ISSUES

Whether the trial court was bound in principle by the Supreme Court decision of Onuoha v Okafor & others (1983) 14 NSCC 494?

Whether, in view of the provisions of Order 10 Rule 4 of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja (Civil Procedure Rules), 1991, the action ought to have been brought before the Abuja High Court of the Federal Capital Territory rather than in the State where the event occurred?

Whether a court of law can assume jurisdiction in a case involving the election or selection of a candidate for a political party, having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Onuoha v Okafor & others (supra)?

Whether Onuoha v Okafor was distinguishable as it did not involve election of a candidate but only selection of candidates for senatorial seats in accordance with the party's own constitution?

FACTS

The All Nigeria People's Party ("ANPP" fourth respondent) scheduled all its primary elections to be held on 3 January 2003. In the case of Jigawa State, the primary elections were to be held in Dutse, the capital of Jigawa State. A committee of the party conducted the screening and the primary election in Kano in which only the appellant (Bashir Mohammed Dalhatu) participated and was accordingly declared the winner by the committee. Meanwhile, another primary election was conducted in Dutse, which only the first respondent participated and was returned to the party as the winner. The party recognised and duly announced the first respondent as the party's candidate for the Jigawa State Gubernatorial Elections and issued him with a certificate of such recognition.

The appellant by a Writ of Summons at the High Court of Abuja, challenged the recognition of the first respondent as the Gubernatorial Candidate of the party for Jigawa State. The appellant filed two motions along with the writ: motion ex parte for interim injunction and motion on notice for interlocutory injunction. The trial judge granted the ex parte injunction. Thereafter, the first to third respondents by a notice of preliminary objection challenged the jurisdiction of the court, but the objection was dismissed. Dissatisfied, they appealed to the Court of Appeal. They also applied for a stay of execution pending the appeal which was refused. The first to third respondents applied to the Court of Appeal for a stay of proceedings pending the appeal. The attention of the trial court was drawn to this motion but the court proceeded with the hearing of the case and gave judgment for the appellant.

The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal. One of the issues considered in the appeal was whether the principles of the Supreme Court decision in Onuoha v Okafor can oust the jurisdiction of a court from entertaining the action. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against that judgment.

The appeal was dismissed.

HELD

1.      On the principle of stare decisis

The case of Onuoha v Okafor & others (1983) 14 NSCC 494 was rightly applied to the facts of this case by the Court of Appeal. It is unfortunate that the trial Judge, deliberately and consciously refused to apply it, because he thought the Supreme Court was wrong. If the Supreme Court was wrong, the trial Judge was also wrong not to have followed the age long established doctrine of stare decisis, otherwise known as judicial precedent. Per Kutigi, JSC at page 214.

The doctrine of stare decisis is a sine qua non for certainty to the practice and application of law. A refusal, therefore, by a Judge of the court below to be bound by this Court's decision, is gross insubordination. Per Katsina-Alu, JSC at page 207.

Judges of the lower courts have no right under any circumstances to ask or advise this Court to change its decision in any case. Their duty is to follow the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in all cases, and apply them in similar cases before them. Per Kalgo, JSC at page 217.

2.      On jurisdiction of the High Court

It is not the Rules of Court that vest jurisdiction in the court but rather the statute creating that court. It is to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 that one has to look to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, for it is Section 255(1) of the Constitution that established the Court. The subject matter of the appellants' case relates to the governorship of Jigawa State, a territory that is distinct and separate from the Federal Capital Territory. If any court must have jurisdiction over such a subject matter, it has to be the court in Jigawa State. For the purpose of exercising jurisdiction each State of the Federation is independent of the other and the jurisdiction of its court is limited to matters arising in its territory.

By the authority of Onuoha v Okafor (supra) the trial High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The issue of who should be a candidate of a given political party at any election is clearly a political one to be determined by the rules and constitution of the said party. In other words, it is a domestic issue and not such as would be justiciable in a court of law.

(Obiter) Judges of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory ought to be circumspect before deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction in matters outside the territory of the Federal Capital Territory. That court, unlike the Federal High Court has jurisdiction only in matters arising out of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. Order 10 rule 4 is only to determine the proper judicial division of the court where a matter can be heard and determined. Per Ogundare, JSC at 214.

C.O. Akpamgbo, SAN and Y.U. Usman, SAN, B. Akin-Aina, K. Uthman, Miss Irene Ekwuozoh and Mohammed Tola for the plaintiff/appellant.

K. Sofola, SAN and A. Abubakar and T. Banjoko for defendant/respondent 1, 2 & 3.

M.S. Shuaib for defendant/respondent 4.

E. Okoro for defendant/respondent 5.

A.O. Okeaya-Inneh and Miss F. Abdullahi for defendant/respondent 6.

The following cases were referred to in this judgment:

Nigeria

A-G, Ogun State v Egenti (1986) 3 NWLR (Part 28) 265

Emerah & Sons Ltd v A-G Plateau State (1990) 4 NWLR (Part 147) 788

Johnson v Lawanson (1971) All NLR 58

Onuoha v Okafor & others (1983) 14 NSCC 494

Rossek v ACB Ltd (1993) 8 NWLR (Part 312) 382

Williams v Daily Times (1990) 1 NWLR (Part 124) 1

The following statute was referred to in this judgment:

Nigeria

Constitution: S 255(1); 257

The following rules were referred to in this judgment:

Nigeria

High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja (Civil Procedure Rules), 1991: Order 10 rule 4(1); Order 10 rule 4(2)

Katsina-Alu, JSC (Delivered the Leading Judgment):- On 10 April 2003, I dismissed this appeal and indicated that I would give my reasons today. I now give my reasons.

