which the Public Officers (Protection ) Act 2004 is one, See C. P. C. V. INEC & Ors. (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 493,  on the other hand an originating application made pursuant to the provisions of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 enjoys the protection afforded by the provisions of Order 3  thereof, which provision, for the purpose of  emphasis, is reproduced hereunder thus: 

              “An application for the Enforcement of fundamental right shall not be affected  by any statute of limitation whatsoever”  

    It is therefore, the law that whilst an application for the enforcement of the fundamental rights  of the citizen pursaunt to the provisions of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 is not affected by the operation of any statute of limitation, including the Public Officers (Protection ) Act 2004, it is not the same for a claim for declarations such as the Appellant suit initiated by means of a writ of summons which is not protected by the provision of Order 3 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 and thus affected by any relevant statute of limitation and where commenced outside the prescribed period of limitation would become statute barred in law. See Mallam Nasir Ahmed El – Rufai V. Senate of the National Assembly & Ors  ( 2014) LPELR 423115 (CA), where Adumein JCA, had stated succinctly thus: 
    “It is therefore, clear that an action for the enforcement of a person’s fundamental right cannot be defeated by the provisions of a statute of limitation”
In the circumstances therefore, I have no difficulty resolving the first issue for determination in the negative against the Appellant and hold firmly that the isue of fair hearing was not at the stage in which the Appellant’s suit was dismissed by the court below an issue properly arising for determination and further that the Appellant’s suit initiated by writ of summons claiming declarations and orders against the Respondent is not an application for the enforcement of the Appellant’s right to fair hearing pursaunt to the provisions of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 and thus not protected by the provision of Order 3 of the said Rules 2009 which oust the operation of any statute of limitation.          

ISSUE NO. 2
Whether the trial Court was right to have dismissed the Appellant suit by holding that it is statute – barred?
In my understanding of the facts and circumstances of this appeal, this issue is the real crux of the matter as it deals with the most pertinent question in this appeal on whether on the pleadings and circumstances of the Appellant’s suit against the Respondent was the suit statute barred  by virtue of the operation of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act LFN 2004? 

Learned counsel to the Appellant had submitted that where the words used in statute are clear and not ambigious effect should be given to them.  Counsel relied on Federal Government of Nigeria V. Zebra Energy Ltd (2002) All FWLR (Pt. 92) P. 1749 @ 1771; Momoh V. Okewale (1977) 6 SC 81 @ 88 – 89; NECO V. Tokode (2011) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1239) P. 45; Ibrahim V. JSC Kaduna (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 948) 334; A. G. F. V. Guardian Newspaper Ltd (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt. 618) 187 @ 264; Dangana V. Usman (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1349) 50 @ P. 93; Amadi V. INEC (2013) 4 NWLR (pt. 1345) 595 @ P. 633; Bronik Motors V. WEMA Bank (1983) 1 SCNLR 296.

Learned counsel to the Appellant further submitted that the Respondent is in contravention of the principles of “Nemo Judex In causa sua” being “a judge in its own case” and contended that it was both complainant and judge at the same time and as such cannot seek protection under the Public Officers (Protection) Act  in violation of a cardinal principle of the law.  Counsel relied on N. A. U.  V.  Nwafor (1999) 1 NWLR (pt. 585 P. 166 @ 144; NEC V. MTN (Nig) Com Ltd (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1086) P. 229 @ P. 263; Nigeria Army V. Yakubu (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) P. 1 @ 17; A. G. Rivers State V. A. G. Bayelsa State (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) P. 123 @ 148; Ikoho V. Effiong (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) P. 31 @ 37; Ibeto Cement Co. Ltd V. A. G. Federation (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1069) P. 470; Hassan V. aliyu (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223 P. 547 2 622.

Learned counsel for the Respondent had submitted that a legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right but a right limited by statute and contended that afer the expiration of the prescribed time in the statute, legal proceedings cannot be taken and thus any person having a right of action can no longer competently institute an action and once an action is statute – barred it affects the legal competence or jurisdiction of the Court.  Counsel relied on AG. Adamawa & Ors V. AG. Federation (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1428) 575 @ 550; Ibrahim V. JSC Kaduna State (1998) 12 SCNJ P. 228 @ 272; Lessee V. Real Estate Investment Co. Ltd (1930) 45 C.L.R. 22 @ 25; A. G. Bayelsa V. A. G. Rivers State (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 @ 148; Unijos V. Ikeguola (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 478 @ 493.

In reply on law, Senior learned counsel for the Appellant had submitted that the Respondent herein and indeed the trial lower Court confused the real import of the Public Officers Protection Act, because the intention of the Legislature in drafting the Act is manifestly clear act is clearly intended to protect Public Officers in the due discharge of their official duties.  However, the Respondent herein is importing the import and intent of the English Public Authorities Protection Act, 1803 which is essentially aimed at protecting public authorities just like the Respondent whereas the Nigerian Law is aimed at protecting Public Officers as individuals in the discharge of public duties.  Counsel relied on Momoh V. Okewale (1977) 6 SC 81 @ 88 – 89; NECO V. Tokode (2011) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1239 (P. 49.)

On the issues as joined between the parties in their pleadings and the submissions of their respective counsel before the court below, certain basic facts are of common grounds between the parties, namely; The original cause of action of the Appellant arose in 2010, there were concerted efforts by the Appellant to get the Respondent reconsider its decision against him between 2010 and 2013 and that on 8/3/2013 the Appellant’s concerted efforts yielded fruit as the Respondent by its letter of 8/3/2013 invited the Appellant to appear before its Advisory Committe on Students Discipline. 
The law is that facts on which the parties to a suit are agreed forms part of the established facts in this case between the parties and therefore, no longer forming part of the issues or facts in dispute to be proved at the trial. See Smurtiff Ltd. V. M. V. Gongola Hope (2002) 22 WRN 30. See also Honika Sawmill V. Hoff (1994) 2 SCNJ 86; Oshodi V. Enyifunmi (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 298; Unity Bank Plc. V. Denclag Ltd. & Anor (2012) LPELR 9729 (SC). 

