PRINCE YAHYA ADIGUN AND 2 ORS (APPELLANT)

v.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OYO STATE (RESPONDENT)

(1987) All N.L.R. 328

 

Division: Supreme Court of Nigeria

Date of Judgment: 14th April, 1987

Case Number: (SC 98/1986)

Before: Obaseki, Bello, Eso, Nnamani, Coker, Karibi-Whyte, Kawu, Oputa; JJ.S.C.

 

On the 20th March, 1987, the Supreme Court gave judgment in the appeal by the Appellants now Applicants, against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, wherein their appeal again to the judgment of the High court was dismissed in its entirety. The appeal to the Supreme Court was allowed in part and certain consequential orders were made. The present application is by the appellants invoking the provisions of section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution, 1979 on the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and asking for an order for a reversal of the decision earlier given by the Supreme Court. In effect, the appellants were seeking as relief, an appeal to the Supreme Court against its decision.

HELD

(1)     Section 6(6)(a) of the 1979 Constitution which provides judicial powers vested in the Courts shall extend notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the constitution to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law does not empower the court to review its own decision. If it were otherwise, there would be no finality about any judgment of this Court and every affected litigant could bring further appeals as it were ad infinitum. That is a situation that must not be permitted.

Appeal dismissed.

Chief F.R.A. Williams S.A.N. for Appellants with him S.B. Johnston; F.R.A. Williams (Mr).

Mr O.A. Boade, Snr. State Counsel, Oyo State for 1st, 6th-19th Respondents.

Chief J.O. Fawole & O. Ojutiku for 2nd, 3rd, 4th & 5th Respondents.

Cases Referred to:-

1.      Ashiyanbi v. Adeniji (1967) 1 All NLR. 82.

2.      Austin Moherman v. Nickels and Ors. 143 ALR. 1174, 1177.

3.      Bronik Motors Ltd. v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) 1 SC.N.R. 290.

4.      Chief Iro Ogbu & Qrs v. Chief Ogburu Urum (1981) 4S.C.I.

5.      Chukwuka v. Ezulike (1985) 5 N.W.L.R. 892 at 899.

6.      Hunley v. Wooton (1912) 29 TLQ 132.

7.      Ikechukwu & Ors v. Nwamkpa (1967) NMLR. 224.

8.      Minister of Lagos Affairs, Mines and Power & Anor v. Chief Akin-Olugbade & ors. (1974) 1 All NLR pt. 1 226.

9.      National Telephone Co. v. Post Master-General (1913) A.C. 546

10.    Nafiu Rabiu v. Kano State (1980) 8-11 SC. 130.

11.    Oba Jacob Oyeyipo v. Chief J.O. Oyinloye (1987) 1 NWLR (Part 50) 356.

12.    Obimunore v. Erinosho (1966) 1 All NLR 250.

13.    Patrick J. Osoba v. The Queen F.SC 141/196/decided on May 19, 1961.

14.    Shynne v. Shynne (1955) 3 All. ER 129 at 146.

15.    Sodeinde Brothers (Nig.) Ltd v. African Continental Bank Ltd. (1982) 6 SC. 137.

16.    Sken Consult (Nig.) Ltd & Anor. v. Godwin Okey SC/58/1980.

17.    Varty v. British South Africa Co. 1965 1 Ch 508.

18.    Yonwuren v. Modern Signs (Nig.) Ltd, 1985 1 NWLR Pt 2. 244

Statute Referred to:-

1.      Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979.

Rule Referred to:-

Rules of the Supreme Court (England).

Coker, J.S.C. On the 20th day of March 1987, the plaintiffs' appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal was partly allowed in respect of item 2, but their claims seeking an order for declaration that by the customary law prevailing in Iwo, the Ogunmakinde Ande Ruling House is the only Ruling House from which appointment to the Oluwo of Iwo Chieftaincy and for injunction against the defendants were dismissed. The Court further ordered inter alia that-

"A proper inquiry to be the basis of a new and proper declaration should be set in motion so that the stool vacancy can be filled within a minimum of delay."

The plaintiffs claims against the defendants jointly and severally were-

"(1)    A declaration that by the customary law prevailing in Iwo, the Ogunmakinde Ande Ruling House is the only Ruling House from which appointment to the Oluwo of Iwo Chieftaincy is to be made.

(2)     A declaration that the Instrument dated 28th day of July, 1981 is in so far as it purports to declare the customary law prevailing in Iwo with respect to the appointment to the Oluwo of Iwo Chieftaincy, is wrong and accordingly illegal and void.

(3)     An injunction restraining all servants, officers or agents of the Government of Oyo State or of the Iwo Central Local Government from acting pursuant to or taking any steps to implement the aforesaid declaration registered on 29th July, 1981."

The plaintiffs, it would appear from their application which I set out below, were not satisfied with the decision of the Court, applied to the Court for the following order-

"(1)    that notwithstanding the provisions of Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules this Honourable Court shall entertain the prayers contained in paragraph (ii) of this motion on Notice

(2)     that the judgments delivered by the Justices of this Honourable Court on the 20th day of March 1987 be amended to read as if-

(a)     the decision to dismiss the first claim of the plaintiff (i.e. the claim for declaration that by the customary law prevailing in Iwo, the Ogunmakinde Ande Ruling House is the only Ruling House from which appointment to the Oluwo of Iwo Chieftaincy is to be made) were deleted and that there should be substituted therefore a decision granting the said declaration.

(b)     all references to orders (in the nature of mandatory or prohibitory injunction or of mandamus or otherwise howsoever) not included among the reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs and directed against the said plaintiffs or directed against any of the other parties to the action were deleted from the said judgments.

(3)     Such further or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make."

The application further stated that the Plaintiffs/Appellants at the hearing of the Application will be relying on "the Record of Appeal, the Briefs filed by all the parties to the appeal and a brief to be filed in support of the application as soon as practicable hereafter." The grounds on which the application were stated include the following-

"(i) Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules ought not to be construed so as to deprive the Supreme Court of its undoubted inherent jurisdiction to correct errors drawn to its attention.

(ii) Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules is incapable of bearing a construction which has the effect of nullifying or rendering ineffective the provisions of Section 6(6) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.

(iii) In the premises it is competent for this Honourable Court to entertain prayers (ii) (a) and (b) of this Motion on Notice.

(iv) The learned Justices of this Honourable Court overlooked the effect of Section 9 of the Chiefs Law Cap. 21 Laws of Oyo State and its impact on the Plaintiffs' first claim.

(v) Save as expressly stated in their Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs herein are not claiming any order or orders (in the nature of mandatory or prohibitory injunction or of mandamus or otherwise however) against any of the other parties to this action and none of the defendants herein have failed a counterclaim to the plaintiff's action.

(vi) The decision whether or not to hold an inquiry into a Chieftaincy declaration is regulated by Section 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the chiefs Law of Oyo State and is purely one vested by law in the two tiers of the Executive Branch of the Government.

(vii) The decision whether to process the appointment of the next Oluwo of Iwo forthwith, or only after effect has been given to any decision to initiate and complete steps necessary to amend existing declaration relating to the Chieftaincy, is purely one for the Executive Branch of the Government.

(viii) In the Premises neither the court of trial nor this Honourable Court can, as part of its final judgment in the action herein, properly make the orders restraining or dispensing with the operation of the chieftaincy declaration now currently in force or direct the Oyo State Government to hold an inquiry into any matter concerning the chieftaincy."

Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985 referred to in grounds (i) and (ii) above reads-

"(16) The Court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission, or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning or intention. A judgment or order shall not be varied when it correctly represents what the Court decided nor shall the operative and substantive part of it be varied and a different form substituted."

A careful reading of the application and the grounds for making it leave one in no doubt that what the applicants were seeking is to challenge the validity of and for a reversal of the decision given by this Court delivered on the 20th March 1987. The application calls into question the Constitutional validity of Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985 and questions the validity of the order that a "new and proper declaration should be set into motion so that the stool vacancy can be filled within a minimum delay." In effect, the application was seeking as relief, an appeal to the Court against its decision.

When the application was called on Monday the 6th instant the Court asked Chief Williams, S.A.N., learned Counsel for the applicant whether the Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the applications. The learned Senior Advocate submitted that the Court has the power under its inherent jurisdiction and that is cumulative to the power of the court under Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985 and does not derogate from the power vested under section 6(6) (a) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federation. He then proceeded to submit that, notwithstanding the provision of section 215 of the Constitution, the Court has the inherent jurisdiction to review its decision and alter same as if it was sitting on appeal over its own decision. His argument and submissions were exactly the same as he did in at least three similar applications or matters which were rejected by this Court. As he was unable to advance any convincing argument to persuade the court to change its view as expressed in Minister of Lagos Affairs Mines and Power & Anor. v. Chief Akin-Olugbade & Ors. (1974) 11 S.C. 11 and other cases cited, the application was summarily dismissed on 6th April 1987 and I now give my reasons.

The earlier 1977 Rules of this Court, Order 7, rule 30 (1977 Rules) is identical with the Order 8, rule 16 of the 1985 Rules of the Supreme Court. The Rule reflects the view of the Courts relating to the extent of the power to correct or amend any error or mistake in any decision once given and delivered. See also Order VII, rule 29 of the Supreme Court Rules 1961 which provided that-

"The Court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save and except in accordance with the practice of the Court of Appeal in England."

The said rule came before the Court for consideration in Minister of Lagos Affairs Mines and Power & Annor. v. Chief Akin-Olugbade & Ors. (1974) 11 S.C. 11, Elias C.J.N. (as he then was) delivering the Ruling of the Court on an application by Chief F.R.A. Williams as counsel for the Egba Refugees (186) Descendants Community for an order.

"(1)    to review the decision of this Honourable Court delivered in the above-matter (i.e. Atkin-Olugbade & Ors. v. Onigbongbo Community & Ors. (1974) 6 S.C.1 delivered on June 21, 1974) pursuant to the provisions of Order VII rule 29 of the Supreme Court Rules 1961 in the manner and on the grounds set forth in schedule 1 of the Motion on Notice."

Objection was taken in limine by the respondents on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion, the court having held the view that application was not an appeal, the applicant was ordered to show that the Court had jurisdiction. As in this application, learned Counsel, Chief Williams, submitted that the court was entitled to review its own previous decisions-

"(a) Where the order of the Court has not been drawn up at the time of the application for a review and

(b)     Where the decision sought to be reviewed was given without jurisdiction."

In his argument before the court learned Counsel referred to Asshiyanbi & Ors. v. Adeniji (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 86 and Varty v. British South Africa Coy. (1965) 1 ch. 508 and In re Barber (1886) 17 Q.B.D.259. at p. 14 Elias, C.J.N. said-

"Learned Counsel submitted that in (b) it is immaterial whether the order has been drawn up or not, and further that the two principles enunciated by him would apply to any final court of appeal. He referred us to Ashiyanbi and Ors. v. Aeniji (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 82, where this Court thoroughly examined the circumstances in which it will review its own previous judgment. We will do no more than observe that this case is one involving and decided upon the "slip rule" for the correction or modification of an order or orders embodied in a judgment on the ground that the order as drawn up did not represent what the court had intended to record. The case is clearly no authority for the proposition that issues relating to fact or law in the judgment itself could be the subject matter by this Court."

And later at p. 16, he stated-

"Learned Counsel or the applicants also argues that in Varty v. British South African Coy. (1965) 1 Ch. 508 and In Re Barber (1886) 17 Q.D. 259 the Court of Appeal in England reversed its previous decision in each case after a review following further arguments by counsel on certain points. We would only say here that in such cases involving a review of matters of fact or law, the court of Appeal in England has always acted suo motu, and that we are unable to agree with learned Counsel that such reviews had been undertaken at the instance of a party to the case. No authority was cited to us on this point, although learned Counsel erroneously attempted to equate the amendment of the compromise judgment in the instant Onigbongbo Community Case with the situation under discussion."

Finally, at p. 19 he stated-

"We are firmly of the view that Order 7, r. 29 of our Supreme Court Rules, 1972 envisages only an application for the invocation of the "slip rule" as adumbrated in Ashiyanbi's case and that it does not enable an application to be brought for the review of any fact or law in a previous judgment of this Court. To allow that to be done would amount to treating the application as an appeal, and this could not be in view of the provisions of s. 120 of the Constitution of the Federation, 1963."

Section 215 of the 1979 Constitution which is same as section 120 of the 1963 Constitution of the Federation, provides that no appeal shall lie to any other body or person from any determination of the Supreme Court.

And after referring to the unreported case of Patrick J. Osoba v. The Queen F.S.C. 141/1961 decided on May 19, 1961, the Court came to the conclusion that Order 7, rule 29 did not go further than the "slip rule" and that the allegations were not directed towards any clerical mistake either in the judgment of the court under attack, and that since issues of fact and law were raised for determination by the review sought, the remedy if any, did not come within the purview of the "slip rule". Finally, the learned Chief Justice then referred with approval to the statement of Morris, L.J. in Shynne v. Shynne (1955) All E.R. 129 at p. 146.

"Where a Court has decided an issue and the decision of the Court is truly embodied in some judgment or order that has been made effective, then the Court cannot reopen the matter and cannot substitute a different decision in place of the one which has been recorded. Those who seek to alter must in those circumstances invoke such appellate jurisdiction as may apply."

Section 6(6) (a) of the 1979 Constitution which provides judicial powers vested in the Courts shall extend notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the constitution to all inherent powers and sanctions of a Court of Law does not empower the Court to review its own decision. If it were otherwise, to borrow the words of Elias, in Chief Akin-Olugbade's case supra, "there would be no finality about any judgment of this Court and every affected litigant could bring further appeals as it were, ad infinitum. That is a situation that must not be permitted."

The grounds on which this application was brought showed clearly that the Court was being asked to sit on appeal over its own decision. In other words, that the decision is wrong because of the effect of section 9 of the Chiefs Laws Cap. 21 Laws of Oyo State on the plaintiffs case, that as there was no claim in the nature of order of mandamus or prohibitory injunction the court had no jurisdiction to take the order directing the Government of Oyo State to order an inquiry into the Chieftaincy declaration under the Chiefs Law of Oyo State, which is a power vested in the Executive arm of Oyo State Government. In short, the application sought for an order that the court should sit on appeal over its own judgment. It is my considered view that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court does not extend so far. At p. 86 in Ashiyanbi's case supra, Coker, J.S.C., after referring to the judgment of Lord Denning, M.R. in Varty (Inspector of Taxes v. British South Africa Co. (1965) 1 Ch. 508 at p. 515 state-

"It has not been contended before us however, that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in this respect would entitle the Court to effect an amendment which would tantamount to re-hearing an order which it intended to make but which it is said it ought to have made."

