IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is a Cross-Appeal against parts of the decisions in the Ruling of the Federal High Court Yola dated 13th January, 2012 but delivered by His Lordship S. M. Shauibu, J. on the 20th day of January, 2012 in suit No:FH/YL/CS/50/2011, whereby he struck out the 1st Cross-Respondent's suit challenging the primary election and nomination of the Cross-Appellant as the Candidate of the 2nd Cross-Respondent for the 2012 Gubernatorial Election in Adamawa State; on grounds of non-compliance with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended); the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended); the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Constitution and Guidelines for Primary Elections of the 2nd Cross-Respondent. The 1st Cross-Respondent had sought for declaratory and injunctive Reliefs as encapsulated in his Statement of Claim on the Grounds articulated in Paragraph 47 thereof and upon being served and as earlier stated in the main Appeal, the Cross-Appellant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection to the competence of the suit and against the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain same amongst other grounds. See page 3 of the Cross Appellant's Brief particularly paragraph 1.05 and 1.06 where the issues formulated as arising from the preliminary objection and for determination of the lower court are reproduced.

At the hearing of the preliminary objection, the learned Counsel for the respective parties adopted their written Addresses and the learned trial Judge ruled on the 20th day of January, 2012, dismissing the Appellant/1st Cross-Respondent's suit on the grounds that the complaints of the 1st Cross-Respondent were not on the conduct of the party primaries but were on matters that occurred before the conduct of 

the said primaries and as such the complaints were not such as envisaged by the provisions of Section 87(9) and (10) of the Electoral Act, 2010.

The first grouse of the Cross-Appellant herein is that in spite of the fact that the Court below had rightly held as above, the learned trial Judge nevertheless overruled the Cross-Appellant on the contention of the Cross-Appellant that the 1st Cross-Respondent's complaints fell within the domestic and internal affairs of the 2nd Cross-Respondent (the Peoples Democratic Party). Secondly, the other grouse of the Cross-Appellant is that the 1st Cross-Respondent, did not first of all appeal to the 2nd Respondent's Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal panel as required by Article 22(g) - (h) of the Electoral Guidelines of the 2nd Cross-Respondent which he reproduced at page 4 of the Cross-Appellant's Brief of Argument and which copy of the Guidelines he had Exhibited as Exhibit PDP1 to the Affidavit in support of the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Notice of Preliminary Objection as can be found at pages 409 - 442 of the Record of Appeal.

Against this second aspect of the Cross-Appellant's objection, the Court ruled at page 849 of the Records as to whether the condition precedent for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction had been fulfilled since the 1st Cross-Respondent had not submitted his grievances to the said Appeal panel; that the condition precedent had been so fulfilled. Dissatisfied with the position taken by the learned trial Judge, the Cross-Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal dated 2nd March, 2012, on the same day through his learned Senior Counsel K. G. Agabi (CON), SAN. The Notice of Appeal with two Grounds is contained in pages 875 and 876 of the Record of proceedings. Upon transmission of the Records hereto, parties exchanged their respective Briefs of Argument and in the Brief settled by Ayo Akam, Esq. for the Appellant, two Issues have been raised as falling for determination couched in the following terms:-
"1. Whether the Court below was not in error when it held that the complaints of the 1st Cross Respondent do not fall within the domestic or internal affairs of the 2nd Cross-Respondent (Ground 2).

"2. Whether lodging complaints or grievances to 2nd Cross-Respondent's Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel was not a condition precedent for seeking redress in Court and if it was whether the Court below was not in error when it held that the 1st Cross-Respondent had no obligation to lodge his complaints or grievances to the Gubernatorial Electoral Panel of the 2nd Cross Respondent (Ground 1)".

On his part, the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st Cross Respondent Sylvester Imhanobe, Esq. in the 1st Cross-Respondent's Brief adopted the issues formulated by the learned Counsel for the Cross- Appellant.

ARGUMENTS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL ON THE ISSUES FORMULATED.
"1. WHETHER THE COURT BELOW WAS NOT IN ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE COMPLAINTS OF THE 1ST CROSS-RESPONDENT DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE DOMESTIC OR INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE 2ND CROSS-RESPONDENT (GROUND 2)."

In his argument on this first issue the learned counsel for the Cross-Appellant drew our attention to the history of intra party contests including the selection and nomination of candidates for public offices prior to the enactment of the Electoral Act, 2010 which were in law purely the domestic affairs of the political party and not for the Court's to decide. Abdulkadir v. Mamman (2003) NWLR (pt.834) at 30 C.A. per Oyedemi, JCA; Akpan v. Bob (2010) 17 NWLR (pt. 1223) 421 at 501; per Muhammad, JSC; were cited to submit that with the enactment of Section 87(10) of Electoral Act, there is a slight change that the Courts now have the jurisdiction to determine matters relating to breaches of the provisions of the Electoral Act and the Guidelines of political parties for primary elections where the breaches are shown to have been committed in the selection and nomination of a party's candidates for election.

In the view of learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant, the provision of Section 87(10) of the Act now draws a distinction between complaints which are still within the domestic and internal affairs of a political party, of which the Courts cannot interfere and complaints which are outside the domestic affairs of a party by virtue of their being acts upon which the jurisdiction of the Court can be invoked. Referring us to the claim of the 1st Respondent in paragraph 47(a-c) of his Statement of claim at page 15 of the Record of Appeal, it was further submitted that the Court in its Ruling found that the above complaints of the 1st Cross-Respondent were on matters not envisaged by the provisions of Section 87(10) and as such the Court lacked jurisdiction to interfere and determine the suit. He cited and reproduced the finding of the court at page 825 of the Records and highlighted each of the heads of the 1st Cross-Respondent's grouse in the lower Court that necessitated the institution of the suit thereat and which he analysed seriatim and concluded that all of those grievances are not allegations in the conduct of a primary election nor are they allegations that any of the provisions of the Constitution of the 2nd Cross-Respondent and the Guidelines for Primary Election, 2010; had been breached in the course of the conduct of the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Primary Election.

We were then urged to hold that the Court below was right when it held that the complaints of the Appellant were not matters envisaged by the provisions of Sections 87(9) and (10) but was in error to have held that the matters complained of are not within the domestic and internal affairs of the 2nd Cross-Respondent. This is because matters, for which no jurisdiction is conferred on the Court to adjudicate on, must certainly be matters which the law left exclusively to the political parties and we were further urged to so hold particularly if we take into consideration the decision of the learned trial Judge at pages 824-825 of the Records.

Finally on this point, the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant took the view that by the finding/decision of the learned trial Judge in the pages of the Record of proceedings above cited, it implies that a complaint not related to conduct of primaries for selection and nomination of a candidate of a political party, is not envisaged by Sections 87(9) and (10) and if the Court below so held, then it would have upheld the Cross-Appellant's submission that the subject matter was not such that the jurisdiction of the Court could be invoked, and secondly the contention of the Cross-Appellant that those complaints were on matters within the domestic affairs of the 2nd cross-Respondent of which the court below lacked the jurisdiction to interfere.

Reacting to the above submission the learned counsel for the 1st cross-Respondent, Mr Imhanobe conceded to the arguments of the learned counsel for the Cross-Appellant to the extent only of the position of the law prior to the enactment of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010; but argued on the contrary that the learned counsel for the Cross-Appellant erred when he contended that the enactment distinguished complaints which are still within the domestic affairs of the political party of which the courts cannot interfere and those envisaged by Section 87(10) which the Court's jurisdiction can be invoked.

Learned counsel for the 1st Cross-Respondent then adopted his argument in paragraphs 1.5 to 1.2 of the Appellant's Brief on the correct interpretation of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 which he also reproduced and in answer to the question raised by the Cross-Appellant in issue Number 1; submitted 

that the answer is contained in the portion of the wordings of Section 87(9) as underlined i.e. "any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party." He added that his complaint in the lower court as contained in the statement of claim is that the 2nd Cross-Respondent (Peoples Democratic party) is in breach of the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) and the party Guidelines in the process for the nomination of the Gubernatorial candidate of the party in Adamawa State in 2012 Gubernatorial Election. He maintained that the word "any" as used in Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, means "all".