It is for the above reason amongst several other reasons that in law pleadings is taken as notice of the case of one party to the other party and thus not only define the issues in dispute between the parties but also highlight matters on which the parties are in agreement, which need no longer be proved at the trial by either party. See Honika Sawmill V. Hoff (supra) @ p. 94. See also Balogun V. Egba Onikolobo Community Bank Nig. Ltd. (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1028) 584.

It is on the state of pleadings of the parties as to the issues of facts as agreed by the parties in the relationship between them that the court below had upon its consideration of the preliminary objection of the Reepondent as Defendant/Applicant challenging the competence of the Appellant’s suit as Plaintiff/Respondent came to the following findings inter alia thus:

            “Therefore, from the facts stated in the statement of claim and the endorsement on the writ of summons by this action is commenced, it is clear to me that the cause of action arose in 2010. The period between 2010 and 2014 when the Plaintifff instituted this action is the period he devoted to making efforts to get the Defendant release the witheld result. There is nothing that will stop the period of three months provided by Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 from running as soon as the cause of action arose, not even negotiations or concerted efforts to get the alleged wrong reverted. Consequently, this action is statute barred in view of the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. The objection of the Defendant is upheld and this suit is hereby dismissed.” 
See pages 166 – 167 of the record of appeal. 

Now, at page 70 of the record the Respondent as Defendant/Applicant in the preliminary  objection challenging the competence of the Appellant’s suit had correctly stated the position of the law to the effect that the operation of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 is not a blanket one in that it has some known exceptions to its application in law, including whether the cause of action was one of continuance of damage or injury, whether the Public Officer had acted outside the course of his official or statutory or constitutional duty, whether he had acted in bad faith, whether the cause of action was one for recovery of land or for breach of contract. Counsel had relied on AG. Rivers State V. AG. Bayelsa State (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 @ p. 148. 

Curiously, but with due respect, in the entire 15 page ruling of the court below not a single thought was given to this crucial aspect of the case raised by the Respondent itself as all that the court below considered were whether the Respondent was a Public Officer and whether the Appellant’s suit was statute barred in view of the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004? 

By Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act LFN 2004, it is provided thus: 

            “Where any action, prosecution or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any act done in pursaunce or execution of any act or law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglet or default in the execution of any such act, law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect: 

              (a): The action , prosecution or proceedings shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof”
My lords, to properly focus this most crucial issue in the determination of this appeal, it is my view that the following pertinent questions call for answers namely:

1.    Is the Respondent a “Public Officer” within the meaning of the words “Public Officers” in the contemplation of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act LFN 2004?
2.     Is the claim of the Appellant within or outside any of the exceptions to the operation of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004? 

    In the application of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, it has long been accepted as well settled law that there are two requisite conditions that must exist for its application to protect a public officer. These two conditions are namely; firstly, the person must be a “public officer”; secondly, the act complained of must be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of a law or public duty or authority. See CBN V. Okojie (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt. 882) 488.

     Both parties vehemently disagree on the existence or absence of these two conditions on the facts and circumstances of the instant appeal.
     On the first condition, the Appellant’s counsel had contended that the Respondent was not a “Pubic Officer” within the meaning of those words in the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 and thus not entitled to the protection afforded to public officers by that law. Reliance was placed on several decisions for this contention, including; Momoh v. Okewale (1977) 6 SC 81 @ pp. 88 – 89; Federal Government of Nigeria V. Zebra Energy Ltd. (2002) All FWLR (Pt. 92) 1749 @ p. 1771; N.E.C.O. V. Tokode (2011) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1239) 48.

    On the other hand, the Respondent’s counsel had contended that the Respondent is a public institution and thus within the meaning of the words “Public Officers” as used in the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 and thus entitled to the protection of three months limitation period as prescribed in Section 2 (a) of the said law, which protects both natural public officers and artificial or corporate public bodies. Reliance was placed on several decisions, including; Ibrahim V. Judicial Service Commission, Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584)1; AG. Rivers State V. AG. Bayelsa (supra); Lessee V. Real Estate Investment Co. Ltd. (1930) CLR 22 @ p. 25; Unijos V. Ikeguoala (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 478 @ p. 493; Other authorities to the same effect include; Adigun V. Ayinde & Ors (1993) 8 NWLR (pt. 313) 516 @ p. 53; Aiyetan V. N.I. F.O.R (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 59)48 @ p. 50; Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works & Anor V. Balogun (1975) NSCC 292.    

     My lords, it does appear to me that the resolution of the first issue, being purely an issue of law, would ultimately depend on a careful analysis of these decisions on both divide as relied upon by respective counsel to the parties in this appeal to decide which of these decsions represent the applicable current position of the law on the question whether or not the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act LFN 2004 protects both natural public officers and artificial or corporate public bodies or only natural public officers?
     Let me commence this discourse with the views of Dixon JJ, in Lessee V. Real Estate Invetsment Co. Ltd. (supra), which though a decision of the Australian Jurisdiction has received the vast approvals of our courts, where he explained the rational of including “artificial persons” within the meaning of the word “person” when used in a statute, thus: 

  “The times have passed for supposing that legislation would use the word ‘person’ only to signify a natural person in dealing with a class of businesses in which the utility of the proprietry company has long been made manifest. Indeed it may be said that in modern business and elsewhere few ‘persons’ remain natural”

    In Aiyetan V. N.I.F..O. R. (supra), Nnamani JSC (God bless his soul) had opined thus:   