The plaintiffs, by a Writ of Summons dated 8 January 2003, commenced an action against the defendants before the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The plaintiff in the action claimed against the defendants the following reliefs:-

1.      A declaration that purported return of the first defendant Ibrahim Saminu Turaki as the 2003 "ANPP" Gubernatorial Candidate for Jigawa State is unconstitutional, void and that the return was and still is a violation of the plaintiff's right of fair hearing, right to be elected for any elective office.

2.      An injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the aforesaid rights of the plaintiff.

3.      And any other relief and/or reliefs as this Honorable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.

The issues involved in this appeal are simple and straightforward. I shall therefore concern myself with the facts material to the consideration of the questions presented for determination.

From the facts before the trial court, two things happened. The All Nigeria People's Party ("ANPP") scheduled all its primary elections to hold on 3 January 2003. This is not in dispute. In the case of Jigawa State, the primary elections were to hold in Dutse, Jigawa State capital. A committee with Chief Nnoruka as Chairman, Hajiya Nahibi as member and Arc. Joseph, as secretary, conducted the screening and the primary election in Kano in which the first defendant did not take part. Only the appellant Bashir Mohammed Dalhatu did. He was naturally declared the winner by the committee.

Meanwhile another primary election was conducted in Dutse, Jigawa State Capital in which the first defendant participated. The appellant did not. The first defendant was the winner. The result of the election was released to the "ANPP" by the Chairman of the election committee. The "ANPP" recognised the same and duly announced the first defendant as the winner and issued him a certificate of such recognition on 7 January 2003. It was as a result of this state of affairs that the appellant took out a Writ of Summons on 8 January 2003, challenging the recognition of the first defendant as the Gubernatorial Candidate for Jigawa State.

The appellant filed two motions along with the writ: a motion ex parte for interim injunction and a Notice on Motion for interlocutory injunction. The learned trial Judge granted the ex parte injunction on 8 January 2003.

The first, second and third defendants on 14 January 2003 filed a Notice of preliminary objection as to jurisdiction which was dismissed on 2 January, 2003.

The first, second and third defendants appealed against the dismissal of their preliminary objection. They also applied by motion for a stay of execution pending appeal. Stay was refused.

On 30 January 2003, the first, second and third defendants applied to the Court of Appeal for a stay of proceedings pending appeal. The motion was fixed for hearing on 5 February 2003. The trial court's attention was drawn to this motion but in spite of that it proceeded with the hearing of the case and on 5 February 2003, it gave judgment for the appellant.

The defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed. This appeal by the plaintiff is against that judgment.

The parties filed their respective briefs of argument. Based on his grounds of appeal, the appellant has submitted at 4 of his brief of argument three issues for determination, to wit:-

"1.     Whether the principles of the Supreme Court decision in Onuoha v Okafor & others (1983) 14 NSCC 494, a case based purely on selection rather than election of candidate and which was decided under a different constitution, with different provisions governing the two different cases, can oust the jurisdiction of a court of law from entertaining this action?

2.      Whether, in view of the provisions of Order 10 rule 4 of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja (Civil Procedure Rules), 1991, the court below was right in striking out the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the action?

3.      Whether, having regard to the subsisting order of the Court of Appeal to the effect that the appellants' (now respondents) brief of argument must be based upon settled records of appeal, the judgment now appealed against, based upon the brief, which was not based upon the said settled record is not a nullity?"

For their part, the first, second and third defendants who filed a joint brief of argument, also submitted three issues for determination. They read as follows:-

"1.     Whether having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Onuoha v Okafor (1983) 14 NSCC 494, a court of law can validly assume jurisdiction in a case to elect or select a candidate for a political party in its internal affair or nominate him for sponsorship in an election?

2.      Whether in view of the provisions of Order 10 rule 4(1) and (2) of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja (Civil Procedure Rules), 1991, the court below was not right in striking out the appellant's claim on the ground that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the action?

3.      Whether the court below acted properly when it proceeded to hear the appeal before it having made an order by consent of the parties that they are at liberty to provide other documents that they may wish to file on or by Wednesday, 19 February 2003?"

The fourth defendant raised two issues in his brief of argument which read:-

"1.     Whether having regard to the facts of the appellant's case and the state of law in Nigeria today, a court of law can make an order directing the fourth respondent to sponsor the appellant in preference to the first respondent or any other person as its Gubernatorial Candidate for the April 2003 general elections in Jigawa State?

2.      Whether the order of the lower court alleged by the appellant was ever made, if yes, whether the appellant has not waived any right he may have had to complain by filing his respondent's brief based on the record before the lower court as well as taking other steps in the proceedings before the lower court?"

The fifth defendant, for his part, submitted two issues for determination, to wit:-

"1.     Whether the claims of the plaintiff appellant were sufficiently targeted at getting the All Nigeria Peoples Party to sponsor him as its Gubernatorial Candidate for Jigawa State so as to justify the invocation by the Court of Appeal of the principles in Onuoha v Okafor & others (1983) 14 NSCC 494?