Finally, on this issue, the learned counsel for the 1st Cross-Respondent contended on the distinction by the Appellant between complaints which are still within the domestic affairs of the Political parties of which the courts are stripped of jurisdiction and those which are outside the internal affairs of party, that the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant does not represent the correct position of the law. We were then urged to affirm the decision of the learned trial Judge on the issue and hold that the Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act has changed the law and that Courts have unfettered power to inquire whether a political party conducted its primary in full compliance with the Electoral Act, the Constitution of the Political Party and the Guidelines for the Primary Election of the Political Party.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NUMBER ONE (1)
I have carefully considered the submissions of Counsel on this Issue and am of the candid view that although prima facie it may appear that Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act does not dichotomize between acts or complaints on events that occurred before or during the election, because of the use of the words "any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party, what qualifies the words underlined by the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st Cross-Respondent is that the breach or non-compliance should be "in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election".
The word 'in' has been defined by the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (7th Edition) at pages 751 and 752 as "during a period of time" "involved in something", "taking part in something" and so on. From the definition of the word "in" above and as used in the Section of the Electoral Act now the subject of interpretation the only distinction or qualifying factor is participation by the aspirant and it seems to me that where an aspirant contested a primary election, whether he complains of pre-acts of non-compliance or inactions of the political party during the election which resulted in breaches of the Electoral Act or the Constitution of the political party and its Guidelines for primary election; he is qualified to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act.

For purposes of emphasis, let me once more cite the case of NDIC v. Okem Enterprises (2004) 10 NWLR (pt. 880) 107 at 182 para. H; where the word 'notwithstanding' as used in Section 87(9) was judicially defined by Uwaifo, JSC; while interpreting the provisions of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution that deals with the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as connoting thus:

"When the term 'notwithstanding' is used in a section of a statute, it is meant to exclude an impinging or impeding effect of any other provision of the statute or other subordinate legislation so that the said section may fulfill itself. It follows that as used in Section 251(1) of the Constitution, no provision of that Constitution shall be capable of undermining the said section."
Again, in the most recent decision of the Supreme Court on intra party squabbles particularly on nomination or selection of a party's candidate for elections into public offices, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC reiterated what he said in Hope Uzodinma v. Senator O. Izunaso (2011) Vol. 5 (pt. 1) MJSC p.11; (No.2) (2011) 17 NWLR (pt.1275) 30; when he interpreted Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, thus:-

"A person who was not a candidate/aspirant at the primaries cannot come to the Court to complain about the conduct of the primaries. See Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) Vol.1 14 NSCC P. 494; (1983) 2 SCNLR 244; Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt.843) P. 310; PDP v. T. Sylva & 2 Ors. (2012) 13 NWLR (pt.1316) 85.

But where the political party conducts its primaries and a dissatisfied contestant of the said primaries complains about the conduct of the primaries, the Courts have jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act to examine if the primaries were conducted in accordance with the Electoral Act, the Constitution and the Guidelines of the Party. The reason is simple. The Courts will not allow a political party to act arbitrarily or as it likes. A political Party must obey its own Constitution. See Emeka v. Okadigbo (2012) 18 NWLR (pt. 1331) 55 at 88 paras. F - G.
At page 90 of the Report para. G. His Lordship reiterated that "The emergence of the 1st Respondent as the PDP Candidate for the Senatorial Elections cannot be questioned by the Appellant, since he never contested the primaries from which the 1st Respondent emerged."

From the above decisions it is clear that what determines the locus standi of a person to challenge the breach of the Electoral Act, the party's Constitution and the Guidelines of a political party as in this case, is his/her participation as a candidate or contestant in the primary election. Again from the word 'in' as used by Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act 2010; it would appear that the subject matter of the complaint must be the breach of the Constitution of the party and the Electoral Guidelines at the time of the contest not prior or before such Primary Election was conducted. The analogy drawn by the learned Counsel on the distinction between events that occurred before the primary of which the Court would have no jurisdiction is accordingly true for the purpose of this case since from the pleadings of the Cross-Respondent all his complaints were based on discriminatory membership revalidation in which his supporters were excluded, refusal of the 2nd Cross-Respondent to sell Delegates Nomination Forms to them which denied them the opportunity to be elected Ad-Hoc Delegates at the primaries of 24th October, 2011 and lack of valid Notice to the 1st Cross-Respondent or to his supporters and Campaign Organisation on the date of Ward Congress of the 21st day of October, 2011; which are all events not connected with the 2nd Cross-Respondent primary election held on the 24th of October, 2011 for the selection/nomination of her candidate for 2012 General Election.

Thus, the Court below rightly divested itself of the jurisdiction to entertain the Cross-Appellant's suit. However, if Appellant had participated in/contested the primary election the Court would have assumed jurisdiction to hear the complaints of the Appellant and/or determine the matter on the merit, if at all. The submission by learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant therefore, that matters for which the Courts have no jurisdiction are vested exclusively on the political parties to determine, is unassailable and right because as the complaints in this case that warranted the institution of this action now on Appeal are matters not within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Appellant had the discretion to approach the party for redress. This is because to a large extent the jurisdiction of the Courts as donated by Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act for aspirant to challenge their political party elections is limited to intra party matters/or disputes like the one at hand which emanated from the primary election of the 2nd Cross-Appellant to select or nominate the party's candidate for the Governorship Election of 2012.
See again Emeka v. Okadigbo (supra) per Adekeye, JSC at 106 paras. D - F and H to page 107 para. A; who remarked on this vexed issue that: "The position still remains intact that the issue of nomination or sponsorship of an election candidate is within the domestic affairs of the political parties and the Courts have no jurisdiction to nominate for a political party its candidate for any election Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244; Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt.842) P.310. The Court however is duty bound to interpret the law as made by the legislature so as to determine whether or not in the exercise of its rights of sponsorship or nomination the political party has complied with the relevant provisions of the law laid down for the conduct of the primaries in the present dispensation under the Electoral Act, 2010 as amended". The emeritus Law Lord then went on to reproduce the provisions of Section 87(1) and (9) of the Electoral Act and added that: "The Courts both the Federal High Court or State High Court and in the Appeal to the Court, are competent to determine whether the relevant provisions of the party Constitution and electoral guidelines have been followed in the choice of the candidate."

From the foregoing dictum of His Lordship, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the Courts to pry into the internal affairs of the 2nd Respondent is limited and circumscribed by the provision of Section 87(1), (4) (b)(ii) and (9) of the Election Act, 2010, in the case of Governorship primary elections of the party. This point is buttressed by the dictum of Fabiyi, JSC at page 104 paras. F - G of the above cited case when he asserted:-
"The Court is however vested with limited and thin jurisdiction which can be ignited under the provision of Section 87(4)(b)(ii),(c) (ii) and (g) of the Electoral Act (as amended). The Section imbues the National Executive Committee of the party with the vires to organise and conduct the primaries. A candidate who took part in such a primary and is aggrieved can complain before the Court..." Going by the dicta of their Lordships in the Emeka v. Okadigbo's case, it would appear that the jurisdiction of Courts to question party primaries for the nomination of candidates to carry their flags at the General Elections into Public Offices is not at large in that the parties still have the prerogative or call it the exclusive jurisdiction in areas which have not been donated to the Court and aspirants by Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, to challenge the breach of the party Constitution and Guidelines; and accordingly resort must be had by aggrieved aspirants or candidates to the internal disputes resolution mechanism set up by the party Constitution and the Guidelines of the Political Parties as far as nomination or selection of candidates are concerned. See Lado v. CPC (2012) ALL FWLR at page 263 paras. G - H to 624 para. A; per Onnoghen, JSC also at page 627 paras. F - H, 638 paras. A - C; Emenike v. PDP (2012) 12 NWLR (pt. 1315) 556; Onuoha v. Okafor (supra) Okadigbo v. Emeka (2012) 11 NWLR (pt. 1311) 237; Uzodinma v. Izunaso (No.2) (2011) 17 NWLR (pt.1275) 30.