         “The Court of Appeal accepted a proposition that the Public Officers (Protection) Law does not protect a public officer against his master; that it does not protect the Appellant against the Federal Government or its agencies on whose behalf the public officer was performing the duty. No authority was cited in support of this very wide proposition, for as the court rightly pointed out, IGP V. Olatunji 21 NLR 52, which held that protection is only available to a public officer who does the act in good faith in the execution of his public duties, was not of any assistance. The Public Officers (Protection) Act which is the same terms as the Bendel State law to which reference was earlier made is an Ordinance ‘to provide for the protection against actions of persons acting in execution of public duties’. I see nothing which would neccessitate the exclusion of the Federal Government or any of its agents from the application of the Act”

                   In Momoh V. Okewale (supra), Sir Udo Udoma JSC, had espounded the position of the law, and which had influenced several subsequent decisions of the Court of Appeal in same direction, when he stated thus:     
                  “It seems to have been overlooked that there is a vital difference between the titles of the two Acts. The Nigerian Act is entitled ‘Public Officers (Protection) Act’, whilst the English statute bears the title ‘Public Authorities (Protection) Act. The aims and objects and purposes of the two Acts are also different. The intention of the British Parliament in enacting the English Act was to protect Public Authorities engaged in the discharge of responsibilities imposed upon them by Parliament. The Nigerian law was aimed at protecting public officers as individuals in the discharge of public duties” 

In N.E.C.O V. Tokode (supra), Galadima JCA (as he then was) had added his voice to this issue thus: 
           “I have also read the case of Ibrahim V. JSC Kaduna State (supra)relied upon by the Appellant. The case of Momoh V.Okewale (supra) is based on the real import of the Act. The reliance on the latter decision on the meaning of ‘person’ in Section 3 of the Interpretation Act to include artificial person like the Appellant is not the point. The Act provides for ‘Public Officers’ not ‘Public Persons’. I agree with the Respondent that an artificial person does not by virtue of the Interpretation Act become an officer or public officer. The Public Officers (Protection) Act does not apply to the Appellant who is not a ‘Public Officer’. 

                  In Federal Republic of Nigeria & Ors V. Zebra Energy Ltd. (supra), Mohammed JSC, was of the view that: 
                   “The word ‘Public Officer’ or ‘any person’ as stipulated in Section 2 of the Public Officers (Protection) Law not only refer to natural persons in their personal names but they extend to public bodies, artificial persons or persons sued by their official names or titles”
                    I now come to the decision that had reviewed the pisition of the law, both past and present, before coming to the conclusion that the provisions of  the Public Officers (Protection) Act or law affords protection to both natural perons and artificial bodies. 

                    In Aliyu Ibrahim V. Judicial Service Commision (supra), Iguh JSC, who delivered the leading judgment, with which Onu JSC, Kutigi JSC (later CJN) and Wali JSC concurred but Ogundare JSC disssented, has taken time to espound the law thus:

                        “It is the observation of Udoma JSC in Momoh V. Okewale (supra) that learned counsel for the Appellant relied on in his submission that the decision in Okewale’s case is to the effect that the Public Officers (Protection) Act, which by the way is impari materia with the provisions of the Public Officers (Protection) Law 1963, was aimed at protecting only public officers who are human beings, that is to say natural persons and not otherwise. As I have already stated, I cannot accept that proposition of  law by learned counsel as well founded. This is so for the simple reason that the observation in issue is not the ratio decidendi in the case which will be regarded as binding until it is departed from. The 1st Respondent in that case was admittedly sued as a human being or a natural person and in his personal names. The question whether he was sued as an individual or natural person did not therefore, arise for decision or constituted an issue for consideration in that case nor was the issue infact canvassed by the parties. I think I ought to mention that it does appear clear that the chain of decided cases of the Court of Appeal in support of the Appellant’s contention invariably relied on the said observation of Udoma JSC in the Okewale’s case as a binding precedent as a resul of which it arrived at its decisions. I think, with respect, that the Court of Appeal was wrong in this exercise.................. I think I ought to say a word or two with regard to the decision of this court in Gamu Yare V. Alhaji Adamu Nunku (1995) 5 NWLR (Pt. 394) 129.  In my contribution to the leadimg judgment in that case, I did observe in  very general terms that the purpose of the Public Officers (Protection) Law is to protect public officers as individuals in the discharge of their public duties. That observation in the first place, was entirely an obiter as it relates to no issue argued before the court. I should however, make it clear that it was not my intention by the use of the words ‘ as individuals’ in that observation to limit the public officers covered under the law to natural persons only. In the case on hand, I did hold that the words Public Officers’ or ‘any person’ in public office as stipulated by Section 2 of the Publi Officers (Protection) Law 1963 not only refers to natural persons or persons sued in their personal names but that they extend to public bodies, artificial persons, institutions or persons sued by their official names or titles. ............... I have repeatedly stressed that all the Court of Appeal cases which established that the Public Officers (Protection) Law only applies to protect public officers as individuals or natural persons and not otherwise erroneously arrived at those decisions from the obiter dictum in Okewale’s case. That obiter dictum, by no means, forms any part of the ratio decidendi in the case. In my view, the set of cases of the Court of Appeal which purports to have applied the decision in the Okewale’s case were decided per incuriam and ought not be allowed to stand..........”

    Interestingly, Ogundare JSC who had written a dissenting opinion in the above case had remained consistent with his earlier position as JCA in both Alapiki V. Governor of Rivers State (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt. 211) 575 @ p. 598 and Utih V. Egorr (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 153) 771 to the effect that the Public Officers (Protection) Law does not extend to afford protection to artificial persons as it only protects individual public officers in the due discharge of their public duties relying on Momoh V. Okewale (supra).

     Also interesting is the view of Galadima JSC in AG. Rivers State V. AG. Bayelsa State (supra), who had earlier as JCA delivered the leading judgment in N.E.C.O V. Tokedo (supra) in which he held firmly that the Public Offcers (Protection) Law does not afford protection to artificial bodies but only protects individual public officers, when he now opined thus: 

 “However, I need to emphasize a point here. Prior to the decsion in Ibrahim V. JSC Kaduna State (supra), several decisions of our courts were in conflict on the exact categories of persons contemplated by the law for whom protection is afforded or accorded. It was in that case this court exhaustively reviewed the authorities on the point. .........This court held in that case that persons holding Government positions, such as Attorney General, Permanent Secretary or Inspector General of Police etc are Public Officers and are covered by the law. Several cases decided after the case of Ibrahim V. JSC Kaduna State (supra) have followed the same reasoning.”