2.      Whether the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs' claim?"

The sixth defendant raised only one Issue at page 1 of its brief of argument:-

"Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in law and on the facts in holding that the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court in Onuoha v Okafor (supra) is that once a matter pertains to the internal dispute of a political party, the courts have no jurisdiction?"

The central issue in this appeal is the appellant's Issue 1. This issue has been raised by all the parties in their respective briefs of argument. It is whether having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Onuoha v Okafor & others (supra) a court of law can validly assume jurisdiction in a case to elect or select a candidate for a political party in its internal affair or nominate him for sponsorship in an election.

The kernel of the arguments for the plaintiff is that the facts of Onuoha v Okafor are distinguishable from the facts and law applicable to the present case. It was said that in Onuoha's case there was no question of contesting for an election but that it was a pure case of a panel of 10 members set up by the political party to select its candidates for senatorial seats in accordance with the party's own constitution. Learned Senior Counsel endeavoured to distinguish between selection of a candidate and election of a candidate.

For the defendants it was said that the thrust of the plaintiff's claim was for an Order of Perpetual Injunction restraining the defendants, particularly fourth defendant, from recognising the gubernatorial primary election result which took place in Dutse, Jigawa State Capital on 3 January 2003 which declared the first defendant as the winner of the said election. It was also for an order declaring the plaintiff as the only legally recognised ANPP Gubernatorial Candidate for the 2003 governorship election in Jigawa State. What was before the trial court for decision was whether in view of the Supreme Court decision in Onuoha v Okafor (supra) the court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Learned Senior Counsel for first, second and third defendants submitted that the court is not an appellate body set up by the Party under its constitution to hear appeals from unsuccessful candidates in the nomination and sponsorship exercise within the party.

Let us recall the facts of and the decision in Onuoha's case. The plaintiff brought an action to compel his political party - NPP to nominate and sponsor him for election to a senatorial seat. The action was instituted in the High Court, which found in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed against the decision of the trial High Court to the Federal Court of Appeal, contending that a court of law ought not to entertain an action to determine whom a political party should or should not sponsor. The appeal was allowed and, the action was dismissed. The plaintiff appealed to this Court.

This Court dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff. Obaseki, JSC who delivered the leading judgment stated and held at various stages in the course of his judgment at 501, 503, 504 and 505 of the report as follows:-

"The issue raised in this appeal before us, is, in my opinion, as stated by learned Counsel for the respondents, i.e. whether the court ought to make an order directing the NPP to sponsor the appellant as against the third respondent.

The answer to the question so raised must, in my view, be in the negative. A positive or an affirmative answer will instantly project or propel the court into the area of jurisdiction to run and manage political parties and politicians. Can the court decide which of the two candidates can best represent the political interest of the NPP In all honesty, I think the court will in so doing be deciding a political question which it is ill fitted to do."

"Implicit in the right to canvass for votes for a candidate is the right to sponsor a candidate for election. The question that therefore arises is whether the court can justifiably interfere under any guise with the free exercise of this right by a political party. I think it cannot in law do so."

"The exercise of this right is the domestic affair of the NPP guided by its constitution. There are no judicial criteria or yardstick to determine which candidate a political party ought to choose and the judiciary is therefore unable to exercise any judicial power in the matter. It is a matter over which it has no jurisdiction. The question of the candidate a political party will sponsor is more in the nature of a political question which the courts are not qualified to deliberate upon and answer."

"The failure to sponsor the appellant cannot be said to be in breach or ultra vires the powers of the NPP because the appellant won the nullified nomination or because the appellant paid N5,000 (sic) to contest the nomination."

Irikefe, JSC (as he then was) in his concurring judgment held:-

"The matter in controversy in the appeal is whether a court has jurisdiction to entertain a claim whereby it can compel a political party to sponsor one candidate in preference for another candidate of the self same political party. If a court could do this, it would in effect be managing the political party for the members thereof. The issue of who should be a candidate of a given political party at any election is clearly a political one to be determined by the rules and constitution of the said party. It is thus a domestic issue and not such as would be justiciable in a court of law."

Bello, JSC (as he then was) in his contribution stated that:-

"Upon reading the above constitutional and statutory provisions together, it seems to me that the power and the right to nominate and sponsor a candidate to the election is vested in a political party and the exercise of such power and right is a matter within the discretion of a political party. A court has no jurisdiction to nominate a candidate for a political party or to compel a political party to nominate or sponsor a particular candidate."

Now, the plaintiff's claim before the trial court was simply this. The plaintiff sought an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, particularly the fourth defendant, from recognising the Gubernatorial primary election which took place in Dutse, Jigawa State on 3 January 2003 which declared the first defendant as the winner of the said election. He also sought for an order declaring the plaintiff as the only legally recognised ANPP Gubernatorial Candidate for the 2003 Gubernatorial Election in Jigawa State. Put simply, the plaintiff wanted the Party - ANPP to sponsor him as the Party's candidate, as against the first defendant, in the 2003 Gubernatorial Election in Jigawa State. In other words, he went before the court and sought for an order directing his political party (ANPP) as to which of the two persons (the plaintiff and the first defendant) it ought to sponsor for the Gubernatorial Elections. This clearly is a political question.