Also the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant was therefore on very sound pedestal to have argued that where the Court below had held at pages 851 to 852 of the Record, that for the Plaintiff/Appellant to successfully invoke the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010:
(a) the complaint must be in relation to the conduct of primaries for the selection or nomination of a candidate for an election by a political party;
(b) but that in the case at hand the complaints of Plaintiff/1st Cross-Respondent as could be seen in paragraph 47 of the Statement of claim, were complaints on matters that had arisen before the conduct of the primaries leading to the emergence of the 1st Defendant/Cross-Appellant as a candidate of the 2nd Cross-Respondent;
(c) and that the Court below having found that the jurisdiction of the court could not be invoked, pursuant to Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act; the implication is that complaints which are not in relation to conduct of primaries for the nomination of candidates for a political party, are not envisaged by Section 87(9). I therefore, totally agree with learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant that the Court below would have upheld (his) the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant's contention that those complaints were within the domestic affairs of the 2nd Cross-Respondent, which the court below had no competence to interfere.
The above notwithstanding, the holding by the learned trial Judge which is the subject of this issue has not occasioned any miscarriage of justice to the Cross-Appellant since the Court below still struck out the Plaintiff/1st Cross-Respondent's case for want of jurisdiction. This Ground of Appeal and the Issue arising there from is therefore academic and without any utilitarian value to the Cross-Appellant although it is hereby resolved in his favour.

ISSUE NUMBER 2 (TWO): "WHETHER LODGING COMPLAINTS OR GRIEVANCES TO CROSS-APPELLANTS' GUBERNATORIAL ELECTORAL APPEAL PANEL OF THE 2ND CROSS-RESPONDENT WAS NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR SEEKING REDRESS IN COURT AND IF IT WAS WHETHER THE COURT BELOW WAS NOT IN ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE 1ST CROSS-RESPONDENT HAD NO OBLIGATION TO LODGE HIS COMPLAINTS OR GRIEVANCES TO THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTORAL APPEAL PANEL OF THE 2ND CROSS-RESPONDENT.

Arguing this issue, the learned counsel for the Cross-Appellant drew our attention to two of the Grounds of the Notice of preliminary objection before the lower Court which amongst others were:-
"1. That the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action in that the Plaintiff (now 1st Cross-Respondent) failed to comply with the provisions of the Constitution of the Peoples Party 2009 (as amended) and the Electoral Guidelines for primary Elections, 2010 for the resolution of party dispute arising from primary elections.
"2. A condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction has not been fulfilled in that the Plaintiff did not lodge any appeal against the election and nomination of the 1st Defendant to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel of the 2nd Defendant."

The learned Counsel also reproduced the issues formulated in the lower Court for determination of the preliminary objection which were that:-
"1. This Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action in that the Plaintiff failed to comply with the provisions of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party 2009 (as amended) and the Electoral Guidelines for primary Elections 2010 for the resolution of party dispute arising from primary election.
"2. A condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction has not been fulfilled in that the plaintiff did not lodge any appeal against the election and nomination of the 1st Defendant to the Gubernatorial Appeal Panel of the 2nd Defendant."

The learned Counsel referred us to Article 22(g)-(h) of the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Constitution and submitted that as part of the primary election process for the selection or nomination of the 2nd Respondent's candidate for the Governorship election in Adamawa State, it was required under Article 22(g-h) of the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Electoral Guidelines for Primary Election, 2010, that an aggrieved aspirant should lodge an appeal to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel-a body set up by the 2nd Cross-Respondent to look into complaints of Governorship aspirants on the conduct of Governorship Primary Election. The Guidelines according to learned Counsel is found in Exhibit PDP 1 at page 409 - 442 of the Records.

It was his contention that the 1st Cross-Respondent ought to have lodged his complaints or grievances with the Gubernatorial Appeal Panel before proceeding to Court which he did not do but the Court below held that the 1st Cross-Respondent had no obligation so to do (page 849 of the Records refers). On the import of the provisions of Article 22(e)-(h) of Guidelines, the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant argued that the above Article provides party members opportunity to first exhaust the internal remedy before recourse is had to Court and do not in any way prevent or bar an aspirant from seeking redress in the Court if he is dissatisfied with the decision of the Appeal panel.

Citing the cases of UNILORIN v. Oluwadare 27 NSCQR 18 at 44 paras. F - G (SC); Owoseni v. Faloye (2005) ALL FWLR (pt. 284) 220 at 224 (S.C), Orakul Resources Ltd. v. NCC (2007) 16 NWLR (pt.1060) 270 at 302 and Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR (pt. 341) 348; the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant contended that the 1st Cross-Respondent ought to have exhausted the internal dispute resolution machinery before having recourse to Court and in not so doing 'jumped the gun' when he rushed to Court without exhausting that machinery for redress available to him within the domestic forum and the Court below ought to have so held that the 1st Cross-Respondent jumped the gun. In the same vein, the learned Counsel took the view that the Court below ought to have declared the Cross-Respondent's suit bad for incompetence and that the failure to fulfill a condition precedent to the initiation of the action was fatal to the action as it robbed the Court of the jurisdiction to entertain the action.

The learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant went on to argue on the essence of primary election and the fact that the hearing of an Appeal by the Electoral Appeal Panel terminates the election or nomination process unless one of the aspirants concedes to the decision based on the counting of votes cast by the delegates at the primary election. He therefore insisted that it was obligatory to first of all lodge an appeal with the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal panel of the 2nd Respondent before seeking redress in the Court. Again, in his view, the hearing of an appeal for an Aspirant by the Electoral Appeal Panel under Article 22(g) and (h) relates to the nomination of a party candidate and where the panel fails or refuses to entertain an appeal lodged by an Aspirant under the above Article, such a refusal would be considered non-compliance with the provisions of the Guidelines.

Mr. Akam was of the further view that if we agree with the above position, then the 1st Cross-Respondent was bound to comply with the provisions of the above Articles of the Guidelines just as the 2nd Cross-Respondent would be expected to hear appeals lodged by Aspirants to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel, and the Aspirants are expected to first lodge Appeals with the panel where not satisfied with results of primary election after counting the votes. He submitted further that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands and as such the 1st Cross-Respondent had a duty to show that he had exhausted all internal remedies available to him before approaching the Court and having failed so to do, he could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act more so as the Act does not provide that an aggrieved person should not first exhaust the internal remedy available to him before seeking redress in the Court.

On the phrase, "Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act or rules of political party" as employed by the law makers in Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, he submitted that it only operates against provisions in the Act or rules which oust the jurisdiction of the Court from entertaining actions instituted by aggrieved Aspirants which is not the case in the circumstance for according to him, nowhere is it provided by the Act that an aspirant shall not approach the Court if not satisfied with the decision of the Gubernatorial Appeal Panel. Citing again Chinwo v. Owhonda (2008) 3 NWLR (pt. 1074) 341 at 351 paras. C - H (CA); he maintained that as a member of a political party, the 1st Cross-Respondent was bound by the provisions of Articles 22 (g) and (h) of the Guidelines.

Accordingly, we were finally urged to set aside parts of the decision or Ruling of the Court below dated 13th January, 2012 but delivered on the 20th January, 2012, wherein the learned trial Judge held that 
complaints of the 1st Cross-Respondent cannot be domestic or internal affairs of the 2nd Defendant and further that the 1st Cross-Respondent had no obligation to lodge his complaints or grievances with the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel of the 2nd Cross-Respondent. In conclusion, we were also urged to allow the Cross-Appeal and affirm the decision of the Court below declining jurisdiction in the matter on the two Grounds of Cross-Appeal.

Responding to the above arguments of the learned Counsel to the Cross-Appellant, Mr. Imhanobe for the 1st Cross-Respondent in his terse submission urged that the arguments of the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant on Article 22 (e) and (h) of the Guidelines for Primary Elections of the 2nd Cross-Respondent must fail because they fail to take cognizance of the fact that the provision of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act starts with the words "Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act or rules of a political party...." Apart from the foregoing, the learned Counsel for the Cross-Respondent argued that in the hierarchy of laws, the Guidelines are inferior to the Act and by the word "Notwithstanding" used in the Act, it subordinates the Guidelines to the Act.