Having taken the time to calmly read through the divergent and conflicting views in the several decisions of the courts on the issue whether the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 extends to affords any protection to artificial or corporate bodies as it does natural persons, the law is well settled that where there are conflicting decisions of the same court on an issue it is the decision which is latter in time that prevails. See Chief Nwako & Ors V. The Governor of Rivers State (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 104) 470 @ p. 481.
     In the light of the discourse above and the reasoning in the latter decision in Ibrahim V. JSC Kaduna State (supra), which reviewed all the extant decisions of the courts on the issue under consideration, I am of the firm view that the Respondent’s counsel was on point when he contended vehemently and quite rightly too that the Respondent being a public institution, a public corporate body, was within the contemplation of the meaning of the words “Public Officers” in Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 and is entitled in appropriate and deserving cases to the protection afforded to “Public Officers” in the said Act. See Ibrahim V. Judicial Service Commission, Kaduna State (supra. See also AG. Rivers State V. AG. Bayelsa (supra); Lessee V. Real Estate Investment Co. Ltd. (supra); Unijos V. Ikeguoala (supra); Adigun V. Ayinde & Ors (supra) @ p. 53; Aiyetan V. N.I. F.O.R (supra) @ p. 50; Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works & Anor V. Balogun (supra). 

    The second question is whether on the pleadings of the Appellant as Plaintiff, the Respondent has been shown to come within or under any of the exceptions to the operation of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 by the Appellant and thus not entitled to the protection afforded by Section 2 (a) of the said Act?  

    Looking calmly at the ruling of the court below, it does appear, with due respect, that it was fixated on the simple two issues as to when the writ of summons was filed and whether the Respondent is a public officer within the meaning of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 and did not bother to make any concerted effort at properly appreciating the well settled position of the law that the Public Officers (Protection) Act does not afford a blanket or absolute protection to Public Officers, natural or artificial without any  exceptions whatsoever. The Respondent’s counsel had in the argument in support of the preliminary objection before the court below made it so abundantly clear that there are well known and accepted exceptions to the operation of the said Act relying of AG. Rivers State V. AG. Bayelsa State (supra).     
Curiously, in the face of such clear submission by Respondent’ s counsel the court below failed to consider these exceptions and thus lost the unique opportunity of considering the totality of the issues submitted to it for determination by the parties. I am aware that this court, being an appellate court, is not so much concerned with whether or not a trial court such as the court below had reached its conclusion through a sound and correct or bad and wrong reasoning as all that this court is concerned with is whether the conclusion reached or finding arrived at was correct or wrong. The law is that once the conclusion reached or finding arrived at was correct, then it is immaterial and of no consequences that the reason adduced was wrong. In such circumstances, this court will not interfere. It is thus only when the misdirection in the reasoning had led the court below to reach wrong conclusion or arrived at perverse findings that this court will interfere to make proper findings on the printed record to render justice according to law to the parties which the trial court had failed to do. See Alhaji Ndayoko V. Alhaji Dantoro & Ors (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 @ p. 198. 

 The facts of every case are sacred and it is what guides the court in reaching its decision one way or the other between the parties. In law therefore, a proper appreciation of the respective cases of the parties is key and sine quo non to a proper resolution of the issues as joined and the dispute between the parties. 

The Appellant as Plaintiff had pleaded in his statment of claim inter alia thus: 

“21: The Plaintiff avers that based on the averments in paragraph 18, 19 and 20 above, the Defendant again invited the Plaintiff to appear before the Advisory Committee on Students Discipline and he dutifully appeared and made representations to the Committee. Copy of the Defendant’s letter dated 8/3/2013 is hereby attached and shall be relied upon at the trial of this suit.”

In response, the Respondent as Defendant had pleaded in its statement of defence inter alia thus: 
               “17: The Defendant admits paragraphs 20 and 21 of the claim and avers that the Senate with all relevant documents at its 172 regular meeting held on Thursday 28/3/2013 considered the Advisory Committee on Students Discipline in respect of admission fraud and re – affirm his earlier expulsion from the University...................”

Curiously, on this issue the Respondent’s counsel who had made it conspicously part of his arguments canvassed before the court below in support of the Respondent’s notice of preliminary objection had completely ignored it in this appeal and had thus not made even an iota of submisssion on this very salient but crucial issue as to whether the Appellant by his pleadings had alleged any act of bad faith and abuse of office against the Respondent to take his case against the Respondent out of the operation of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004?  On the other hand, there was surfeit of submissions by the Appellant’s counsel relying on several decided cases that on the pleadings of the Appellant as Plaintiff alleging grave violation of the right to fair hearing of the Appellant in bad faith and gross abuse of power, the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 was not available to protect the Respondent and thus did not avail the Respondent in the instant case. Appellant’s counsel had relied on Ibeto Cement Co.Ltd. V. AG. Federation (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1069) 470 @ pp. 499 – 501; Hassan V. Akilu (2010) 17  NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547 @ p. 622; AG. Rivers State V. AG. Bayelsa State ( 2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 @ p. 148.