By the authority of Onuoha v Okafor (supra) the trial High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The issue of who should be a candidate of a given political Party at any election is clearly a political one to be determined by the rules and constitution of the said party. In other words, it is a domestic issue and not such as would be justiciable in a court of law. This is so because the power and the right to nominate and sponsor a candidate to an election are vested in a political party and the exercise of this right is the domestic affair of the party, in this case the ANPP.

Now, the case of Onuoha v Okafor (supra) was brought to the attention of the trial Judge. Regrettably, for reasons best known to him, he chose to ignore it and proceeded to decide as follows:-

"There is no doubt that the court has no duty to nominate or elect a candidate for a political party, as it cannot campaign for the candidate. It is the constitutional responsibility of the concern party to campaign for their chosen, candidates but where as in this case the party had encouraged and permitted an individual to strive toward the realisation of his constitutional right as a citizen to vote and be voted for through the acceptance of prescription fee, processed nomination forms, and to further screen him for that purpose to stand for the election and win, yet the political party is allowed to turn its back against all the obvious solid grounds that entitles him to be the candidate of the party now for the post he is seeking, my view is dishonest and fraudulent, and contravenes item 15(5) of the 1999 Constitution.

The purported recognition of the first defendant by ANPP is illegal going by the evidence before the court. On the other hand evidence revealed and this Court is satisfied that the declaration of PW1 Nnoruka, the appointed chairman of the Primaries Election Committee for Jigawa State in which he genuinely returned the plaintiff as the winner at the sixth defendant ('INEC') has the opening to accept the plaintiff as the rightful candidate for the Gubernatorial Candidate for Jigawa State under the platform of the ANPP."

He concluded his judgment thus:-

"I also with the great respect call on the Supreme Court to re-amend its position on the internal affairs of political parties."

The conduct of the learned trial Judge I.U. Bello is, to say the least, most unfortunate. This Court is the highest and final court of appeal in Nigeria. Its decisions bind every court, authority or person in Nigeria. By the doctrine of stare decisis, the courts below are bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court. The doctrine is a sine qua non for certainty to the practice and application of law. A refusal, therefore, by a Judge of the court below to be bound by this Court's decision, is gross insubordination (and I dare say such a judicial officer is a misfit in the Judiciary).

It is for the foregoing reasons that I dismissed this appeal on 10 April 2003 with costs.

Kutigi, JSC:- I read in advance the reasons for judgment just rendered by my learned brother Katsina-Alu, JSC for dismissing the appeal herein on 10 April, 2003. I also indicated on that same day that I will give my reasons for dismissing the appeal today. I agree with the reasons so ably stated by my learned brother that. I adopt them as mine. I however wish to stress the point that the case of Onuoha v Okafor & others (1983) 14 NSCC 494, was rightly applied to the facts of this case by the Court of Appeal. It is unfortunate that although that case was cited to the trial Judge, he deliberately and consciously refused to apply it, because he thought the Supreme Court was wrong in its decision in that case. If the Supreme Court was wrong, he was also wrong not to have followed the age long established doctrine of stare decisis, otherwise known as judicial precedent. His action has been variously described as "gross insubordination", "judicial rascality," "reckless," "judicial impertinence" amongst others. I think he richly deserved the descriptions. I have nothing more to add.

Ogundare, JSC:- I dismissed this appeal on 10 April 2003 with N10,000 costs and indicated then that I would give reasons for my judgment on 4 July 2003. I now proceed to give my reasons for dismissing the appeal.

I have read in advance the reasons given by my learned brother Katsina-Alu, JSC for also dismissing the appeal. I agree with his reasons which I hereby adopt as mine. I only need to comment briefly on the issue of the territorial jurisdiction of the trial High Court of the FCT Abuja to entertain the suit in the first instance.

Three issues have been placed before us in this appeal and they read as follows:-

"1.     Whether the principles of the Supreme Court decision in Onuoha v Okafor & others (1983) 14 NSCC 494 a case based purely on selection rather than election of candidate and which was decided under a different constitution, with different provisions governing the two different cases, can oust the jurisdiction of a court of law from entertaining this action?

2.      Whether, in view of the provisions of Order 10 rule 4 of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja (Civil Procedure Rules) 1991, the court below was right in striking out the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the action.

3.      Whether, having regard to the subsisting order of the Court of Appeal to the effect that the appellants' (now respondents) brief of argument must be based upon settled Records of Appeal, the judgment now appealed against, based upon brief, which was not based upon the said settled record is not a nullity."

On Issue (2) which relates to the territorial jurisdiction of the trial High Court, Chief C.O. Akpamgbo, SAN learned leading Counsel for the appellant contended both in his brief and oral submissions before us that the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja had jurisdiction for the reasons that the substitution of the name of the first respondent for that of the appellant was done by the fourth respondent at the latter's Headquarters in Abuja and that the defendants were all resident in Abuja. He relied on Order 10 rule 4 of the Federal Capital Territory High Court Rules which provides:-

"(1)    All other suits shall, where the defendant resides or carries on business or where the cause of action arose in the Federal Capital Territory be commenced and determined in the High Court of the Federal Territory Abuja.

(2)     If there are more defendants than one resident in different Judicial Divisions, the suit may be commenced in any of the Judicial Divisions; subject, however, to any order which the court may, upon the application of any of the parties, or on its own motion, think fit to make with a view to the most convenient arrangement for the trial of the suit."