For the above submission he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Appeal No.CA/YL/31/2011 - Peoples Democratic Party v. Senator Dahiru Gassol (unreported) judgment of this Court delivered on the 3th day of September, 2011; where the Court held that the consideration of a complaint of breach of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) or Guidelines on selection or nomination of a candidate for election by a Panel, Committee or other body established by the Rules or Guidelines of a political party, is invalid for hindering the right of access to Court by a citizen in view of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended).

The learned Counsel for the 1st Cross-Respondent concluded his submission on this Cross Appeal by dismissing all the cases cited by the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant as irrelevant to the main question arising from the issues in this Cross Appeal as every case must be treated on its own merit. He therefore took the view that the word "Notwithstanding...." in Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) renders the compliance with the 2nd Cross Respondent's Guidelines unnecessary. We were then urged to dismiss the Cross-Appeal and affirm the decision of the lower Court on the two Issues raised by the Cross-Appellant.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NUMBER 2 (TWO)
In the resolution of this Issue based on the submissions of learned Counsel on both sides of the divide, it is pertinent to recall that the crux of the Cross-Appellant's grouse on this Ground of Appeal and issue formulated there from is that the Court below had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit because the grouse of the 1st Cross-Respondent in the lower Court as can be gleaned from paragraph 47 (c-d) was within the exclusive domain of the political party and that the 1st Cross-Respondent ought to have exhausted all the internal mechanisms for dispute resolution before proceeding to Court and having not done this, the 1st Cross-Respondent jumped the gun. The result of this according to learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant is the non-fulfillment of a condition precedent for the invocation of the jurisdiction of the lower Court.

There is no doubt that Article 22(g) and (h) of the Electoral Guidelines for Primary Election of the gubernatorial candidate of the Party provides for internal dispute resolution in the following terms:-
"22(g) There shall be Gubernatorial Appeal Panel, appointed by the National Executive Committee and which shall comprise all members of National Working Committee.

(h) An aggrieved aspirant shall have the right of appeal in writing to the Gubernatorial Election Panel within 24 hours from the time of receipt of the decision appealed against."

The learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant having argued the two issues submitted for resolution as contended herein that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff/1st Cross-Respondent's Claims because the Cross-Respondent failed to comply with the provisions of the Constitution of the 2nd Cross-Respondent/Peoples Democratic Party, 2009 (as amended) and the Guidelines for Primary Elections, 2010, for resolution of party disputes arising from primary elections; a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court below had not been fulfilled in that the Plaintiff did not lodge any appeal against the nomination of the Cross-Appellant to the Gubernatorial Appeal Panel.

The learned trial Judge on his part ruled at page 849 of the Records after considering the decision of this Court in PDP v. Senator Dahiru Gassol (supra) and came to the following conclusion:-
"Consequently the argument by the learned Counsel to the 1st Defendant that the proceedings by the Plaintiff is premature or incompetent for failure to resort to the internal dispute resolution mechanism of the 2nd Defendant, is with respect misconceived. Plaintiff has no obligation whatsoever to lodge his complaints or grievances to Gubernatorial Electoral Panel established by Article 22 (g) - (h) of the Guidelines of the 2nd Defendant in view of the provisions of Section 87(10) of the Electoral Act, 2010".

The learned trial Judge also added:-
"Furthermore, the provisions of Article 22(g)-(h) of the Electoral Guidelines of the 2nd Defendant is at best a subsidiary legislation which cannot override the substantive statutory provisions of Section 87(10) of the Electoral Act, 2010. I therefore resolve this issue against the 1st Defendant."

I must state herein without any hesitation that the learned trial Judge stated the obvious position of the law except that he went a little too far when he held that the 1st Cross-Respondent "has no obligation whatsoever to lodge his complaints or grievance to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel established by Article 22(g) - (h) of the Guidelines of the 2nd Defendant in view of the provisions of Section 87(10) of the Electoral Act." With the greatest respect, the 1st Cross-Respondent is obligated as a member of the political party (2nd Cross-Respondent), to abide by the party Constitution from which the Guidelines derived its powers as well as the Electoral Act. Section 87(10) now (9) of the Electoral Act does not provide absolutely for an aggrieved Political Party Aspirant for the candidacy of the Political Party for election into Public Office, to seek redress in Court against the breach of/or non compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act and Guidelines/Rules of the party. The operative words on the seeking of redress in the Courts by an aggrieved aspirant under Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, is "may apply". In other words, it is discretionary and not obligatory that the aspirant must seek redress in Court.

On the other hand, the submission of learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant on the import of Article 22(g) and (h) of the Guidelines which according to him is that the 1st Cross-Respondent ought to have exhausted the internal dispute resolution mechanism by approaching the Governorship Appeal Panel before proceeding to Court, is no longer the position of the law and accordingly the learned Counsel's submission is erroneous. From what I had said earlier, the 1st Cross-Respondent did not jump the gun when he went to Court because as at that time he initiated proceedings he had the reasonable (though erroneous belief as it turned out to be); that he was a candidate at the Gubernatorial Primaries of the 2nd 
Cross-Respondent and he therefore had the option by the permissive provision of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act to either resort first to the Gubernatorial Appeal Panel or proceed to the Court pronto to seek redress.
The case of UNILORIN v. Oluwadare (supra) interpreted the provisions of the UNILORIN Act which entrenches in absolute terms that in matters involving the award of degrees, diplomas and certificates an aggrieved party, be he a student or a lecturer, must have recourse or must exhaust all the internal dispute resolution machineries for redress before resorting to Court as was decided in Akintemi v. Onwumechili; and other cases decided under the Universities Law.

Owoseni v. Faloye (supra) also cited by the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant may have been decided on its peculiar facts and circumstances but has definitely been cited out of context in this case in view of the position I had taken earlier. I reiterate that the Plaintiff/Cross-Respondent had no obligation to first approach the Gubernatorial Panel but had an option to either proceed first to the Appeal Panel or the Court to ventilate his grievances. To that extent, the provisions of paragraphs (g) and (h) of Article 22 of the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Constitution may not necessarily be null and void for inconsistency with Sections 6 (6) (b) and 36 (1) of the 1999 Constitution by virtue of Section 36 (2) (a) and (b) of the same Constitution which most times have been ignored by the Courts in their interpretation of Sections 36 (1) thereof which guarantees every citizen of this Country's unfettered fundamental right of access to a court of law for the ventilation of his grievances.
For the avoidance of doubt, Section 6(6) (b) of the 1999 Constitution has provided that the judicial powers vested in accordance with the previous provisions relating to the Courts listed in Section 6(6) of the Constitution of which the Courts mentioned in Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010, are some of them (See Section 6(5) (c), (d) and (e) of the Constitution); "shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the Civil rights and obligations of that person."
As for Section 36(1) of the Constitution, it has entrenched that in the determination of his Civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to fair hearing within a reasonable time by Court or, other tribunal established by law and Constitution in such a manner as to ensure its impartiality. Section 36(2) however stipulates that:
"(2) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this Section, a law shall not be invalidated by reason only that it confers on any government or authority power to determine question arising in the administration of a law that affects or may affect the civil rights and obligations of any person if such law -
(a) provides for an opportunity for the person whose rights and obligations may be affected to make representations to the administering authority before that authority makes the decision affecting that person;
(b) contains no provision making the determination of the administering authority final and conclusive."
I had the opportunity to comment on the invalidity of some of the provisions of the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Guidelines for the conduct of primary Elections at pages 69 to 76 of my lead Judgment of this Court in Hon. B. S. M. Nguroje v. Hon. Ibrahim Tukur El-Sudi (Appeal Number CA/YL/30/2011 unreported); delivered on the 17th December, 2012; when I stated at page 76 thereof that: "Articles 27 (XII) and 50(f) of the Guidelines of the 2nd Respondent when considered side by side with Sections 36(2) (a) and (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and 87 (10) (now 9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) are void in so far as they make the decisions of the NWC or NEC on the primary election of her candidate for the selection or nomination of the party's candidate for the 
National Assembly Election final and binding in which case, they purportedly oust the jurisdiction of Courts."