In Ibeto Cement Co. Ltd. V.  AG. Federation (supra) the position of the law on malice and abuse of office as constituting some of the exceptions to the operation of the provisions of the Public Officers (Protection) Act was restated by Mary Peter Odili JCA (as he then was now JSC) thus:  
                      “Where malice is established on the part of a public officer in the exercise of the administrative powers conferred on him by law the protection afforded him by Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act would cease to avail him. The Public Officers (Protection) law is designed to protect the officer who acts in good faith and does not apply to acts done in abuse of office and with no semblance of legal justification. Thus the law will not apply if it is established that the Defendant had abused his position for the purpose of acting maliciously. In that he is not acting within the terms of the statutory or other legal authority. In such a state of facts he has abused his position for the purpose of doing wrong and the protection of the law would not avail him”

The onus is on the Appellant as Plaintiff to adduce evidence or facts to established bad faith, lack of semblance of legal justification to deprive the Respondent as Defendant from availing itself of the protection afforded by the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004. It follows therefore, that the presence of bonafide and the absence of malice or improper motive is without doubt an essential ingredients in the proper or lawful exercise of every lawful act as could afford such a public officer the protection of the provisions of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004.  See Egbe V. Alhaji (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 127) 546. See also Egbe V. Belgore (2004) 8 NWLR (Pt. 875)336; Nwankwere V. Adewunmi (1966) SCNLR 66; Offoboche V. Ogoja LG. (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 458; Lagos City Council V. Ogunbiyi (1969) 1 All NLR 197.   
The above clear position of the law was enunciated as far back as 1969 by the Supreme Court in the words of the indefatigable Ademola CJN (God bless his soul) in Lagos City Council V. Ogunbiyi (1969) 1 All NLR 297 @ p. 229, where his lordship had stated thus:
                       “Abuse of office and bad faith are factors that deprive a party who would otherwise have been entitled to the protection of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) law of such protection. The burden is on the Plaintiff to establish that the Defendant has abused his position or that he has acted with no semblance of legal justification. Evidence that he may have been over zealous in carrying out his duties or that he had acted in error of judgment or in honest excess of his responsibility, will not amount to bad faith or abuse of office. Abuse of office is the use of power to achieve ends other than those for which power was granted for example for personal gain to show undue favour to another or to wreck vegeance on an opponent”    

                    See also Hassan V. Akilu (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547 for the opinion of Adekeye JSC on this salient issue, thus:

            “A public officer can be sued outside the limitation period of three months, if at all times material to the commission of the act complained of, he was acting outside the colour or scope of his office or outside his statutory or constitutional duty.”

My lords, having reviewed the decisions of the courts on the effect of bad faith, malice and abuse of office on the protection afforded public officers by the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004, let me now consider the pleadings of the Appellant to see the allegations made against the Respondent and resolve the second question whether or not the Respondent’s action was tainted with any form or act of malice or bad faith or abuse of office as would render the operation of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 unavailable to the Respondent? 

By paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the Statement of claim and paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the Reply to Statement of Defence , it does appear to me that they raise elements of bad faith in that it is the case of the Appellant as Plaintiff that the Respondent acted against the right to fair hearing of the Appellant outside the due process of the law and had in haste purportedly expelled the Appellant and withheld the release of his final results even after  clearing him for graduation and sponsoring him for his Industrial Training programme at the American University of Nigeria. It is also the Appellant’s case that on 18/3/2013, the Respondent in recognition of the genuiness of his complaint had invited the Appellant to appear before the Advisory Committee on Students Discipline even after it had allegedly expelled him in 2008. 

The Respondent as Defendant expressly admitted paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the statement of claim while paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 thereof were merely generally denied as fradulent but without even any particulars of the alleged fraud against the Appellant. In my humble view, these averments raise grave issues of bad faith, malice and lack of due process in the alleged actions of the Respondent against the Appellant, which can only be duly inquired into and resolved on the merit after considering evidence of the parties at the trial. I hold the view, therefore, that to drive the Appellant from the judgment seat at the stage it was done by the court below, with respect, in such a lackadaisical manner as shown in the very shallow reasoning in the ruling appealed against is the enthronement of grave injustice against the Appellant, which cannot be allowed to stand, it having been promptly and most deservedly challenged by the Appellant in this appeal.

My lords,why if I may ask did the Respondent invite the Appellant vide its letter of 8/3/2013 to appear before the Advisory Committee of Students Discipline if its earlier avowed expulsion of the Appellant in 2008 followed due process and was  in good faith? The answer to this very crucial question can not be arrived at without a full hearing of evidence of the parties. This is where I am minded to agree with the submissions of the Appellant’s counsel that the court below, with greatest respect was in haste to terminate in limine the case of the Appellant and thereby fell into grave error. In law, the operation of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004, is not absolute but subject to some well defined and accepted exceptions, of which the pleadings of the Appellant has shown prima facie that his claim falls within the expected circumstances and therefore, ought to have been heard on the merit and these crucial issues resolved along with the proprietory or otherwise of the expulsion of the Appellant and the withholding of his fianl statement of results by the Respondent. See AG. Rivers State V. AG. Bayelsa (supra) @ p. 148; Ibeto Cement Co. Ltd V. AG. Federation (supra) @ pp. 499 – 501; Hassan V. Akilu (supra) @ P. 622; Egbe V. Belgore (supra); Nwakwere V. Adewunmi (supra); Offoboche V. Ogoja LG.(supra); Lagos City Council V. Ogunbiyi (supra); Egbe V. Alhaji (supra).      

It is my view therefore, that the stage the Court below terminated in limine the Appellant’ s suit on  the preliminary objection of the Respondent was gravely pre – mature and erroneous having not considered fully and duly all the issues properly submitted to it by the parties in the preliminary objection to resolve whether the Appellant’s case fell within or outside the exceptions to the operation of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004. The decision of the Court below was arrived at in error and thus perverse and cannot be allowed to stand as it is liable to be set aside. See Obajimi V. Adeobi (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1075)1. See also CSS Bookshop Ltd. V. The Regd. Trusteees of Muslim Community in Rivers State (2006) 4 SCM 310. 

Having come to the above inescapable conclusion, I hereby resolve issue two in the negative against the Respondent in favour of the Appellant.      

 ISSUE NO. 3
 Whether or not the period of negotiation will stop to prevent the period of limitation from running?