With profound respect to learned Senior Advocate, it is not the Rules of Court that vest jurisdiction in the Court but rather the statute creating that court. In this respect, it is to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 that one has to look to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja for it is Section 255(1) of the Constitution that established the court. Section 257 sets out its jurisdiction and it reads:-

"257. (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 251 and any other provisions of this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by law, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.

(2) The reference to civil or criminal proceedings in this Section includes a reference to the proceedings which originate in the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja and those which are brought before the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja to be dealt with by the court in the exercise of its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction."

It cannot be denied that the subject matter of the appellants' case relates to the governorship of Jigawa State, a territory that is distinct and separate from the Federal Capital Territory. If any court must have jurisdiction over such a subject matter, it has to be the court in Jigawa State. For the purpose of exercising jurisdiction each State of the Federation is independent of the other and the jurisdiction of its court is limited to matters arising in its territory. The court below, per Oguntade, JCA, was in my respectful view, correct when it held:-

"The evidence called by the first respondent upon which the judgment of the lower court was hinged clearly shows that nothing in connection with the primaries the subject matter of this dispute took place in Abuja. It is irrelevant that the defendants resided or had offices in Abuja. Would the first respondent have sued in Lagos or Port-Harcourt if the defendants had offices or reside in either of the two cites. There was no reason sustainable in law why the suit could be initiated in any venue other than Dutse or Kano. There was no jurisdiction in the Abuja High Court to entertain this suit. The lower court should have struck out the suit."

I have taken pains to discuss this judgment on territorial jurisdiction of a court in view of recent development whereby litigants rather than suing in the proper courts come to the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. I think their Lordships of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory ought to be circumspect before deciding whether or not it is wise and correct to exercise jurisdiction in matters outside the territory of the Federal Capital Territory. Their court, unlike the Federal High Court has jurisdiction only in matters arising out of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. Order 10 rule 4 is only to determine the proper judicial division of the court where a matter can be heard and determined.

I entirely agree with my learned brother Katsina-Alu that Onuoha v Okafor & others (1983) 14 NSCC 494 was rightly applied to the facts of the case on hand by the Court of Appeal. This case was cited to the trial Judge. He failed, rather he refused, to apply it. He thought the Supreme Court was wrong in its decision in that case and arrogantly closed his judgment in these words:-

"I also with great respect call on the Supreme Court to re-amend its position on the internal affairs of political parties."

This to my mind is the height of judicial impertinence ever exhibited by a Judge of a court lower than the Supreme Court. The doctrine of stare decisis is fully entrenched in our jurisprudence to ensure certainty of the law. Had the learned trial Judge in this case cared to read that case and the various dicta of their Lordships of this Court he would not have exhibited such crass ignorance that ran through his judgment. I think enough said on this the better.

Kalgo, JSC:- This appeal was dismissed by me on 10 April 2003. I indicated on that day, that I shall give my reasons for dismissing the appeal and I do so now.

I have had the privilege of reading in advance the reasons given by my learned brother Katsina-Alu, JSC in his leading judgment just delivered. I entirely agree with all the reasons given by him therein which I adopt as mine. I have no doubt in my mind that the decision of this Court in Onuoha v Okafor & others (supra), fully covered the main dispute in this case. It involved the decision of a political party, in this case the ANPP, to sponsor a candidate for the 2003 gubernatorial election. It appears to me based on Onuoha's case that irrespective of what happened at the primary election stage in this case, it is not the function of the court to compel the ANPP to sponsor any candidate in preference to another one from the same party, as in this case. That decision is entirely domestic political affair of the party, and it was in my view properly taken by the ANPP in this case.

My general comment on the last sentence in the judgment of the learned trial Judge which says:-

"I also with great respect call on Supreme Court to re-amend its position on the internal affairs of political parties."

is that it is rather daring and unfortunate. In my view it is a clear misconception of the well established principle of stare decisis in our judicial system. There is no doubt that the learned Judge had at the back of his mind the decision of this Court in Onuaha's case (supra) and he did not realise that his duty like all other Judges of the lower courts was to apply its ratio decidendi whether he agreed with it or not. See A-G, Ogun State v Egenti (1986) 3 NWLR (Part 28) 265; Emerah & Sons Ltd v A-G, Plateau State (1990) 4 NWLR (Part 147) 788. He could only avoid it where it was possible to distinguish the case he was dealing with from that of Onuaha. In this, case, he could not do so and so it was not open to him to avoid applying it to the case before him nor could he "advise" the Supreme Court to change its position on it. It is well-settled that the Supreme Court can only change its position in a case decided earlier by it where it considers, for good and substantial reasons, to overrule itself on an application where the need arises. Williams v Daily Times (1990) 1 NWLR (Part 124) 1; Rossek v A.C.B Ltd (1993) 8 NWLR (Part 312) 382; Johnson v Lawanson (1971) All NLR 58. Judges of the lower courts have no right under any circumstances to ask or advise this Court to change its decision in any case. Their duty is to follow the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in all cases, and apply them in similar cases before them.

It is for the above and the more detailed reasons given by Katsina-Alu, JSC in his leading judgment, that I dismissed this appeal on 10 May 2003, with costs.