The provisions of Section 36 (2) (a) and (b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, were therefore entrenched to check the excesses of provisions on the need to exhaust or resort to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in some institutions or establishments which are couched in absolute terms and interpreted as the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant has done by citing Unilorin v. Oluwadare (supra); Owoseni v. Faloye (supra) and Akintemi v. Onwumechili (supra).

In the case at hand paragraphs (g) and (h) of the Article 22 of the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Guidelines for conduct of Primary Election for nomination of the Candidate of the Party for the 2012 Gubernatorial Election in Adamawa State, provide for an aggrieved Aspirant to appeal in writing to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel and to that extent, is Constitutional. However, as I said earlier, where Articles 27(XII) and 50(f) of the Guidelines make the decisions of the Appeal Panel final, then those Articles are to the extent of their inconsistencies with Section 35(2) (a) and (b), null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
The dictum in Orakul Resources v. NCC (supra) may have so decided (and this is the position of the law ideally where the rule of law is observed) as against naked power and the rule of impunity which have now characterised the conduct of political parties' primaries in this Country; that where a condition precedent for doing an act has not been complied with, no subsequent act thereto can be regarded as valid and the non-doing of such thing renders the subsequent act void.

However, because of the hue and cry of the political elite and indeed well meaning Nigerians and to stem the tide of arbitrariness that characterises the conduct of primaries and the untoward malpractices of political gladiators, Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act was enacted to afford an aggrieved aspirant the leverage and option to seek redress in a court of law or in the alternative succumb to the machinations of political party god-fathers and their goons in the course of Primary Elections.
There is no doubt that the locus classicus of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra) on jurisdiction, decided that a Court is seised of jurisdiction when there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising jurisdiction and the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. However, in this case, Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act has cushioned the effect of the failure of the 1st Cross-Respondent to fulfill the condition precedent of exhausting the internal dispute resolution mechanism like first having recourse to the Gubernatorial Appeal Panel of the 2nd Cross-Respondent, before resorting to the Federal High Court to seek redress.

In the same vein, the 1st Cross-Respondent was not bound willy-nilly to abide by the provisions of Article 22(g) and (h) of the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Guidelines since the Article as has been rightly submitted and held by both the learned Counsel for the 1st cross-Respondent and the Court below that in the hierarchical structure of statutes, the PDP Guidelines nay her Constitution are inferior to the Electoral Act. Indeed, as I said elsewhere which I hereby reiterate, (see Babangida Nguroje v. Hon. Ibrahim Tukur El-Sudi & 2 ors Appeal No.CA/YL/30/2011 unreported Judgment of this Honourable Court delivered on the 17th day of December, 2012; at pages 30 to 36) on a similar intra-party primary Election dispute while commenting on the purport of Section 87(9) then (10) of the Electoral Act and placing reliance on the case of NDIC v. Okem Enterprises (2004) 10 NWLR (pt. 880) 107 at 182 para. H, where Uwaifo, JSC; defined the term 'notwithstanding' while interpreting the provision of Section 251 of the Constitution which deals with the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as connoting thus:
"When the term 'notwithstanding' is used in a section of a statute, it is meant to exclude an impinging or impeding effect of any other provision of the statute or other subordinate legislation so that the said section may fulfill itself. It follows that as used in Section 251(1) of the Constitution, no provision of that Constitution shall be capable of undermining the said section."

Going by the above authority, Section 87(10) now 87(9) of the Electoral Act excludes any impinging or impeding effect of any other provision of the Act or even the Guidelines for Primary Elections made pursuant to the Constitution of the PDP/2nd Appellant (which by its Preamble admits at page 1 thereof that: "The Electoral Guidelines for Primary Elections, 2010 of the Peoples Democratic Party were, therefore drawn up, to conform strictly with the provisions of..., the Electoral Act, 2010 and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria"); from that section of the Electoral Act fulfilling itself in the regulation of party primaries. In other words, by the above authority, every other section of the Electoral Act, the PDP Constitution and Guidelines for the conduct of primary Elections; are subordinated to Section 87(10) (now 9) of the Electoral Act which guarantees an aspirant in a Party Primary the right to seek redress in a Court of Law provided his complaint is that any of the provisions of the Act, Rules or Guidelines of the Political Party has not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of such a political party for an election.
It has to be noted that, Tobi, Oguntade and Muhammad JJSC; in Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) 12 NWLR (pt. 1048) 367, (2008) 2 CCLR 215; (although the subject matter of the case then was substitution under the conduct of Primary Election; had emphasized on the right of candidate in a Party Primary Election to proceed to Court without necessarily having resort to an Appeal Panel thus:
"If the political parties, in their wisdom had written it into their Constitutions that their candidates for election would emerge from their party primaries it becomes unacceptable that the Court should run away from the duty to enforce compliance with the provisions of the parties' Constitution. The Court did not draft the Constitutions for these political parties. Indeed, the Court, in its ordinary duties, must enforce compliance with the agreements reached by the parties in their contract."
Finally, Muhammad, JSC; in lending his voice to those of his colleagues still on this subject intoned inter alia: "Where a member of a political party feels aggrieved because both the political party to which he belonged and INEC sidelined him, after having been initially and properly screened and nominated to contest for an election but at the nick of time had been substituted by another member of the party, I think, he has every right to ask the Court of law to intervene and protect his right to be allowed to contest the election".

See further the dicta of Rhodes-Vivour, JSC in Uzodinma v. Izunaso (No. 2) (2011) 17 NWLR (pt. 1275) 30 at 60 paras. C - E. Fabiyi, JSC; in Chief Ikechi Emenike v. Peoples Democratic Party & Ors. (2012) 12 NWLR (pt. 1315) Pg 556; Tobi, Oguntade and Muhammad JJSC; in Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) 12 NWLR (pt. 1048) 367, (2008) 2 CCLR 215; which I adopt into to and to hold as had earlier been held, that a party member ordinarily should be bound by the provisions of his Political Party's Constitution and Guidelines for primary elections and that when the 1st Cross-Respondent filed this action, he acted under the presumption that he was an Aspirant properly so called until the Court below found out that his claims were basically on events that occurred before the primary election. Apart from the above finding, the learned trial Judge also found out that the 1st Cross-Respondent did not participate as a candidate at the primary election held on the 24th day of October, 2011 for the selection and nomination of the Gubernatorial candidate of the PDP for the Gubernatorial election of 2012 in Adamawa State, otherwise, he was entitled in the first place to have come to Court without fulfilling any condition precedent like lodging a complaint to the Gubernatorial Primary Election Appeal Panel of the 2nd Cross-Respondent.
Even if we go by the argument of learned Counsel for the Cross-appellant that aspirants are expected to first lodge appeals with the Panel where they are not satisfied with the results of primaries, in this case, from the Cross-Appellant's objection at the Court below, the learned trial Judge had held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the 1st Cross-Respondent in that all his grievances were on pre-
primary election. It is therefore tantamount to waste of judicial time and energy for the Cross-Appellant to bring up a Cross-Appeal which to me is hypothetical, theoretical, moot and raised herein merely for its intellectual argument qua reason and which is more to test its logicality or empirical consequences but of no beneficial effect to him. See per Tobi, JSC in Odedo v. INEC (2008) 17 NWLR (pt.1117) 554 at 600 paras. C - E; Abubakar v. Yar'Adua (2008) 4 NWLR (pt.1078) 467 at 497 paras. C - E Ogbonna v. President F.R.N. (1997) 5 NWLR (pt.504) 281, Noobosi v. A.C.B. (1995) 6 NWLR (pt.404) 658 and Ndulue v. Ibezun (2002) 12 NWLR 1.
Again, the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant would be shooting himself on the foot if he insists that the 1st Cross-Appellant did not Appeal to the Gubernatorial Appeal Panel; when he claimed and raised the objection which culminated in the decision by the learned trial Judge that having perused the entire process filed (the Statement of claim), there was no evidence that the Cross Respondent participated in the Governorship primaries. In the circumstances the case of Chinwo v. Owhonda (supra) does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. I reiterate that in as much as the 1st Cross-Appellant would have been bound by the provisions of Article 22(g) and (h), he had the option to proceed to the Court to ventilate his grievances as Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) has taken away any toga of absolutism which then adorned the concept of party supremacy and provisions of her Constitution and Guidelines on primary Elections as in this case.