Learned counsel to the Appellant had submitted that other exceptions to limitation of action is where there has been a continuance of damage or a fresh cause of action arises from time to time and contended that in the case of continuance of damage or injury, the Act permits actions to be brought on the cessation thereof outside three months.  Counsel relied on Akijule V. Delta State Government  (supra) @ Pp. 307 – 308; A. G. Rivers State V. A. G. Bayelsa (Supra); Tolorunke V. Armti 1 (2009) FWLR (pt. 497) P. 152 @ 173; Ibeto Cement Co. Ltd V. A. G. Federation (supra).

Learned counsel to the Respondent had submitted that the period of negotiation by the parties will not stop or prevent the three months period of limitation from running.  Counsel relied on Inlaks Ltd V. Polish Ocean Times (1980 – 1986) 2 NSC @ 501; John Eboigbe V. the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (1994) 6 SCNR P. 71; Texaco Panama Incorporation V. shell Petroleum Development Corporation of Nig. Ltd (2002) 2 SC (Pt. 11).
In reply on law, learned counsel to the Appellant had submitted that the law that the period of negotiation or settlement process will not bar the time from running is not without qualification  and contended that where negotiation, as in the instant appeal, involved the admission of liability by the Respondent, it would stop the time from running from the date of the accrual of the original cause of action. Counsel relied on John Ebogbe V. NNPC (1994) NWLR (Pt. 347; Plateau State V. A. G. Federation (2006) all FWLR (Pt. 305) 590 @ 646. 

My lords, having resolved and held firmly that in the light of the pleadings of the Appellant alledging bad faith, irrationality and abuse of office against the Respondent in the discharge of its duty and had thus taken this case out of the immediate purview and operation of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004, at least until evidence is heard and clear findings of facts made by the court below on these allegations, I therefore, do not consider the third issue for determination as remaining a live issue any longer in this appeal since its determination one way or the other would not, in my view, be of any utilitarian value to the parties in this appeal.  It has thus become merely academic, nothing more nothing else! See Mbachu V. Anambra – Imo Rivers Basin Development Authority, Owerri (supra) @ p. 1497.
         

          Be that as it may, as the penultimate Court in the land, I intend to proceed to consider and resolve the third issue for determination albeit briefly to bring this  judgment to a final closure. 

                    Now, even on an issue as germane and open on the pleadings of the parties and in their submissions as to whether or not the claim of the Appellant is one of continuance of injury or damages and thus outside the operational scope of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004, the court below, with respect, made only a feeble attempt at considering this issues but without making any findings on it in its ruling. 

                    The law is and has always been that where there is an allegation of continuance of injury or damage on the pleadings of a Plaintiff, such as the Appellant in the instant case, and such an allegation is not effectively denied at the stage in which an objection to the competence of the suit is taken or where it made at the close of trial and sufficient evidence in support has been adduced, the Public Officers (Protection) Law or any other limitation law for that matter, is clearly not applicable to afford any protection to the Defendant who seeks to so do and such a suit is competent to be heard on the merit and not to be terminated in limine. See AG. Rivers State V. AG. Bayelsa (supra).

In the peculiar circumstances of the pleadings of the Appellant in the instant case, the salient question which was conspicously left unanswered by the court below is the nagging question whether by the Respondent’s letter of 18/3/2013, admitted to have been so written by the Respondent, the cause of action of the Appellant was revived or continuing as at that date and whether it was not affected by the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection ) Act 2004 by reason of this circumstances? 

      On this very crucial issue, let me first allow the court below to speak for itself in the way it considered it in its ruling, which with respect I find to be very feeble, thus:

              “He was apparently given this information in 2010 after he was cleared and fulfilled all the requirement for graduation which means he was not given his result and was not allowed to graduate in 2010 by the Defendant. Thus the alleged wrongful withholding of the statment of result of the Plaintiff by the Defendant is the cause of action......... The Defendant issued a memo to investigate the Plaintiff’s complaint. He was invited to appear before the Defendant’s Advisory Committee on Students’ Discipline. He appeared before the Committee in March 2013, but the Defendant did not communicate to him its decision. The Plaintiff waited for another seven months before he instructed his lawyers to write a demand letter to the Defendant to release his result. The Plaintiff’s lawyers wrote the letter on 28th October 2013, which the Defendant ignored again. He waited another nine months before filing this suit on 26th August 2014. Therefore, from the facts stated in the statemnt of claim and the endorsements on the writ of summons by this action was commenced (sic), it is clear to me that the cause of action arose in 2010. The period between 2010 to 2014 when the Plaintiff instituted this action is a period he devoted to making efforts to get the Defendant release the withheld result. There is nothing that will stop the period of three months provided by Section 2 (a) of POPA from running as soon as the cause of action arose, not even negotiatios or concerted efforts to get the alleged wrong reversed.”

Here again, I think the court below was in a grave error in the too wide a proposition of law it made that nothing can stop the three months limitation period in Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 from running. Regretably, that proposition is a completely wrong statement of the law on limitation of action by virtue of statute of limitation, including the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004. Indeed the protection afforded by limitation laws is not absolute. In law, there are some well defined and accepted exceptions to the operation of limitation statutes and which when properly invoked would legitimately stop the limitation period prescribed by the limitation law from running, contrary to the erroneous holding and finding of the court below. 
                  My lords, without attempting to make or set down any exhaustive list of all situations and circumstances that could stop the three months limitation period prescribed in Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004, either from running or completely render it devoid of any legal consequences are the following, namely;
1.    Cases of continuance of damage or injury.