Ejiwunmi, JSC:- I had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons for judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Katsina-Alu, JSC. I agree with them. Two issues clearly dominate the appeal. The first is, whether the action ought to have been brought before the Abuja High Court of the Federal Capital Territory rather than in the State where the event occurred. In support of the contention that the action could be brought before the Abuja High Court as was done in the case, learned Counsel for the appellant relied on Order 10 rule 4 of the Federal Capital Territory High Court Rules which provides:-

"(1)    All other suits shall, where the defendant resides or carried on business or where the cause of action arose in the Federal Capital Territory be commenced and determined in the High Court of the Federal Territory Abuja.

(2)     If there are more defendants than one resident in different judicial divisions, the suit may be commenced in any of the judicial divisions; subject, however, to any order which the court may, upon the application of any of the parties, or on its own motion, think fit to make with a view to the most convenient arrangement for the trial of the suit."

I do not consider that the learned Advocate can be right in his submission. With the greatest respect to him, it must be stated that the rules of court do not vest jurisdiction in court. Rather it is the status that created the court that also makes the necessary provision for the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, it is Section 255(1) of the Constitution that established the court. Its jurisdiction is set out in Section 257, thus:-

"257 (1)  Subject to the provisions of Section 251 and any other provisions of this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by law, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of any offence committed by any person.

(2) The reference to civil or criminal proceedings in this Section includes a reference to the proceedings which originate in the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja and those which are brought before the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja to be dealt with by the court in the exercise of its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction."

It is undeniable that the events that led to that action had to do with the governorship of Jigawa State. It is of course not debatable that Jigawa State is totally distinct and different from the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. It seems to me that if any action was to be properly commenced, that action should have been initiated in the court in Jigawa State. In this respect, I think it must be remembered that by our Constitution, each State of the Federation is independent of the other and the jurisdiction of each State is limited to matters arising in its territory. Hence the court below per Oguntade, JCA, was right when it held:-

"The evidence called by the first respondent upon which the judgment of the lower court was hinged clearly shows that nothing in connection with the primaries the subject matter of this dispute took place in Abuja. It is irrelevant that the defendants resided or had offices in Abuja. Would the first respondent have sued in Lagos or Port-Harcourt if the defendants had offices or reside in either of the two cities? There was no reason sustainable in law why the suit could be initiated in any venue other than Dutse or Kano. There was no jurisdiction in the Abuja High Court to entertain this suit. The lower court has struck out the suit."

I think what I have said above is to make it clear that courts ought to bear in mind that jurisdiction is not to be assumed, but must be based on the constitutional provisions that established the court.

I have already stated above that I agree with reasons given by my learned brother that the case Onuoha v Okafor & others (1983) 14 NSCC 494 applied to the facts of this case. It is difficult to understand the judicial reasoning which led the trial High Court to make the preposterous observation in his judgment when he said thus:-

"I also with respect call on the Supreme Court to re-amend its position on the internal affairs of political parties."

The less said about this observation the better. Suffice it to say that the Judge did not in making this statement bear in mind the settled principle of stare decisis, which compels him to abide by the decisions of Appellate Courts. In any event, had he properly understood the reasoning in the judgment delivered by the Justices of this Court in Onuoha v Okafor & others (supra), he would have refrained from making that observation. In this regard, it is apposite to quote the observation of Nnamani, JSC at 511 of Onuoha v Okafor & others (supra) which reads:-

"In the circumstances of this case, it seems to me that the only matter which would have properly called for determination by a court is the possibility of breach of the proprietary interest of the appellant. Regrettably that is not the matter before the courts. In my view, in the interest of the healthy growth of our democratic process, in an appropriate case (and I do not here decide that on the facts of this case this was necessarily one) political parties must by use of the remedy of damages be dissuaded from swapping one sponsored candidate for another without due regard to their constitution and/or the rules of natural justice." (My emphasis.)

Our courts must not allow itself to be drawn into the conflicting positions taken by our political parties when jockeying for political power. It is for the reasons stated above, and the fuller reasons given in the judgment of my learned brother Katsina-Alu, JSC that I dismissed this appeal on 10 April 2003 with N10,000 as costs.

Tobi, JSC:- On 10 April 2003, I dismissed the appeal and I indicated that day that I will give reasons for my judgment on 4 July, 2003. I now give my reasons.

Let me first take the issue of jurisdiction. Learned senior Advocate for the appellant, Mr C.O. Akpamgbo, submitted that the court below was wrong in holding that the suit ought to have been initiated in Dutse or Kano and not at the High Court of the FTC, as it overlooks both the appellant's pleadings, evidence and Order 10 of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1991.

Learned Senior Advocate for the first, second and third respondents, Mr Kehinde Sofola, submitted that since the subject matter of the suit is the primary election for the Jigawa State ANPP Gubernatorial Candidate, the court below was right in holding that there was no reason sustainable in law why the suit could be initiated in any venue other than Dutse or Kano. I think learned senior Advocate for the first, second and third respondents is correct. It is clear that the primaries, the subject matter of the action, was held in Kano.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides for the jurisdiction of the High Court of the States as well as the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. It does not appear to me that Section 257 of the Constitution can really accommodate the action. In the face of the constitutional provision, one cannot talk about a rule of court, which Order 10 rule 4 of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1991 is. The answer to Issue 2 is that the court below was right in striking out the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the action.