The Ashiyanbi's case clearly established the principle that the Court "while able to correct a misnomer or misdescription under 'slip rule' will not under that Rule, whether in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction or by the powers conferred by the Rule of Court, vary a judgment or order which correctly represents what the Court decided nor will it vary the operative and substantive part of its judgment so as to substitute a different form."

In conclusion I will refer to the decision of this Court in Chukwuka v. Ezulike (1986) 5N.W.L.R. 892 at p.899 where Anbiagolu, J.S.C. said-

"The above Order 8 Rule 16 has identical wordings with Order 7 Rule 30 of the 1977 Rules of the Supreme Court under which Chief Iro Ogbu And Ors. v. Chief Ogburu Urum and Anor. (1984) 4 S.C.I. was decided. In Iro Ogbu (supra) this Court (per Obaseki, J.S.C.) at p. 9 stated as follows-

"I am aware that since the order of dismissal was delivered by the court, the judgment has been drawn up, signed and sealed.

Even if it were not drawn up, signed and sealed, the provision of Order 7 rule 30 deprives this Court of any jurisdiction to review the judgment of dismissal for want of prosecution. The inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 6(6) (a) of the constitution cannot be invoked to save the situation. This Court is therefore unable and incompetent to entertain this application to direct that the appeal be re-entered." ..........

..........

Iro Ogbu (supra) was approved and followed in Sodeinde Brothers (Nig.) Ltd. v. A.C.B. Ltd. (1982) 6 S.C. 137. But Iro Ogbu (supra) was still being pursued angrily by some Counsel with the drawn dagger of an assassin. This Court, in a final bid to settle the issue, in T.A. Yonwuren v. Modern Signs (Nig.) Ltd.; John Enemoh & Anor v. Chief Daniel Onokpite and Ors. and Udealo Nwaopa v. Nwannoli Nwakonobi (1985) 2 S.C. 86 (Consolidated) empanelled a full Court which returned the same verdict that this Court has no jurisdiction inherent or pursuant to the 1977 Supreme Court Rules, to re-enter an appeal dismissed under Order 9 Rule 7 of the 1977 Rules-a fortiori, to re-enter an appeal dismissed under Order 8 Rule 16 of the 1985 Rules. Chief Williams' ingenious argument in the present matter was another way-subtle and penetrating-of resurrecting the old tirade against Iro Ogbu (supra) and Yonwuren (supra)."

For the above reasons, I dismissed the application on 6th April 1987, holding that the Court had not the jurisdiction to entertain the application.

Obaseki, JSC. The applicants were the appellants in the above numbered appeal under which this application was brought. Judgment in the appeal was delivered on the 20th day of March 1987 and from the terms of the judgment, the applicants succeeded in two out of the three claims filed in the High Court. The applicants had in the High Court and the Court of Appeal lost all the three claims. On the determination of the appeal, this Court became functus officio. It appears the applicants were not satisfied with that part of the judgment that dismissed one of the claims and the consequential order for a new inquiry following the successful appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal in respect of claims 2 and 3.

On the 23rd day of March, 1987, the applicants filed an application praying the court to review the judgment, grant the claim that was dismissed and revoke the consequential order notwithstanding the provisions of Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court rules 1985. Expressly, the motion prays for an order:

(2)     that notwithstanding the provisions of Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1985, this Honourable Court shall entertain the prayers continued in paragraph (ii) of this motion on Notice;

(2)     That the judgments delivered by the Justices of this Honourable Court on the 20th day of March, 1986 be amended to read:

(a)     the decision to dismiss the first claim of the plaintiff (i.e. the claim for declaration that by the customary law prevailing in Iwo, the Ogunmakinde Ande Ruling House is the only Ruling House, from which appointment to the Oluwo of Iwo Chieftaincy is to be made) were deleted and that there shall be substituted therefore a decision granting the said declaration;

(b)     all references to orders (in the nature of mandatory or prohibitory injunction or of mandamus or otherwise howsoever) not included among the reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs and directed against the said plaintiffs or directed against any of the other parties to the action were deleted from the said judgments;

(3)     such further or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make."

The grounds upon which the application was based numbered eight and were fully set out in the motion paper. Further the applicants gave notice that:

"at the hearing of the application, the plaintiffs/appellants will rely on the Record of Appeal, the Briefs filed by all parties to the appeal and a Brief to be filed in support of the application as soon as practicable hereafter."

The applicants never filed any brief in support of the application. However, the grounds of the application set out in the motion paper contained sufficient material to give an outline of the argument of counsel.

The application was set down for hearing on the 6th day of April, 1987. At the hearing, the Court decided to hear arguments on the issue of jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the application as set out in the motion paper. After hearing arguments of learned Counsel for the parties, I, in concurrence with all my learned brothers who heard the matter, decided that the inherent powers of the Court cannot be invoked to entertain the matters set out in the motion paper and thereupon dismissed the application. I then indicated that I would give my reasons for the Ruling today, 14th day of April, 1987. I now proceed to give them. Before now, I had the privilege of a preview of the Reasons For Ruling just delivered by my learned brother, Coker, J.S.C. They fully accord with my Reasons for dismissing the motion and I hereby adopt them as my own. I will however add the following additional comments.

Chief F.R.A Williams, SAN who appeared as leading learned Counsel for the applicants spared no effort to persuade this Court to his view that Order 8 Rule 16 Supreme Court rules 1985 had eroded the inherent powers given to this Court by section 6(6)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic 1979. He further contended that the inherent powers vested by section 6(6)(a) of the Constitution is so expensive that being a constitutional provision, the restriction or limitation imposed by Order 8 Rule 16 Supreme Court Rules 1985 is a nullity. It is therefore necessary to re-examine the provision of section 6(6)(a) of the Constitution which reads:

"The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provision of this section shall extend notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law."

And Order 8 Rule 16 Supreme Court Rules 1985 reads-

"The court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning and intention. A judgment or order shall not be varied when it correctly represents what the court decided nor shall the operative and substantive part of it be varied and different form substituted."

The powers or inherent powers of the court of the court of law are powers which enable it effectively effectually to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it. The jurisdiction given to the Supreme Court by the Constitution is to hear and determine the matters set out and specified in section 213(1) and (2) and section 213(1) and (2) (a, b, c, d, e and f) of the Constitution. In the course of the discharge of its main duty of adjudication, the court takes and expresses its decision which it intends to give in the matter in writing and delivers it. See section 258(1) of the Constitution. If the decision is what the court intends to give in the matter, that is the end of the adjudication process. If the expression used does not accurately convey the court's intention both Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985 and section 6(6)(a) of the Constitution enable the court to make the necessary correction but if the terms of the judgment correctly conveys the intention of the court, neither the inherent powers of the court nor Order 8 Rule 16 Supreme Court Rules 1985 allows an alteration in the judgment to convey a different intention. I cannot therefore see any conflict between the two provisions. Learned counsel for the applicants also contended that section 6(6)(a) cannot be limited by the provision of section 215 of the Constitution which reads:

"without prejudice to the powers of the President or of the Governor of a State with respect to the prerogative of mercy, no appeal shall lie to any other body or person from any determination of the Supreme Court." (Italics mine)

This provision gives a stamp of finality to the determination by the Supreme Court. There is no constitutional provision for the review of the judgments of the Supreme Court by itself. Indeed, if there were, it would constitute an appeal into which category the present application falls. But as the Constitution and the law now stand, there cannot be an appeal questioning the decision of the Supreme Court to itself or to any body. This is good for the integrity of the courts as there must be finality to litigation when a matter has undergone two, three or four appeals.