2.    A Public Officer acting outside the colour of his Statutory or Constitutional duty.
3.    Cases of recovery of land.
4.    Breaches of contract.
5.    Claims for work done.
6.    Absence or lack of good faith.
 See AG. Rivers State V. AG. Bayelsa (supra) @ p. 148; Ibeto Cement Co. Ltd V. AG. Federation (supra) @ pp. 499 – 501; Hassan V. Akilu (supra) @ p. 622; Egbe V. Belgore (supra); Nwakwere V. Adewunmi (supra); Offoboche V. Ogoja LG.(supra); Lagos City Council V. Ogunbiyi (supra); Egbe V. Alhaji (supra).      
There are in law yet other situations that could either stop the prescribed time from running or completely render the limitation law, including the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004,  irrelevant and inapplicable to defeat a claim, namely;
7.    Order 3 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 made pursuant to the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 by the Chief Justice of Nigeria for applications for the enforcement and securing the enforcement of the fundamantal rights of the Citizens. See El- Rufai V. Senate of the National Assembly & Ors (supra) @ p. 115

8.    Revival of cause of action by admission of liability by the Defendant during negotiation. See Egboigbe V. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649 @ p. 659. See also Lahan V. AG. Western Region of Nigeria (1976) WNLR 39; Nwadiaro V. Shell PDC (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 322.
It follows, therefore, that in law while it is true as stated by the court below that mere negotiations and concerted efforts alone cannot and does not operate as a bar to the operation of a statute of limitation, such as the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004, yet it was too wide a generalized proposition of law by the court below that nothing can stop the prescribed time from running. In law, an admission of liability during negotiations revives the cause of action and the Defendant who made such an admission would not be allowed to resile from it to contend that the action had become statute barred during the period of negotiation in which he made an admission of liability.  See Egboigbe V. NNPC (supra) @ p. 659 per Adio JSC.
Having stated the above as the correct statement of the law, how does it apply to the case under consideration?  Both parties are agreed that after the initial issue of expulsion of the Appellant by the Respondent was made known to the Appellant in 2010, his cause of action arose in 2010. However, due to the Appellant’s consistent appeals the Respondent, despite its earlier stand that the Appellant had been expelled since 2008 from the insitution, wrote a letter dated 8/3/2013 inviting the Appellant to appear before the Advisory Committe on Students Discipline.

By this letter, it does appear to me that the issue of Appellant’s expulsion was reopened and the Respondent had agreed to set in motion another process of investigating the allegations against the Appellant with a view to taking decision one way or the other. In law, what else can such a letter amount to? In my finding it amounted to nothing than that it revived the cause of action of the Appellant and brought it forward to 8/3/2013. In the face of the said letter of 8/3/2013, I am at pains to see how the Court below still arrived at the finding that the Appellant’s cause of action arose and remianed permanently in 2010. In my view therefore, that conclusion by the Court below, with respect, was in grave error and cannot be allowed to stand but must be set aside. I so set it aside. In my finding therefore, the cause of action having been revived by the letter of 8/3/2013 became alive as at 8/3/2013 and no longer in 2010 as erroneosuly held by the Court below. 

I had already held that the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 was, on the allegations of the Appellant, not available to protect the Respondent at the stage the court below gave its decision even before evidence of the alleged bad faith, malice and abuse of office was led by the Appellant against the Respondent. It follows therefore, that whether the Appellant’s suit filed on 26th August 2014 was statute barred when calculated from 8/3/2013 is neither here nor there as it is now merely academic having already held firmly that the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 was not immediately available to the Respondent on the clear pleadings of the Appellant unless and until evdience is led and a clear decision reached by the court below on the allegations of the Appellant against the Respondent bordering on bad faith, malice and abuse of office.

Consequently, the third issue is hereby resolved in the negative against the Appellant in favour of the Respondent.  Be that as it may, if the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 were to be applicable the Appellant whose cause of action was revived on 8/3/2013 would still have had upto but not exceeding 8/6/2013 to file his claims against the Respondent within the three months as prescribed by Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) 2004 contrary to the 26/8/2014 when it was filed, clearly 14 months outside the prescribed three months and would had been rendered statute barred and thus incompetent.  

However, in so far as I have already held that the Public Officers(Protection) Act 2004 does not avail the Respondent at the stage of the case in which it was raised by the Respondent and decided upon by the Court below in limine before full hearing on the face of the grave allegations of  bad faith, malice and abuse of office against the Respondent by the Appellant, I hold that the appeal has merit and perforce succeeds and it is hereby allowed.

In the result, the decision of the Federal High Court Yola Division contained in its ruling delivered on 25/5/2015 in Suit No. FHC/YL/CS/4/2014:  Ijander Isaac Samuel Yarai V. Modibbo Adama University of Technology Yola dismissing the Appellant’s suit is hereby set aside.

In its stead, an order is hereby made remitting this case to the Honourable Chief Judge of the Federal High Court of Nigeria for same to be reassigned to any judge of the said court other than B. B. Aliyu J, for expeditious and accelerated hearing and determination of the Appellant’s suit according to law.   

 
I make no order as to cost. 

JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.
I had the benefit of reading in draft the erudite Judgment just rendered by my learned brother, Georgewill, J.C.A. I am in total agreement with his reasoning and conclusion on the issues arising in the Appeal which has been exhaustively thrashed out, and so there is not much to add. 
The suit of the Appellant was terminated in limine upon the hearing and determination of a preliminary objection argued before it by the parties. The Respondent had claimed that the suit was statute-barred having been filed more than three months after the cause of action arose in 2010. Without a proper consideration of all the salient issues raised in the preliminary objection, more particularly whether the action fell within one or more of the exceptions to the Act, i.e. whether the public officer acted outside the colour or scope of his office; or whether he acted outside the scope of his statutory or constitutional duty; the lower Court capitulated to the application and with undue haste, terminated the proceedings. 
Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act provides:

2. Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any act or Law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect – 

a) the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or on the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.”
The effect of the Act is that it makes an action unenforceable if an action against the public officer is not taken within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of; or in the case of continuous damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof. Failure to seek redress by commencing an action within three months renders his action unenforceable. See Okeke V Baba (000) 3 NWLR (Pt. 650) 644; Ogoja L.G. V Offoboche (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 458) 48; Olasebikan V Williams (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 449) 437; & Egbe V Adefarasin (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 549.