In Onuoha v Okafor (supra) the appellant brought an action to compel his political party-NPP-to nominate and sponsor him for election to a senatorial seat. The action was instituted in the High Court, which held in favour of the plaintiff. The respondents appealed against the decision to the Federal Court of Appeal, contending that a court of law ought not to entertain an action to determine who a political party should or should not sponsor. The appeal was allowed and the action was dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Nomination or sponsorship of a candidate for election is a political matter solely within the discretion of the party; accordingly, the appellant's claim should not have been entertained by the High Court.

Learned senior Advocate for the appellant, Mr C.O. Akpamgbo, submitted in his brief that Onuoha, a case based purely on selection rather than election, is not applicable to the facts of this case. Learned Senior Advocate submitted that in Onuoha there was no question of contesting for an election but it was a pure case of a panel of 10 members set up by the political party to select its candidates for senatorial seats in accordance with the party's own constitution.

Learned senior Advocate for the first, second and third respondents, Mr Kehinde Sofola, submitted in his brief that the issue before this Court is on all fours with the decision in Onuoha. He urged the court to follow its earlier decision in Onuoha. Counsel, quoted the decision of this Court in Onuoha in extenso. He called the attention of the court to the decision of the learned trial Judge who refused to follow the decision in Onuoha.

What are the facts of the case? The fourth respondent, ANPP, scheduled all its primary elections to hold on 3 January, 2003 at the various State capitals. In the case of Jigawa State, it took place in Dutse, the State capital on that day. In the primaries, the first defendant who is the first respondent in this appeal, Ibrahim Saminu Turaki, was returned as the 2003 ANPP Gubernatorial Candidate for Jigawa State.

The appellant filed an action in the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, for a declaration that the return was unconstitutional, and an injunction restraining the first respondent from interfering with the rights of the plaintiff. The learned trial Judge granted the prayers of the appellant. He said at 140 of the record:-

"The purported recognition of first defendant by ANPP is illegal going by the evidence before the court. On the other hand, evidence revealed and this Court is satisfied that the declaration of PW1, Mr Nnoruka, the appointed Chairman of the Primaries Election Committee for Jigawa State in which he genuinely returned the plaintiff as the winner at the sixth defendant ("INEC") has the opening to accept the plaintiff as the rightful candidate for the Gubernatorial Candidate for Jigawa State under the platform of the ANPP. This is the position and judgment of this Court on the plaintiff's claim, which has succeeded and accordingly granted. It is now left to the ANPP as a political party to demonstrate to the Nigerian citizens and the world its ability to uphold the tenets of the rule of law."

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. The judgment of the learned trial Judge was set aside. The plaintiff's suit was struck out. Relying on Onuoha v Okafor (supra), Oguntade, JCA, said at 362 of the record:-

"The lower court should have declined the invitation to adjudicate on this matter. It should have struck out this suit once it became manifest that what was in issue was a political decision to be made as to who should be the candidate for the ANPP. I decide this issue against the first respondent."

Is Onuoha distinguishable from the present case? That is the million naira question. Although Mr Akpamgbo came out brilliantly to argue that Onuoha is distinguishable from this case, I do not see any meaningful distinction that can make the difference in favour of his client. As it is, both cases, in my understanding, involved the sponsorship of a candidate by a political party. While Onuoha involved the political party of the NPP, this case involved the political party of the ANPP.

Mr Akpamgbo made strenuous efforts to distinguish between the words "selection" and "election". I do not see any meaningful distinction as both deal with the exercise of a choice or preference in respect of two or more things; in our context, between two or more candidates. As a matter of diction, the two words could conveniently be used interchangeably in relation to or in respect of the sponsorship of candidate to represent a political party, as in this appeal.

From the decision of this Court in Onuoha, it is clear that the right to sponsor a candidate by a party is not a legal right but a domestic right of the party which cannot be questioned in a court of law. The political party qua political organisation has a discretion in the matter, a discretion which is unfettered; in the sense that a court of law has no jurisdiction to question its exercise one way or the other. The moment a court goes into such a domestic affair of the party, it has involved itself in nominating a particular candidate, a jurisdiction which a court cannot exercise. While a court of law has the jurisdiction to declare a particular candidate as the winner of an election, a court of law cannot be involved in the domestic affair of nomination of a candidate or candidates in primaries.

One basic rationale behind this principle of law is that since persons have freely given their consent to be bound by the rules and regulations of a political party, they should be left alone to be governed by such rules and regulations. Once persons have freely mortgaged their consciences to a situation, courts of law should not interfere. I am of the view that Onuoha is applicable to this appeal and I so hold.

The learned trial Judge refused to follow Onuoha. That was not all. He asked this Court to re-amend its position in Onuoha. In his words:-

"I also with the great respect call on the Supreme Court to re-amend its position on the internal affairs of political parties."

The word "re-amend" gives the impression that this Court had earlier amended its position in Onuoha, whatever that means. I cannot remember the case in which this Court amended its position in Onuoha. But that is not very important. The important thing is that a trial Judge would have the courage and the strength not to follow a decision of the Supreme Court merely because he feels that the decision is wrong. As if that is not bad enough, the Judge has called upon this Court to "re-amend its position" to fall in line with his.

This is an extremely unfortunate situation. Apart from the fact that it attempts to destroy the well settled principles of stare decisis, this Court is invited to abandon its own correct decision to follow a wrong decision of a trial Judge. This is very serious. On my part, I will not obey him. He is wrong in his judgment and this Court is correct in Onuoha.