I would, in conclusion, observe that this Court has in several cases refused to exercise its inherent powers to review its decisions and this is not the first occasion that such application as this is coming before it. Mention may be made of:

(1)     Ashiyanbi v. Adeniji (1967) 1 All NLR. 82

(2)     Minister of Lagos Affairs, Mines and Power & Anor. v. Akin-Olugbade & Ors. (1974) 11 SC. 11

(3)     Chief Iro Ogbu & Ors. v. Chief Ogburu Urum (1981) 4SC. 1

(4)     John Chukwuka & Ors. v. N. G. Ezulike (1986) 5 NWLR. 892 (Part 45)

(5)     Oba Jacob Oyeyipo v. Chief J.O. Oyinloye (1987) 1 NWLR (Part 50) 536.

This does not mean that when a proper case comes before the Court in which the court is satisfied that the matters sought to be amended can be amended within the provisions of the law, it will not exercise its inherent power. But it will be scandalous and suspect of improper and corrupt motives if the court, after delivering a well considered judgment, reserved for about three months, were to be allowed to turn round and deliver a different decision. I have no doubt that such conduct will mark the onset of the erosion of confidence in the integrity of the court and the destruction of the courts' competence to do justice. It will be the death of justice which the courts are established to administer.

It was for the above reasons that I dismissed the application on the 6th day of April, 1987.

Eso, JSC. The issues raised in this application filed by Chief F.R.A. Williams SAN on behalf of the Appellants in this case are two fold. They are-

(1)     whether or not this Court has inherent jurisdiction to amend its decision after judgment has been delivered in a matter placed before it.

(2)     If it has, what is the nature and extent of such jurisdiction?

Both issues are important, though it is easier to deal with the first one. It is the second issue that creates some problem. In this particular instant, having listened to the submissions of learned Counsel this Court had no difficulty in dismissing the application. I indicated on that day, that is 6th April 1987, that I would give my reasons today, and these are the Reasons.

My learned brother Coker J.S.C. who had just read his Reasons for judgment has given a full background to the application and I consider it unnecessarily excessive to duplicate this effort.

I will however, in addition to what my learned brother has said, and with which I am in agreement, deal with the two issues identified supra, and I will start, in regard to the first issue with the Constitutional provisions, Section 6(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 has vested the judicial powers of the Federation in the courts established under the Constitution for the Federation. These courts obviously includes the Supreme Court of Nigeria. Then sub-section (6)(a) of the section provides-

"6      (6)     The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section-

(a)     shall extend, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law."

Now, this provision is very interesting. A first reading of it would appear as if the inherent jurisdiction is only a product of the Constitution. It is not. It was there in specific cases even before the provisions of the Constitution. For instance, the Court has always had inherent jurisdiction to stay an action which must fail; an action brought by an infant suing by a next friend which clearly is brought in the interest of the next friend and not the infant. See Hurley v. Wooton (1912) 29 TLQ 132. In Lawrance v. Norrays (1890) 15 AC 210 Lord Herchell, in extending inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action which is an abuse of the process of the Court said-

"It cannot be doubted that the Court has an inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action which is an abuse of the process of the Court. It is a jurisdiction which ought to be very sparingly exercised, and only in very exceptional cases. I do not think its exercise would be justified merely because the story told in the pleadings was highly improbable, and one which it was difficult to believe could be proved."

Right under the Common Law a court has inherent jurisdiction before the entry of judgment in the case or the drawing up of an order after a judgment has been entered, to reconsider the matter. That was precisely what happened before Kay J. in In re Gray, Dresser v. Gray (1887) 36 Ch.D. 205 at p. 212. After reconsidering the matter he declared-

"It seems to me that my judgment on the former occasion was entirely right.

A Court has inherent jurisdiction to correct errors and slips, giving rise to the so called "slip rule".

The Constitution has just merely reaffirmed this inherent jurisdiction in the Court. It seems to me that to listen to the application brought by Chief Williams, it is only under our inherent jurisdiction that we could take the application, and decide how far to extend that inherent jurisdiction.

This takes me to the second question. What is the nature and scope of this inherent jurisdiction. From my understanding of the submissions of learned Counsel, he is saying it is not limited to the slip rule. Learned counsel, started with the innoduous statement that the power of the Court to correct the terms of its own judgment is part of its own inherent jurisdiction. He said-

"It can be corrected before the order is drawn up"

To pause here for a moment. I do not see how I could quarrel with this submission for it correctly, if I may respectfully say so, summarise the "slip rule" Counsel said further-

"Once the order had not been drawn up, it is the inherent jurisdiction of the court to correct the situation."

Again, this correctly puts the common law position. Counsel then referred us to some authorities to with-

Ashiyanbi v. Adeniji 1967/1 All NLR.82.

Varty v. BNrfityish South Africa Co. /1965/Ch.D. 508.

Austin Moherman v. Nickels and anor. 143 ALR. 1174, 1177.

and our Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules.

Let me however start with Constitutional provisions. S.213 (1) of the 1979 Constitution provides-

"The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court of law in Nigeria to hear and determine appeals from the Court of Appeal"

S. 215 of the same Constitution provides-

"Without prejudice to the powers of the President or of the Governor of a State with respect to prerogative of mercy no appeal shall be to any other body or person from the determination of the Supreme Court."

With these provisions therefore, as they are, subject to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under the Common Law or as conferred by the Constitution-the decision of the Supreme Court is final. Final in the sense of real finality in so far as the particular case before that court is concerned. It is final for ever, except there is legislation to the contrary, and it has to be a legislation ad hominen. The Supreme Court, and it is only the Supreme Court, may depart from the principles laid down in their decision in the case in future cases but that does not alter the rights, privileges or detriment to the parties concerned, arising from the original case. Such is the Constitutional power of the Supreme Court, that learned Counsel, probably rightly, wondered if the Justices of the Supreme Court were supermen. Let me answer the question. The Supreme Court is, under the Constitution, a super Court, deliberately meant and made to be so, by the organic law, and the Justices of that Court, now only to that extent of their decision are super men, meant to be so and so made by the Constitution.

Of course, neither the Court nor the Justices are meant to, or could even be infallible. But the price paid for finality in litigation is that the notion or the dread of infallibility has been sacrificed by the Constitution on the alter of finality. The society can never be stable if there is no such finality in litigation. It is, I very respectfully hold, desirable to have such finality, notwithstanding the price paid for it. As it is usually put, there must be an end to litigation.

It is such dread powers, therefore, that must necessitate and warrant great care in the calibre of the Court and such dread that must necessitate pungent and constructive analytical criticism of every judgment of the Court in law journals and similar fora. The judgments of a Court should not be treated with sacred sanctity, once it gets to the right critical forum. And in this respect, I must respectfully comment the tenacity of learned Senior Advocate, Chief F.R.A. Williams S.A.N. not only in bringing this application but in arming it with force and the wealth of authorities he had presented to the Court.

Now Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rule 1985 provides-

"16     The Court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission, or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning or intention. A judgment or order shall not be varied when it correctly represents what the Court decided nor shall the operative and substantive part of it be varied and a different form substituted. (Italics mine).

This also repeats the common law "slip rule" and I will agree with Chief Williams it does not really derogate from the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in that respect.