A statute of limitation such as this, removes the right of action, right of enforcement and the right to judicial relief of a plaintiff, and leaves him with a bare and empty cause of action which he cannot enforce in court if such an action is filed outside the three month statutory period allowed by the Act. Where however there has been a continuance of injury or damage, a fresh cause of action arises from time to time, as often as the damage or injury is caused. For the purpose of instituting an action in court, time begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues. See Ekeocha V Customs, Immigration & Prisons Services Board (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 392) 1976; N.N.P.C V Iorshase (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 403) 1299; Eboigbe V N.N.P.C (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649; Sanda V Kukawa (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) 379; INEC V Ogbadibo LG (2015) LPELR-SC.309/2014, 1 at 29-30; Aremo V Adekanye (2004) ALL FWLR (Pt. 224) 2113 at 2132; & Battishee V Reed (1856) 18 CB.69C at 714.

Thus, limitation of action is the principle of law requiring the plaintiff, as a matter of obligation, to seek prompt remedy for the breach of his right in a court of law within the time limited by law; otherwise his right of action becomes unenforceable at the expiration of the period allowed for commencing an action by the law. Indeed from the opening sentence in Section 2 of the Act, it is not in doubt that it was intended to protect such officers from proceedings commenced against them “for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act, Law or of any public duty ... or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act...” What this means is that such officers will not be protected by the Act where, for example, the act complained of was done outside the scope of the public officer’s duty or authority. Such officers cannot equally invoke the provision in defence of their acts which were actuated by malice or dictated by bad faith or improper motive. These are parameters for the application or invocation of the statutory defence under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act set down by courts in their interpretative jurisdiction. See: Bakare V Nigerian Railway Corporation (2007) 7 SCNJ 131; UBRD V Alka (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 537) 328; Ekemode V Alausa (1961) 1 ALL NLR 135;  Adedire V Ife Divisional Council (1963) 1 ALL NLR 39; Nwankwere V Adewunmi (1962) WNLR 298; & Ibadan District Council (1961) WNLR 67. 

Instead, the law is designed to protect the officer or person who acts in good faith and does not apply to acts done in abuse of office with no semblance of legal justification. The rationale for this is that statutory powers or authority vested on a person or an individual by law are not intended to be used to advance private individual cause, or that they be used maliciously either for abuse of power or to victimize perceived opponents. Therefore, I agree with the lead Judgment that no malicious act or an act done maliciously by a defendant who is a public officer enjoys the protection of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act. See Dukoke V IGP Nigeria Police Force (2011) LPELR-CA/PH/278/2007; Ibrahim V JSC Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1.

From the preamble of the Act, it is necessary is “to provide protection against actions of persons acting in the execution of public duties.” Thus, where the public officer’s act is not reasonably connected with lawful exercise of his authority, the defence offered by the act would not avail him. The rationale for the necessity of such a law in the nature of a statute of limitation which extinguishes a person’s right of access to the court is that, long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; and that a defendant may have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim; and that a person with a good cause of action should pursue it with reasonable diligence. See Ekemode V Alausa (1961) ALL NLR 135; Ibrahim V Lawal (2015) LPELR-SC.99/2009, 1 at 35-39 per Okoro, JSC; & Ekeogu V Aliri (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 126) 345.

In order to determine the period of limitation, one therefore has to look at the writ of summons and the statement of claim to see when the wrong was committed which gave the plaintiff a cause of action, and comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. This in my view can be done without taking oral evidence from witnesses. If the time on the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute-barred. Yet again, for Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act to avail a party, it must be shown that the person against whom the action is commenced is a public officer and the act done by the person in respect of which the action is commenced must be an act done in pursuance or execution of any law or of any public duty or authority.   

The pith of the action before the lower Court is the application of the limitation of action in respect of the action brought by the Appellant against the Defendant for his expulsion from the Respondent University in 2010. He was informed of his expulsion in that year and, deciding to explore administrative avenues to seek redress, he appealed to the University for a review of the decision. In response to his appeals, the Respondent caved in and by a letter dated 08-03-13 it invited the Appellant to appear before the Advisory Committee on Students’ Discipline, thus reviving the cause of action. The Appellant in his Statement of claim further alleged that his expulsion was activated by bad faith, malice and without due process. That being the case, the lower Court was obliged to have looked into and made a pronouncement on these two issues raised in the Statement of claim in arriving at a decision as to whether or not the Public Officers Protection Act was available as a defence to the Respondent.

Consequently, for the statute of limitation to act as a bar to the claim of the Appellant, since the Advisory Committee was yet to finally decide on the fate of the Appellant, every contingent event that would ultimately give rise to the accrual of a cause of action in favour of the Respondent, was still inchoate; and having not matured, the statute of limitation cannot be invoked to bar the claim of the Appellant on the wrong presumption that the Appellant slept over his right and then woke up later only to press for a stale claim. Since the Council was yet to seal the fate of the Appellant, the cause of action was still in the process of maturation, and could only have matured in the year 2013 when the final action was taken with regard to the Appellant’s matter before the Advisory Committee. If, for instance, the said Committee had vacated the direction given in the letter of expulsion, the chain of events that would have culminated in the Appellant’s cause of action would have petered out. This is because that letter would then have become otiose. See Ekeogu V Aliri (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 179) 255; Egbe V Alhaji (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 128) 546; & Egbe V Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 549. 

Therefore, the lower Court was obliged to have taken these matters into consideration before coming to a decision on the issue of statute-bar. Having not done so, and instead simply confining its consideration of the issue to the date of expulsion in 2010 vis a vis the date the suit was filed (as disclosed in the Writ of summons and the Statement of claim), the invocation of the Limitation Act by the learned trial Judge was wrongly premised as it failed to address its mind to all the necessary parameters for the application of the Act. Therefore it is only proper that the suit be sent back for a proper consideration of all the issues raised in the preliminary objection.

It is for these reasons, and for the more detailed reasons ably set out in the lead Judgment, that I find merit in the Appeal. It succeeds and is allowed. I endorse the consequential orders made in the lead Judgment.