On the whole I affirm the decision of the learned trial Judge on this Issue and shall discountenance the submission of learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant. This Cross-Appeal shall only succeed in part in so far as Issue Number 1 is concerned. I make no order as to costs.

SOTONYE DENTON-WEST, J.C.A. (PJ): I had the advantage of perusing in draft the resounding Judgment of my learned brother, Ignatius Igwe Agube, J.C.A. just delivered. I concur with my lord's reasonings and conclusions, but in my view as can be seen below.

This is a Cross-Appeal against a part of the ruling of the court below delivered on the 20th day of January, 2012 in which the court overruled the Cross-Appellant on its contention that the complaints of the 1st Cross Respondent fell within the domestic and internal affairs of the 2nd Cross-Respondent.

The learned senior Counsel for the Cross-Appellant in his brief dated 29th June, 2012 and filed on 3rd July, 2012 submitted the two issues below for determination.
1. Whether the court below was not in error when it held that the complaints of the 1st Cross Respondent do not fall within the domestic or internal affairs of the 2nd Cross Respondent. (Ground 2).
2. Whether lodging complaints or grievances to Cross Appellant's Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel was of the 2nd Cross Respondent was not a condition precedent for seeking redress in court and if it was whether the court below was not in error when it held that the 1st Cross Respondent had no obligation to lodge his complaints or grievances to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel of the 2nd Cross Respondent. (Ground 1).

The learned senior counsel for the Cross Respondent in his own brief of argument dated 6th July, 2012 and filed on 30th July, 2012 only responded to the issues formulated by Cross Appellant. Therefore I with concentrate on the issues formulated by the Cross-Appellant.

ARGUMENT:
ISSUE NO. 1:
Whether the court below was not in error when it held that the complaints of the 1st Cross Respondent do not fall within the domestic or internal affairs of the 2nd Cross Respondent.

The learned counsel for the Cross-Appellant submitted that prior to the enactment of the Electoral Act, 2010 every intra party contest, including the selection or nomination of candidates for public offices by a political party, were matters considered by law to be purely within the domestic domain of the political parties and of which the courts cannot adjudicate.

Thus, in law intra party governance, including the selection or nomination of a party candidate for election, was entirely within the province of the party. The courts were not to interfere in disputes arising there from.

However, a slight change was introduced by the law when on the 4th day of August, 2010 the Electoral Act, 2010 was passed into law. By virtue of the Electoral Act, 2010 particularly Section 87(9) of the Act, the courts now have the jurisdiction to determine matters relating to breach of the provisions of the Electoral Act and the guidelines of political parties for primary elections where such breaches are shown to have been committed in the selection or nomination of a party candidate for election i.e. in the conduct of primary election.

It was submitted that the complaints of the Appellant upon which the action was filed at the court below were summarized in paragraph 47 (a-c) of the Statement of claim as follows:-
47. The Plaintiff states that the Gubernatorial primary of the 2nd Defendant held in Yola, Adamawa State on Monday, 24th October, 2011 wherein the 1st Defendant was nominated the candidate of the 2nd Defendant in the 2012 gubernatorial election in Adamawa State is invalid and void by reason of:-
a. The discriminatory membership revalidation exercise carried out by the Adamawa State Chapter of the 2nd Defendant in October, 2011 in which known supporters of the plaintiff were excluded.
b. The refusal to issue and or sell delegate Nomination Forms to known supporters of the Plaintiff thereby denying them opportunity to be elected Ad-hoc delegates to participate in the nomination of the candidate of the 2nd Defendant in the 2012 gubernatorial election in Adamawa State at the Gubernatorial Primary held in Yola, Adamawa State on Monday, 24th day of October, 2011.
c. Lack of valid notice to the Plaintiff, as an aspirant, or to his Campaign Organization or Supporters of the date of the Word Congress of the 2nd Defendant purported to have held on the 21st day of October, 2011.
Page 15 of the record of Cross Appeal was referred to.

The court below in its ruling found that the above complaints of the 1st Cross Respondent were on matters not envisaged by the provisions of Section 87(9) and as such the court lacked the jurisdiction to interfere.
Page 825 of the record of Cross Appeal was referred to.

This court was urged to hold that although the court below was right when it held that the complaints of the 1st Cross Respondent were on matters not envisaged by the provisions of Section 87(9) and (10) of the Electoral Act 2010, as they are matters which occurred before the conduct of the primary election, it 
was however in error when it held that the matters complained of is or are not within the domestic and internal affairs of the 2nd Cross Respondent.

The learned senior counsel for the Cross Respondent argued that the submission in paragraphs 3.02, 3.03, 3.04, 3.05 and 3.06 of the Cross Appellant brief are correct to the extent that they represent the position of the law Prior to the enactment of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended).
It was submitted that the Cross Appellant in paragraph 3.09, missed the point when in his interpretation of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) he said:-
"The above provision now draws a line between complaints which are still within the domestic and internal affairs of a political party, of which the courts cannot interfere, and complaints which are outside and internal affairs of a party by virtue of their being envisaged by the provision of Section 87(10) of the Act as acts upon which the jurisdiction of the court cannot be invoked"

The learned senior counsel adopted their argument from paragraphs 1.5 to 1.20 of the Appellant's brief in the main appeal on the correct interpretation of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended):-
Further, it was argued that the complaint of the Cross Respondent in the lower court as contained in statement of claim is that the 2nd Cross Respondent (People Democratic Party) is in breach of the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) and the party Guidelines in the process of nomination of the Gubernatorial candidate of the party in Adamawa State in the 2012 Gubernatorial Election.

This court was urged to affirm the decision of the learned trial Judge on this issue and to hold that section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) has changed the law; the courts now have unfettered powers to inquire whether a political party has conducted its primary election in full and substantial compliance with the provisions of the law, particularly the Electoral Act and its Guidelines.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE IN THE CROSS-APPEAL:
Whether the court below was not in error when it held that the complaints of the 1st Cross Respondent do not fall within the domestic or internal affairs of the 2nd Cross Respondent.

I have extensively discussed this issue in the main appeal and I do not think it is wise for me to start another elaborate and/dramatic resolution. Doing this would amount to an academic exercise which ought to be done or carried out in class rooms other than in courts.

I will simply refer to my resolution of issue one in the main appeal. I also wish to adopt my view in the unreported Judgment of this court in Halilu Dombaz & 7 Ors. v. Alh. Umaru Kugama & Ors. With the Appeal No:CA/YL/7/2010 delivered on 8th day of February, 2013, in that appeal, I exhaustively emphasized the fact that if private and family affairs like non-conjugation of marriage, impotency, rape, sexual assault and harassment which are internal than a party system can be brought before a court of law, how much matters of political parties which produce government meant to preserve and protect interest of the public? There is no doubt that from the legion of decisions from this court and that of the apex court and the Electoral Act before the amendment, that questions of nomination and sponsorship of candidates for a political office by a political party cannot be adjudicate upon by courts. See Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244, Akpan v. Bob (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) at 501, Abdulkadar v. Mamman (2003) NWLR (Pt. 834) 1 at 30, Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) para 367, Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) para. 310; Amaechi v. INEC. (2008) 1 LRECN 1 Pp.72.

However, where the political party nominates a candidate for an election contrary to its own constitution and guidelines, a dissatisfied candidate has every right to approach the court for redress. In such a situation, the courts are vested with the jurisdiction to examine and interpret relevant legislations to see if the political party complied fully with legislation on the issue of nomination. The court will never allow a political party to act with unguided impunity, regardless of its rules. Political parties must give credence and obey their own constitution and once this is done, there would be orderliness and this wilt enhance political stability and good governance in the country. See Uzodinma v. Izunaso (No.2) (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1275) 30 at 59 Ikechi Emenike v. PDP & Ors. (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt.1315) Page 556; Odedo v. INEC (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1117) 554 or (2008) 7 SC 25.
In the commentary of the provisions of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended, Onnoghen, JSC in Lado v. CPC (2010) All FWLR at page 263 para. G - H, reiterated the position of defunct Electoral Laws on the impotence of the courts to choose, select or nominate candidates for political parties even in the face of breaches of the extant Electoral Act, 2010, the party's constitution and guidelines and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) in the conduct of party primaries. An aspirant cannot invoke the jurisdiction of either the Federal High Court or High Court of the State as provided for under Section 87(10) now Section 87(9) of the Act, unless such an aggrieved aspirant brings himself within the ambit of Section 87(4) (b) (c) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended).