In Ashiyanbi v. Adeniji (supra) this Court approved of the English Master of the Rools Lord Dennings's observations in Varty (Inspector of Taxes) v. British South African Co. supra. G. B.A. Coker J.S.C. delivering the judgment of this Court said

"It seems to us, after listening to both side, that there is a measure of agreement on the extent of the inherent jurisdiction of the court to correct or amend the terms of its own judgments so long as those judgment have not been formally drawn up (see the observations of Lord Denning, M.R. in Varty (Inspector of Taxes) v. British South Africa Co. (1965) Ch. 508 at p. 515). It has not been contended before us, however, that the inherent jurisdiction of the court in this respect would entitled the court to effect an amendment which would be tantamount to re-hearing an order which it intended to make (and did make) but which it is said it ought not to have made. The jurisdiction of the court to correct its records before the drawing up of the formal order is one that calls for the exercise of strict judicial discretion." (Italics mine)

The learned justice of the Supreme Court was very careful enough not to extend the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to sitting on appeal over its own judgment.

In Varty's case, after all the learned Counsel had made submissions, the following is quoted from the Report-

"On April 28, 1964, the court gave judgment dismissing the appeal and granting leave to appeal to the House of Lords. On May 28, 1964, Lord Denning M.R. told counsel that the court had taken" the unusual course of putting the case in the list for re-argument because on reading through and revising the oral judgment which had been delivered, the court felt it would like to hear the case further argued particularly on the question whether the commissioners were right in considering the option to be a trading asset. (underlining mine)

It is to be noted that the action taken by the Court of Appeal was clearly a month after the judgment had been delivered. Then counsel addressed at length and the court thereafter adjourned 'Court adv vult". Lord Denning then said on resumption of the Court-

"On April 28, 1964, we first heard argument in this case. We then gave reasons for dismissing the appeal. But on thinking over the case afterwards, we thought that there were points on which we would like to hear further argument. We directed, therefore, that the order of dismissal should not be drawn up and the case should be set down for further argument. We told counsel of the points we had in mind and on May 28, 1964, we had the benefit of their submission upon them. In these circumstances our previous judgments should be regarded as interlocutory observation only; and we will now give our final judgments." (Italics mine)

This, no doubt was a most unusual course. Firstly to distinguish that case from the instant appeal it was the court itself which suo motu thought over the case afterwards and decided to "regard as interlocutory observations only" their earlier judgments. But would it make any difference if points upon which the court ought to have heard further arguments, had been pointed out to the Court by counsel even before the Court saw or without the Court seeing those points. I think it does a great deal. For in so far as the Court is concerned, if it considered the "Judgments" it earlier gave as interlocutory observations only, then the Court had not given a final judgment. Once it gives that final judgment, and whatever it considers to be the final judgment, subject to the "slip rule" the Court is functus officio.

I think the Common Law position has been admirably summed up in the American authority to which Chief Williams has kindly directed our attention. It is Moherman v. Nickels 143 ALR 1174. Hart J. delivering the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court said, and I think this is correct of our own jurisdiction-

"At common law, a court of general jurisdiction has power to control its own orders and judgments during the term at which they are made or rendered, and the power, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to vacate or modify them. 31 American Jurisprudence 272, Section 727. This is an inherent power of the court independent of any statutory authority therefore. 31 American Jurisprudence 268, Section 718. The power of the trial court in this respect has been recognized by this Court on numerous occasions."

Let us now look at the order sought in this application. It is-

"2.     that the judgments delivered by the Justices of this Honourable Court on the 20th day of March 1987 be amended to read as if-

(a)     the decision to dismiss the first claim of the plaintiff (i.e. the claim for declaration that by the customary law prevailing in Iwo, the Ogunmakinde Ande Ruling House is the only Ruling House from which appointment to the Oluwo of Iwo Chieftaincy is to be made) were deleted and that there should be substituted therefore a decision granting the said declaration

(b)     all references to orders (in the nature of mandatory or prohibitory injunction or of mandamus or otherwise howsoever) not included among the reliefs claimed by the Plaintiffs and directed against the said Plaintiffs or directed against any of the other parties to the action were deleted from the said judgments."

The first claim was of course a declaratory action. This court dismissed that Claim. The order sought to "amend" the decision is that this Court should reverse itself and grant the declaration. Of course only a Court of Appeal can do that, and I have earlier postulated, there is no Court of Appeal over this Court.

Again counsel intended at the hearing to-

"rely on the Record of Appeal, the Briefs filed by all parties to the appeal and a brief to be filed in support of the Application as soon as practicable hereafter."

Indeed grounds of appeal are even specified .They are-

(iv) The learned Justices of this Honourable Court overlooked the effect of Section 9 of the Chiefs Law Cap. 21 Laws of Oyo State and its impact on the Plaintiffs' first claim.

(v) Save as expressly stated in their Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs herein are not claiming any order or orders (in the nature of mandatory or prohibitory injunction or of mandamus or otherwise howsoever) against any of the other parties to this action and none of the defendants herein have filed a counterclaim to the plaintiff's action.

(vi) The decision whether or not to hold an inquiry into a Chieftaincy declaration is regulated by Sections 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State and is purely one vested by law in the two tiers of the Executive Branch of the Government.

(vii) The decision whether to process the appointment of the next Oluwo of Iwo forthwith, or only after effect has been given to any decision to initiate and complete steps necessary to amend existing declaration relating to the Chieftaincy, is purely one for the Executive Branch of the Government.

(viii) In the premises neither the court of trial nor this Honourable Court can, as part of its final judgment in the action herein, properly make the orders restraining or dispensing with the operation of the chieftaincy declaration now currently in force or direct the Oyo State Government to hold an inquiry into any matter concerning the chieftaincy."

These are positively beyond what the Court could "smuggle in" relying on its inherent jurisdiction. It will be flouting the Constitution by giving itself a power to sit on a second Supreme Court decision in the same case.

For these reasons and the reasons contained in the Reasons for Ruling which have just been delivered by my learned brother Coker J.S.C. on this his last sitting on the Supreme Court Bench, I dismissed the application.

Nnamani, JSC. In the substantive appeal in this suit, judgment was given by this Court on 20th March, 1987. By notice of motion dated 23rd March, 1987, the plaintiffs Applicants through their counsel, Chief F.R.A. Williams, S.A.N., brought a motion praying this Court, constitute by this same panel that delivered the judgment earlier mentioned for the following order-

"(1)    that notwithstanding the provisions or Order 8, Rule 18 of the Supreme Court Rules, this Honourable Court shall entertain the prayers contained in paragraph (ii) of this motion on Notice

(2)     that the judgment delivered by the Justices of this Honourable Court on the 20th day of March, 1987 be amended to read as if-

(a)     the decision to dismiss the first claim of the plaintiff (re the claim for declaration that by the customary law prevailing in Iwo, the Ogunmakinde Ande Ruling House is the only Ruling House from which appointment to the Oluwo of Iwo Chieftaincy is to be made) were deleted and that there should be substituted thereafter a decision granting said the declaration.

(b)     all references to orders (in the nature of mandatory or prohibitory injunction or of mandamus or of otherwise howsoever) not included among the reliefs claimed by the Plaintiffs or directed against any of the other parties to the action were deleted from the said judgments"

...AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that at the hearing of this application the Plaintiffs/ Appellants will rely on the Record of Appeal the Briefs filed by all the parties to the appeal and the brief to be filed in support of the Application as soon as practicable hereafter."

It is pertinent to mention that of the 8 grounds on which the application was based grounds (i) and (ii) were that-

(i) Order 8, Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules ought not to be construed so as to deprive the Supreme Court of its undoubted inherent jurisdiction to correct errors drawn to its attention.