It is for the above reasons and the more detailed reasons given by my learned brother, Katsina-Alu, JSC, that I too dismiss the appeal.

Edozie, JSC:- This appeal by the plaintiff/appellant was heard and dismissed on 10 April 2003, and the reasons for the judgment reserved for today 4 July, 2003, I now give reasons for the judgment dismissing the appeal.

I had a preview of the lead judgment just read by my learned brother, Katsina-Alu, JSC, and I am in complete agreement with his reasons for dismissing the appeal and the severe strictures passed on the stubborn attitude of the trial Judge in refusing to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis.

The fundamental and overriding question for determination posed by all the parties, that is the plaintiff/appellant and the four sets of defendants/respondents, is as succinctly formulated in the first, second and third defendant's/respondents' brief, thus:-

"1.     Whether having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Onuoha v Okafor (1983) 14 NSCC 494, a court of law can validly assume jurisdiction in a case to elect or select a candidate for a political party in its internal affairs or nominate him for sponsorship in an election."

It was not in dispute that the issue that arose for determination in Onuoha's case (supra) was whether a court had the jurisdiction to entertain an action to determine the candidate whom a political party will sponsor for election to any elective office or seat in the Legislature.

In its unanimous decision, this court answered the question in the negative Obaseki, JSC, in his lead judgment had this to say at page 504 of the report:-

"The exercise of this right is domestic affair of the NPP guided by its constitution. There are no judicial criteria or yardsticks to determine which candidate a political party ought to choose and the judiciary is therefore unable to exercise any judicial power in the matter. It is a matter over which it had no jurisdiction. The question of the candidate a political party will sponsor is more in the nature of a political question which the courts are not qualified to deliberate upon and answer."

In the present appeal, the vital issue for determination is the same as in the case of Onuoha (supra). The gravamen of the plaintiff's case was that he won the Gubernatorial ANPP primary for Jigawa State conducted in Kano but that his political party, the ANPP chose the first defendant who apparently won't the primary conducted in Dutse, Jigawa State as the party's official candidate for governorship election in respect of Jigawa State. It seems to me obvious that the present case is on all fours with the Onuoha's case and by the doctrine of stare decisis, the principle of law enunciated in the Onuoha's case is binding in the present case.

It is evident that the attention of the trial court was drawn to the Onuoha's case (supra) but it refused to follow it on the ground as stated by it that:-

". . . where as in this case the party had encouraged and permitted an individual to strive toward (sic) the realisation of his constitutional right as a citizen to vote and be voted for through the acceptance of prescription fee, processed nomination forms, and further screen him for that purpose to stand for the election and win, yet the political party is allowed to turn its back against all the obvious solid grounds that entitles him to be the candidate of the party now for the post he is seeking, my view is dishonest and fraudulent. . . "

To some extent, I share the sentiments of the trial Judge that it is improper for a political party, having sponsored one of its members for an elective office, to later withdraw that sponsorship in breach of its constitution. But the apparent injustice is not without a remedy. Just as a servant cannot generally sue for re-instatement but can maintain an action for damages for unlawful termination of his employment by his master, so too, a candidate whose political party has withdrawn its earlier nomination for election has his remedy in an action for damages and not an action to compel the political party to sponsor him.

In this regard, the dictum of Nnamani, JSC, in Onuoha's case is apposite. At page 511 of the report, His Lordship said:-

"in my view, in the interest of the healthy growth of our democratic process, in an appropriate case (and I do not here decide that on the facts of this case this was a necessary one) political parties must be use of the remedy for damages be dissuaded from swapping one sponsored candidate for another without due regard to their constitution and/or the rules of natural justice."

In any event, even if the remedy of a candidate whose sponsorship for an election was withdrawn is not redressible in a court of law, that is no justification for the refusal of a lower court to follow the decision of a higher court.

The doctrine of judicial precedent, otherwise known as stare decisis, is not alien to our jurisprudence. It is well settled principle of judicial policy which must be strictly adhered to by all lower courts. While such lower courts may depart from their own decisions of higher courts even if those decisions were reached per curiam. The implication is that a lower court is bound by the decision of a higher court even where that decision was given erroneously: see Emerah & Sons Ltd v Attorney-General Plateau State & others (1990) 4 NWLR (Part 147) 788; Global Transport Oceanico S.A. v Free Ent. (Nigeria) Ltd (2002) 2 SC 154; (2001) 5 NWLR (Part 706) 426 at page 441.

In the case of N.A.B. Ltd v Berri Eng. (Nigeria) Ltd (1995) 8 NWLR (Part 413) 257 at page 280, the principle of judicial precedent was restated thus:-

"The doctrine of judicial precedent (otherwise called stare decisis) requires all subordinate courts to follow decisions of superior courts even where these decisions are obviously wrong having been based upon a false premise; this is the foundation on which the consistency of our judicial decision is based: see Ngwo v Monye (1970) 1 All NLR 91 at 100. It is, however, the principle of law upon which a particular case is decided that is binding. Such a principle is called the ratio decidendi. A statement made in passing by a Judge which is not necessary to the determination of the case in hand is not a ratio decidendi of the case but an obiter dictum and it has no binding effect for the purpose of the doctrine of judicial precedent: see Ofumme v Okoye (1966) 1 ANLR 94." See also the case of Clement v Iwuanyanwu (1989) 4 SC (Part 11) 89; (1989) 3 NWLR (Part 107) 39.