As stated in the lead Judgment, I must re-emphasize the more that Section 87 of the electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) deals with the procedure needed for the nomination of a candidate by a political party for any election and specifically provides remedy for an aggrieved aspirant who participated at the party primaries which produced the winner by the highest number of votes.
Thus the apex court in Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 834) 1 at 30 emphasized that the whole essence of Section 87(7) and (9) of the Electoral Act is to stem the culture of impunity that hitherto characterized the conduct of the primary election by political parties and to enthrone internal democracy within the party by its members in such exercise.
However, that does not mean that the Supreme Court has given restrictive interpretation of the said Section 87(7) (9) of the Electoral Act. The interpretation has been given in such a manner that best expresses the intention of the legislature in enacting those sections of the Act which is that only an aspirant who took part in the primary election can challenge the conduct of such primary election and that the breach of the Electoral Act, the party's constitution and guidelines for the party's primary election must have taken place in the conduct of the primary election for the nomination or selection of a candidate of the political party for election into a public office.

The trial court in my view, ought to have held beyond the facts that the complaints of the 1st Cross Respondent were on matters not envisaged by Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). It should have been made clear that the complaints fell within the domestic affairs of the 2nd Respondent, although it would not have made any difference since the 1st Cross-Respondent has no locus standi and the court was consequently divested of jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
I, therefore resolve this issue in favour of the Cross-Appellant.

ISSUE No.2
Whether lodging complaints or grievances to Cross Appellant's Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel of the 2nd Cross Respondent was not a condition precedent for seeking redress in court and if it was whether the court below was not in error when it held that the 1st Cross Respondent had no obligation to lodge 

his complaints or grievances to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel of the 2nd Cross Respondent. (Ground 1).

It was submitted by the learned Cross-Appellant's Counsel that Article 22(g)-(h) of the Guidelines of the 2nd Cross Respondent are provisions enabling members of the party an opportunity to first exhaust the internal remedy available for redress before a recourse is had to the court. These provisions do not in any way prevent or bar an aspirant from seeking redress in the court if he is dissatisfied with the decision of the Appeal Panel. An aspirant who is not satisfied with a decision reached by the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Committee is at liberty to seek redress in the appropriate court. But he must as a matter of law first go through the process of the Appeal Panel.

It was further submitted that in the instant case where there are provisions for internal machinery for redress, the 1st Cross Respondent ought to have exhausted the internal machinery before having a recourse to the court. The 1st Cross Respondent however "jumped the gun" when he rushed to the court without first exhausting the internal machinery for redress available to him within the domestic forum. Also that rushing to the court as the 1st Cross Respondent did without first exhausting the internal remedies for redress available to him within the domestic forum, the 1st Cross respondent ought to have been held to have "jumped the gun" and the matter ought to have been declared bad for incompetence. That in Unilorin v. Oluwadare 27 NSCQR 18 at 44 paras F - G, the Supreme Court held as follows:-
"It is clear from the above review of cases decided by this court that matters which involved serious criminal allegations against the State such as arson, stealing, indecent assault etc, the suspects should, for obvious reasons, be tried in a court or tribunal properly so called under the constitution. But where the matters involve the award of degree, diplomas and certificates an aggrieved party, be he a student or a lecturer should first exhaust all the internal machineries for redress before a recourse to court. Where he rushes to court without first exhausting all the remedies for redress available to him within the domestic forum, as was the case of Akintemi v. Onwunmechili (supra), he would be held to have "jumped the gun" and the matter would be declared bad for incompetence."

Further, it was argue that it is obvious that the court below in holding that the 1st Cross Respondent had no obligation to lodge an appeal with the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel was not guided by the purpose for which the Panel was set up. The purpose of the Panel was not to oust the jurisdiction of the court, but to afford the panel an opportunity to resolve disputes, if it can, before recourse is had to the court. In other words to prevent actual litigation in court where it is possible or desirable to resolve disputes without involving the court. In Owoseni v. Faloye (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 284) 220 at 224, the Supreme Court held as follows:-
"It is important to stress that the laws which prescribes that some procedural steps be taken to resolve a dispute before embarking on actual legislation are not and cannot be treated or categorized as ousting the jurisdiction of the court... such laws only afford the body to which such disputes must be referred to in the first instance an opportunity to resolve the dispute if it can before a recourse is had to the court. In other words they serve the purpose of preventing actual litigation in court where it is possible or desirable to resolve the dispute."

According to the learned Counsel to the Cross Respondent, nowhere in Article 22(g)-(h) is it stated that an aggrieved aspirant not satisfied with the decision of the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel loses the right to seek redress in the court. Submission of complaints or grievances to the Appeal Panel is only a procedural step which the 1st Cross Respondent was required under the Guidelines of the 2nd Cross Respondent to take before seeking redress in the court.

The 1st Cross Respondent was therefore under obligation to first of all resort to the internal dispute resolution mechanism of the 2nd Cross Respondent by lodging an appeal to Gubernatorial Electoral Panel before seeking redress in the court. Having failed to do so, the condition precedent to the institution of the action was not fulfilled. The action was therefore premature.

That the failure to fulfill a condition precedent to the initiation of the action was fatal to the action as it robbed the court of the jurisdiction to entertain the action.
In Orakul Resources Ltd. v. NCC (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1060) 270 at 302, para B - D, the court held thus:-
"Where a condition precedent for doing an act has not been complied with, no subsequent act thereto can be regarded as valid... the non doing of such thing renders the subsequent act void"
Also referred is Nkemdilim v. Mmadukolu (1962) 2 NCNLR (Pt. 341) 348.

It was submitted that the purpose of a primary election is to enable a political party nominate its candidate for election. The decision as to who the candidate should be is reached either upon the counting of the votes cast by delegates at a primary election or, where any of the aspirants disputes the decision on any ground, upon the hearing of an appeal lodged under Article 22(g)-(h) of the Party Guidelines with the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel by the aspirant. Thus, unless where one of the parties concedes to the decision based on the counting of votes, the contest at the party level for selection or nomination of a party candidate actually terminates at the hearing of the appeal by the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel.

It being so, it was obligatory on the 1st Cross Respondent to first of all lodge an appeal with the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal of the 2nd Respondent before seeking redress in the court.

Again, the hearing of appeal by the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel under Article 22(g)-(h) of the Party Guidelines relates to the selection or nomination of a party candidate for election. Failure to hear an appeal brought by an aspirant is a condition upon which an aggrieved aspirant can apply to challenge the selection or nomination of a candidate for election. In other words, where the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Committee fails or refuses to entertain an appeal lodged by an aspirant under Article 22(g)-(h), such failure or refusal would be considered an act of non-compliance with provisions of the Guidelines.

That in the circumstance, the Appellant having failed to lodge an appeal with the Panel, he ought to have been held to have jumped the gun when he went straight to institute the action and in law he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. The 1st Cross Respondent had a duty to show that he exhausted all the internal remedies available to him before approaching the court. Having not done so, he cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court under Section 87(10) of the Electoral Act, 2010.

That the words "notwithstanding the provisions of the Act or rules of a political party" used in the section only operate against provisions in the Act or rules which oust the jurisdiction of the court from entertaining actions instituted by an aggrieved aspirant, which is not the case in the circumstance. Nowhere is it provided in the party guidelines of the 2nd Cross Respondent that an aspirant shall not approach the court if he is not satisfied with the decision of the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel.
Again, as a member of the party the 1st Cross Respondent was bound by the provisions in Article 22(g)-(h) of the Guidelines. In Chinwo v. Owhonda (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1074) 341 at 361, para. C - H (CA) this court held as follows:-
"In the exercise of their Constitutional right under Section 39 and 40 of the 1999 Constitution, which guarantees freedom of thought, assembly, association etc, individuals elect to and subscribed to membership in associations... He stands bound by the internal rules and regulations of the association."