(ii) Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules is incapable of bearing a construction which has the effect of nullifying or rendering ineffective the provisions of Section 6 (6)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of NIGERIA, 1979."

It is also pertinent to mention that the application was brought under Section 6(6)(b) of the 1979 Constitution and the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.

Learned Senior Advocate for the Applicants, Chief Williams was invited as this Court had done in Minister of Lagos Affairs, mines and Power & Anor vs Chief Akin-Olugbade and Ors. (1974) 1 All NLR pt 1 226, to satisfy this Court that it had jurisdiction to entertain this application. After considering his argument and that of learned Counsel to the Respondents, O.A. Boade Esq, and Chief J.O. Fawole, I refused the application and dismissed it. I indicated that I would give my reasons today. I now give the reasons.

I have before now had a preview of the lead reasons for the ruling just delivered by my learned brother, Coker, J.S.C. I entirely agree with them, and as they were the reasons for my own decision, I would adopt the. Due, however, to the importance of the issues raised in this application, I would wish to make some comments, albeit briefly.

I think the argument of Chief Williams can be briefly summarised. His main submission was that the power of this Court to amend the terms of its judgment is part of its inherent jurisdiction as a Court of Justice. Comparing our Order 8, Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985 with Order 26, rule 11 of the Supreme Court Rules in England he argued that our rule ought not to be construed as detracting from that inherent jurisdiction. Further on Order 8, rule 16, it was his view that being a rule of court it cannot override the provision of Section 6(6)(a) of the 1979 Constitution which had given the Superior Courts all the inherent powers of a Court. Finally, on Section 215 of the Constitution which gave finality to the decisions of this Court, he contended that the contents of section 8(6)(a) of the same Constitution meant that that section could override Section 215. He buttressed his argument by reference to Ashiyanbi v. Adeniji (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 82; Varty v. British South African Coy. (1965) 1 Ch.D.503, 512, 515; Hehermany Nickles 143, American Law Reports 1174, 1177

In their argument, both Mr Boade and Chief Fawole submitted that this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. They relied on Section 215 of the Constitution and Order 8, Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985. They also relied on Asiyanbi (Supra) as well as on T. A. Yonwuren Modern Signs (Nig.) Ltd (1985) 1 N.W.L.R pt. 2. 244.

I think it is convenient to start this comment by stating that from the terms of this application there can be no doubt that what the applicants desire is a review of the decision of this Court given on 20th March, 1987. From the terms of the orders sought, the applicants do not desire a correction of any errors but, as stated earlier, an amendment of its earlier decision by deleting some portions. From the contents of the grounds on which the application was based, this Court was in effect being invited to amend a wrong decision, for how else can such grounds as: "The learned Justices of this Honourable Court overlooked the effect of Sections 9 of the Chiefs Law Cap. 21 Laws of Oyo State and its impact on the Plaintiffs first claim and "The decision whether or not to hold an inquiry into a Chieftaincy declaration is regulated by Sections 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State and is purely one vested by law in the two tiers of the Executive Branch of the Government" be construed. Further more, from the materials which the applicants' counsel proposed to use in the course of argument of the application as disclosed in the motion paper, this Court was being asked to sit on appeal over its decision of 20th March, 1987. The question for determination therefore was, did it have jurisdiction to embark on such an exercise? The question had over the years come to this Court in various guises; but I believe that since 1979 this is the first time it is coming in a manner which puts its undoubted inherent jurisdiction so high that it would not only override the Rules of this Court (made pursuant to Section 218 of the constitution) and even Section 215 which puts a stamp of finality on the judgments of this Court as the Court as the Court of last resort in NIGERIA. To answer this question, one must have recourse to Section 6(6)(a), and 213(1) and (6), 215, and 216 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of NIGERIA, 1979, as well as to Order 8, Rule 18 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1985. I shall set them down.

"6      The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Section-

(a)     shall extend, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this constitution, to all the inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law; (Italics mine)

..........

213     (1)     The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court of law in NIGERIA to hear and determine appeals from the Federal Court of Appeal ..........

..........

(6)     Any right of appeal to the Supreme Court from the decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal conferred by this Section shall, subject to Section 216 of this Constitution, be exercised in accordance with any Act of the National Assembly and rules of court for the time being in force regulating the powers, practice and procedure of the Supreme Court.

215. Without prejudice to the power of the President or of the Governor of a State with respect to prerogative of mercy, no appeal shall lie to any other body or person from any determination of the Supreme Court.

216. Subject to the provisions of any Act of the National Assembly, the chief Justice of NIGERIA may make rules for regulating the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court"

Then Order 8, Rule 16 provides that-

"The Court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission, or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning or intention. A judgment or order shall not be varied when it correctly represents what the court decided nor shall the operative and substantive part of it be varied and a different form substituted."

I shall not dwell on Asiyanbi's case as that case related to the old Order 7, rule 29 of the Supreme Court Rules 1981 which are no longer applicable. Besides the Court there declined jurisdiction as the order after the judgment was delivered had been drawn up. No opinion was expressed as to what the court could have done if the order had not been drawn.

It is Akin-Olugbade's case (Supra) that is first immediately relevant. There this Court was urged to review its previous decision, and to clarify whether the applicants were entitled as co-owners of land as to the sum of money ordered in the previous judgment to be paid to the respondents. The application was brought under Order 7, Rule 29 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1972 which is inpari materia with our present Order 8, Rule 16. This Court refused such prayers holding that they went beyond the "Slip Rule" which it said was all that was involved in the Ashiyanbi case, and raised issues of law and fact. They did not raise merely issues of clerical errors either in the earlier judgment or in the format order as drawn up. Elias C.J.N. who wrote the lead judgment said at p.233,

"We are firmly of the view that Order 7, Rule 29 of our Supreme Court Rules, 1972 envisages only an application for the invocation of the "slip rule" as adumbrated in Ashiyanbi's case and that it does not enable an application to be brought for the review of any fact or law in a previous judgment of this Court. To allow that to be done would amount to treating the application as an appeal and this could not be in view of the provisions of Section 120 of the Constitution of the Federation, 1963."

Section 120 of the 1963 Constitution is inpari materia with Section 215 of the present Constitution which I have set down above. It is pertinent to add that neither in argument nor in the judgment did the question of the Court doing the review being urged on it under its inherent powers arise. The next three cases were not cases in which this Court was directly urged to review its earlier judgment as in the instant case. It was rather cases in which this Court was urged to set aside its earlier judgment of dismissal of an appeal for want of prosecution. In my view, those judgments being unarguably final judgments of this Court, the applications raised the same question whether this Court cold review its previous decision except perhaps in case falling within the "slip rule" In Chief Iro Ogbu & 3 Ors. vs. Chief Ogburu Urum and Anor (1981) 4 S.C. 1-29 in an application in which this Court was urged to exercise the powers being prayed for under Order 7, Rule 23(1), Order 7, Rule 10(1)and 19(4) and Order 10 of the Supreme Court, Rules 1977. This Court unanimously held that the appeal in that case having been dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to Order 9, Rule 7 of the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to review it except to the extent provided in Order 7, Rule 30 of the 1977, Rules which are inpari materia with our present Order 8, Rule 16 (that is correction of clerical errors).