This court was urged to hold that the 1st Cross Respondent was under obligation to lodge his complaints or grievances to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel of the 2nd Cross Respondent and that the court below was wrong when it held that the 1st Cross Respondent had no such obligation.

The learned counsel for the Cross Respondent submitted:
The argument of the Cross Appellant in paragraphs 4.06 of his brief is that:-
"The 1st Cross Respondent did not first of all appeal to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel before this action was instituted at the court below."

That the Cross Appellant supported his argument by quoting Article 22(g)-(h) of the 3rd Cross Respondent's Electoral Guidelines for Primary Election, 2010, submitted that the argument of the Cross Appellant must fail because it fails to take cognizance of the following words that starts Section 87(9) of Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) "Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act or rules of a political party..."

That apart from the fact that in the hierarchy of laws, the Guidelines is inferior to the Act, the word 'Notwithstanding' used in the Act subordinates the Guidelines to the Act.

This court referred to the decision of this Honourable Court in Appeal No.CA/YL/31/2011 - Peoples Democratic Party v. Senator Dahiru Gassol (Unreported) delivered on the 13th day of September, 2011.
That in said Dahiru's case, this Court held inter alia that the consideration of a complaint of breach of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) or the Guidelines of a political party in the selection or nomination of a candidate for election by a panel, committee or other body established by the Rules or Guidelines of a political party, is invalid for hindering the right of access to court by a citizen in view of the provisions of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (sic).

It was finally submitted that all the cases cited by the Cross Appellant in support of issue No.2 are not relevant to the main question arising from that issue. Every case must be treated on its own merit. This court was urged to hold that the word 'Notwithstanding...' in Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) renders compliance with the 2nd Cross Respondent's Guidelines unnecessary.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO IN THE CROSS APPEAL
Whether lodging complaints or grievances to Cross-Appellant's Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel of the 2nd Cross Respondent was not a condition precedent for seeking redress in court and if it was whether the court below was not in error when it held that the 1st Cross-Respondent had no obligation to lodge his complaints or grievances to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel of the 2nd Cross-Respondent.

The proviso to Article 22(g)-(h) of People's Democratic Party Electoral Guidelines for Primary Elections, 2010 is here under reproduced as follows:-
"(g) There shall be Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel, appointed by the National Executive Committee and which shall comprise all members of the National Working Committee.
"(h) Any aggrieved aspirant shall have the right of appeal in writing to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel within 24 hours from the time of receipt of the decision appealed against."

I have studied the above provision and it is my humble opinion that appealing to Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel is a right conferred on the 1st Cross-Respondent and the right can be waived.

It is therefore not a condition precedent before an aggrieved aspirant can go to court.

Moreover, assuming the said provisions were a condition precedent for an aggrieved aspirant to seek redress in court, it would have been at variance with Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) being its superior and would have been wid. For avoidance of doubt the said Section 87(9) of the Act provides thus:-

"Notwithstanding the provision of the Act or rules of a political party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provision of this Act and the guidelines of a political party has not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State, for redress."

From the above provision, it is clear that not minding the provisions of the Act, rules of a political party or the guidelines of a political party with respect to the right of an aggrieved aspirant; he has the right to go to High Court to ventilate his grievances, as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and no law can be above the Constitutional provisions and same can override the provisions of any other ancillary laws of the country.

In NDIC v. Okem Enterprises (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt.880) 107 at 182 para. H. per Uwaifo, JSC; defined the term 'notwithstanding' while interpreting the provision of Section 251 of the Constitution which deals with the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as connoting thus:-
"When the term 'notwithstanding' is used in a section of a statute, it is meant to exclude an impinging or impeding effect of any other provision of the statute or other subordinate legislation so that the said section may fulfill itself. It follows that as used in Section 251(1) of the Constitution, no provision of that Constitution shall be capable of undermining the said section."

Going by the above authority, Section 87(10) now 87(9) of the Electoral Act excludes any impinging or impeding effect of any other provision of the Act or even the guidelines for primary elections made pursuant to the Constitution of the PDP/2nd Appellant (which by its Preamble admits at page 1 thereof that: "The Electoral Guidelines for Primary Elections, 2010 of the People Democratic Party were, therefore drawn up, to conform strictly with the provisions of.., the Electoral Act, 2010 and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria") from that section of the Electoral Act fulfilling itself in the regulation of party primaries. In other words, by the above authority, every other section of the Electoral Act, the PDP Constitution and Guidelines for the conduct of primary Elections; are subordinated to Section 87(10) of the Electoral Act which guarantees an aspirant in a Party Primary the right to seek redress in a Court of Law provided his complaint is that any of the provisions of the Act, Rules or Guidelines of the Political
Party has not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of such a political party for an election.

It is pertinent to note that in Lado v. CPC (2012) All FWLR at page 263 paragraphs G - H to 624 paragraph A; Onnoghen, JSC, again commenting on the provisions of the Electoral Act above highlighted, reiterated the position of defunct Electoral Laws on the impotence of the Courts to choose, select or nominate candidates for political parties even in the face of breaches of the extant Electoral Act 2010, the Party's Constitution and Guidelines for the conduct of primaries and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) in the course of such exercise as an aspirant cannot invoke the jurisdiction of either the Federal High Court of the State as provided for under Section 87(10) unless such an aggrieved aspirant brings himself within the ambit of Section 87(4) (b) (c) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). Hear his Lordship:-
"The power of an aggrieved aspirant who is not satisfied with the conduct of the primaries by his party to elect a candidate must bring himself within the purview of Section 87(4) (b) (ii), (c) (ii) and (10) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), supra. It is only if he can come within the provisions of those subsections that his complaint can be justiciable as the courts cannot still decide as between two or more contending parties which of them is the nominated candidate of a political party; that power still resides with the political party to exercise..."

At page 627 paragraphs F - H to 628 paragraphs A - C; His Lordship in the concluding part of the Judgment further emphasized the point that:-
"As stated earlier in this Judgment, Section 87 of the Electoral Act, 2010 as amended, deals with the procedure needed for the nomination of a candidate by a political party for any election and specifically provided remedy for an aggrieved aspirant who participated at the party primaries which produced the winner by the highest number of votes.
In the instant case, the jurisdiction in question is statutory and is very limited in scope."

In view of the above, I see no logical and statutory reasons to fault the holding of the learned trial Judge at page 849 of the record of the Cross Appeal, that the 1st Cross-Respondent had no duty to first seek internal remedy before litigation. However, I enjoin political parties to always have regard for their rules. Also they should strive and adopt out of court settlement of disagreement arising from their activities especially in their primary elections other than litigation.

Moreso, the courts are generally enjoined to work for peace and justice and settle parties amicably where it is possible so to do.
Judicial notice has however been taken by this court of the fact that there are political wranglings in this state. Therefore, I reiterate my erstwhile appeal to the political parties especially in this state to abandon their bitterness and acrimony and work for peace and harmony in the interest of internal democracy and good governance: not only in Adamawa State but in Nigeria as a whole.
This issue is resolved against the Cross-Appellant.
In all, I too hold that the Cross-Appeal shall succeed in part.
I make no order as to cost as well.

ABUBAKAR ALKALI ABBA, J.C.A.: I totally agree with the judgment of my learned brother Justice I. I. Agube which he just read out.

I have nothing to add or subtract I affirm the Ruling of Federal High Court Yola delivered by his Lordship S. M. Shuaibu on 20th day of January, 2012 in suit No.FH/YL/CS/50/2011
Cross Appeal failed and partly succeed only on issue No.1 cross-appeal is Dismissed and lower Court Ruling is affirmed and Court in.
I fully adopt all the judgment in the appeal No.CA/YL/15/2012 into this cross Appeal No.CA/YL/21/2012 since these two cases are by consent CONSOLIDATED.
Both Appeal No.CA/YL/15/2012 and the cross-appeal No.CA/YL/21/2012 lack merit and both are dismissed with no cost to either side.?

Ayo Akam Esq. - for the Cross-Appellant/Applicant For Appellant
S. O. Imhanobe Esq. - for the 1st Cross-Respondent
Mark Chukwu Esq. - for the 3rd Respondent For Respondent