Although it was not directly raised in argument that the Court could exercise the powers requested under its inherent jurisdiction, this Court made pronouncements on inherent jurisdiction as it was engaged in a search for any possible basis for the exercise of the power sought. Obaseki, J.S.C. who wrote the lead judgment, at pp. 9 and 12 of the record said-

"Even if it were not drawn up, signed and sealed the provisions of Order 7, rule 30 deprive this Court of any jurisdiction to review the judgment of dismissal for want of prosecution. The inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 6(6) (a) of the constitution cannot be invoked to save the situation"

and at P. 12-

"As the jurisdiction of this Court is based upon statute, (the 1979 Constitution, the Supreme Court Act 1960- and Supreme Court Rules 1977) the inherent jurisdiction to regulate proceedings before this Court arises only where there is a lis extant before this Court upon which the inherent jurisdiction can operate. Resort cannot therefore, in this application, be made to Section 6(6)(a) of the Constitution, which provides that:

"The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Section

(a)     shall extend, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law as authority for the exercise of jurisdiction to set aside an order of dismissal of an appeal for want of prosecution (failure to file brief of argument). This Court, in my view, has no inherent jurisdiction to grant the application."

Bello, J.S.C. (as he then was) agreed with these views and at page 2 said-

"I have also considered whether the Court has inherent jurisdiction to set aside its judgment of dismissal of an appeal founded under the provisions of Order 9, Rule 7. It seems to me that on the authority of Obimunore vs. Erinosho (1966) 1 All N.L.R. 250, the inherent jurisdiction of a court to set aside its judgment or order is limited to judgments or orders which are nullities"

On the same issue I was of the same view and at page 17 observed that-

"This Court would also have inherent jurisdiction to set it aside if it could be shown that it was obtained by fraud. If there was a fundamental defect which goes to the issue of jurisdiction and competence of the Court on the day it made its order, it would set aside its judgment. (See the decision of this Court in SC.58/1980 Sken Consult (Nigeria) Ltd. & Anor and Godwin Okkey"

This case was followed by this Court in Sodiende Brothers (Nig.) Ltd. v. African Continental Bank Ltd. (1982) 6 S.C. 137 and there at page 140 Eso, J.S.C. stated-

"There is no statutory or inherent jurisdiction in this Court to grant the application seeking that the appeal which has been dismissed by this Court to be restored. See Chief Iro Ogbu & Ors vs. Chief Ogburu Uvum (1981) 4 S.C. p.4 particularly Obaseki, J.S.C. on pp. 3-15"

But it was in the Yonwuren Case (Supra) in which the decision in Iro Ogbu case was challenged in 3 consolidated applications that a full Bench of this Court thoroughly examined the whole issue. I would wish to reiterate that although the question was still whether a judgment dismissing an appeal for want of prosecution could set aside and re-entered, the issue was substantially the same-whether this Court couls review its final judgment. This Court unanimously held that-

"The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction under the 1979 Constitution, the Supreme Court Act 1960 and the Rules of the Supreme Court 1977 and under its inherent jurisdiction or powers to entertain an application for re-entering an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution"

and

"more importantly, "since it has not been shown that the order of dismissal for want of prosecution was made without jurisdiction or that it was a nullity the applicants cannot invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court as the Court has no inherent jurisdiction to set aside an order of dismissal it had properly made in exercise of its power and jurisdiction and re-enter the appeal."

In argument in this case, this Court had the benefit of an article titled "The inherent Jurisdiction of the Court" written by Mr I.H. Jacob, Senior Master of the Supreme Court in England and published in Vol.23 of the Current Legal Problems 1970, and made available to the court by Chief Williams. Three headings in that article appear important to me in considering the issues raised in this application. They are-

"(a) The inherent jurisdiction of the Court is a concept which must be distinguished from the exercise of judicial discretion.

(b)     It may be exercised in any given case notwithstanding that there are Rules of Court governing the circumstances of each case. The powers conferred by Rules of Court are generally speaking, additional to and not in substitution of powers arising out of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.

(c)     The terms "inherent jurisdiction of the Court" is not used in contradiction to the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by statute. The Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction even in respect of matters which are regulated by statute or by rule of court so long as it can do so without contravening any statutory provision."

Kazeem, J.S.C. who wrote the lead judgment of this Court after examining these views of Mr Jacob concluded his judgment in these words which I consider most relevant to the issues directly raised here,-

"It is to be noted that the writer has made some points in the Article which are relevant for our consideration in the matter namely-

(i) that the court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction even in respect of matters which are regulated by statute or by rules of Courts so long, as it can do so without contravening any statutory provision

(ii) that the main methods by which the inherent jurisdiction of the Courts may be exercised are by coercion and the regulation of its powers...But we are dealing with matters relating to the proceedings of the Court which are already regulated by Rules of Court. The Chief Justice of NIGERIA had made these rules in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Section 216 of the Constitution 1979 read along with Section 274 thereof relating to existing laws. There is nothing in those rules which authorises the relisting of or hearing of an appeal which has been dismissed for want of prosecution by virtue of Order 9, Rule 7 of the Rules. But the rules provide that by a dismissal in such a case, the appeal had been brought to finality and the judgment could no longer be reviewed save in certain cases which are not applicable here. See Order 7 Rule 36 of the Rules. These are the provisions which Mr Jacob in his Article said must not be contravened by the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court"

These then are the consistent views of this Court on the matter of review of its judgment and I was not persuaded that there was need to depart from that position. It is not in doubt that the powers of this Court are conferred and regulated by Statute-the Constitution of the Federal Republic of NIGERIA, 1979, the Supreme Court Act 1960-and by rules of Court, in this case Order 8, Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985 made by the Chief Justice of NIGERIA pursuant to Section 216 of the Constitution, the 1979 Constitution. It is certainly the case, as Mr Jacob stated, that inherent jurisdiction of the Court cannot be used in contradistinction to the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by Statute. In other words it is complementary to it. The 1979 Constitution has in Section 215, set down earlier, provided that there shall be no appeal to any person or body, which would include this Court, from any decision of the Supreme Court. Order 8, Rule 16 to which reference has earlier been made specifically prohibits this Court from reviewing its decision once delivered except in cases of clerical errors. It would seem to me that if the argument of Chief Williams that the inherent powers undoubtedly given to this Court under Section 6(6) (a) of the 1979 Constitution could override these provisions were to be accepted, I cannot see how this would not be an exercise of the Courts inherent jurisdiction in a way which contravenes clear statutory provisions. For this particular submission, Chief Williams relied on the words "notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the constitution" contained in Section 6(6) (a) of the Constitution. With respect I do not construe this as justifying the overriding of

Section 215 which gives finality to the decisions of this Court. On the contrary, it is my view that those words allow the use of this Courts inherent jurisdiction to make corrections of errors in its judgments such as is provided in Order 8, rule 18 which, having regard to the express terms of Section 215 of the Constitution and the earlier part of Order 8, rule 16, it would have been unable to do.

They in effect save the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.

I cannot end this reasons for ruling without referring to the concluding words of Elias C.J.N. in Akin Olugbade's case (Supra) which I find opposite. Again at page 233 of the record the learned Chief Justice had said-

"It is therefore necessary to construe our Order 7, rule 29 in the light of this changed constitutional situation so as to achieve a result which is in consonance with the law and with common sense. For, were we to accept the submission of counsel for the applicants that we can exercise the jurisdiction to entertain these motions to look into complaints about the law or the fact in the judgment being attached, there would be no finality about any judgment of this Court and every dis-affected litigant could bring further appeals as it were ad in finitum. This is a situation that must not be permitted" (Italics mine)

I may add that our principle of stare decisis would be severely hampered, for all lower courts would be obliged to defer application of decisions of this Court until they were sure that such decisions would not by an application almost immediately after their delivery be reviewed and altered. Having said that though, I must add that this Court has never held itself so bound by its decisions as to perpetuate errors. The Court is not manned by super humans nor can it in my view, claim inallibility. Errors such as they may be have often been taken in subsequent substantive appeals, and where substantiated, have been corrected. The court has therefore never hesitated from departing from its decisions where necessary.

In Paul Odi & Another v. Obenuyi Osafile and Anor. Obaseki, J.S.C. said-

Turning to the first question, there is unanimity and I hold strong views on it that the Supreme Court, as a Court at the apex of the judicial hierarchy in this country has the jurisdiction and power sitting in a full Court of seven justices to depart from and overrule previous erroneous decisions on points of law given by a full Court on Constitutional questions or otherwise."

I had also to deal with this matter in Bronik Motors Ltd. v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) 1 SC. N.L.R. 290. At page 317, I said that-

"I believe that this Court is not unconcerned with the principle of State Decisis and the need to maintain certainty of the law. But it would not feel obliged to perpetuate a decision if it is satisfied that such a decision is manifestly wrong or was given per incuriam some relevant statutory or constitutional provisions"

It was for these reasons, and the more detailed reasons contained in the lead reasons by my learned brother, Coker, J.S.C. that I dismissed this application.

Karibi-Whyte JSC. On the 20th March, 1987, this Court gave judgment in the appeal by the Appellants, now applicants, against the judgment of the Court of Appeal Division, Ibadan, wherein their appeal against the judgment of the High Court was dismissed in its entirety. The appeal to this Court was allowed in part and certain consequential orders were made. This application is by Appellants invoking the provisions of section 6(6) (b) of the Constitution, 1979 and the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, and asking for an order-

"(1)    that notwithstanding the provisions of Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules this Honourable Court shall entertain the prayers contained in paragraph (ii) of this Motion on Notice

(2)     that the judgments delivered by the Justice of this Honourable Court on the 20th day of March 1987 be amended to read as if-

(a)     the decision to dismiss the first claim of the plaintiff (i.e. the claim for declaration that by the customary law prevailing in Iwo, the Ogunmakinde Ande Ruling House is the only Ruling House from which appointment to the Oluwo of Iwo Chieftaincy is to be made) were deleted and that there should be substituted therefore a decision granting the said declaration

(b)     all references to orders (in the nature of mandatory or prohibitory injunction or of mandamus or otherwise howsoever) not included among the reliefs claimed by the Plaintiffs and directed against the said Plaintiffs or directed against any of the other parties to the action were deleted from the said judgments.

(3)     Such further or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make.

In the Notice of the Motion the Applicants further stated as follows-

"AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that at the hearing of this Application the Plaintiffs/Appellants will rely on the Record of Appeal, the briefs filed by all parties to the appeal and a brief to be filed in support of the Application as soon as practicable hereafter."

The grounds for the application were stated to be as follows-

"(ii) Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules is incapable of bearing a construction which has the effect of nullifying or rendering ineffective the provisions of Section 6(6) (a) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.

(iii) In the premises it is competent for this Honourable Court to entertain prayers (ii)(a) and (b) of this Motion on Notice.

(iv) The learned Justices of this Honourable Court overlooked the effect of Section 9 of the Chiefs Law Cap. 21 Laws of Oyo State and its impact on the Plaintiffs' first claim.

(v) Save as expressly stated in their Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs herein are not claiming any order or orders (in the nature of mandatory or prohibitory injunction or of mandamus or otherwise howsoever) against any of the other parties to this action and none of the defendants herein have filed a counter-claim to the plaintiff's action.

(vi) The decision whether or not to hold an inquiry into a Chieftancy declaration is regulated by Sections 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the chiefs Law of Oyo State and is purely one vested by law in the two tiers of the Executive Branch of the Government.

(vii) The decision on whether to process the appointment of the next Oluwo of Iwo forthwith, or only after effect has been given to any decision to initiate and complete steps necessary to amend existing declaration relating to the Chieftaincy, is purely one for the Executive Branch of the Government.

(viii) In the premises neither the court of trial nor this Honourable Court can, as part of its final judgment in the action herein, properly make the orders restraining or dispensing with the operation of the chieftaincy declaration now currently in force or direct the Oyo State Government to hold an inquiry into any matter concerning the chieftaincy."

Chief F.R.A. Williams S.A.N. argued the application for the Applicants. Mr Boade, Senior State Counsel, Ministry of Justice, Oyo State and Chief Fawole, replied for the Respondents opposing the application. The court unanimously dismissed the application and indicated that the reasons for doing so will be given today.

I have read the Ruling of my learned brother Coker J.S.C. in this application. I agree entirely with his reasoning. The only issue before us was whether this Court had jurisdiction to hear the application the court being functus officio having finally determined the matter before it. I now proceed to state the arguments of chief Williams S.A.N. in support of his contention can, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, entertain the application before the Court.

Chief Williams was referred to section 215 of the Constitution 1079, and Order 8, rule 16 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1985 and asked to satisfy the Court whether it had the jurisdiction to hear him on the application. In his reply he submitted that he was quite aware of the provisions of Order 8, rule 16, Rules of the Supreme Court 1985, hence his prayer for this Court to rely on its inherent jurisdiction. He submitted that the application seeks to amend the judgment of this Court delivered on the 20th March, 1987. Counsel pointed out that this Court has the inherent power to amend its judgment before the Order was drawn up. He relied for this submission on the judgment of this Court in Ashiyanbi v. Adeniji (1967) 1 ALL NLR. 82, and of the English Court of Appeal in Varty v. British South African Company (1965) Ch. 508. He also referred to the United States of American case or Moherman v. Nickels, 143 Amer. L. Rep.1174. Chief Williams however conceded that applicant must give compelling reasons of justice for invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in this regard. Turning specifically to the application of Order 8, rule 16 to which counsel was referred, he submitted that that order was in the nature of the slip rule, in Order 20, rule 11, Rules of the Supreme Court of England, and is to be construed as adding to and not detracting from the jurisdiction of the Court. Chief Williams submitted that a rule of Court cannot be construed as taking away powers vested in Courts by section 6(6) (a) of the Constitution 1979. Counsel submitted that this Court has the powers and in this case there is a substantial error which in the interest of justice ought to be corrected.

Mr Boade in his reply opposing the application submitted that it amounts to asking this Court to sit as a Court of Appeal against its own judgment, and that this was not permissible both by section215 of the Constitution 1979 and Order 8, rule 16 Rules of the Supreme Court 1985. Counsel submitted that to succeed in an application to review the judgment of this Court an applicant must comply with Order 8, rule 16. He cited in support of his contention the decisions of Ashiyanbi v. Adeniji (1967) 1 All NLR. 88; Yonwuren v. Modern Signs Ltd. (1985) 2.S.C. 86, 103, 123. Mr Boade pointed out that Ashiyanbi v. Adeniji (supra) decided that the jurisdiction can only be exercised to correct clerical errors in the judgment; and that it was irrelevant whether an order had been drawn up or not, if the application was other than to correct clerical errors.

Chief Fawole who associated himself with and adopted the submissions of Mr Boade pointed out that the cases relied upon Chief Williams did not support his contention. Counsel pointed out also that the Notice of Motion, having stated unequivocally that "... at the hearing of this Application the Plaintiffs/Appellants will rely on the Record of Appeal, the Briefs filed by all parties to the appeal and a brief to be filed in support of the Application as soon as practicable hereafter" undoubtedly shows that Applicant intends not merely to correct clerical errors in the judgment but to argue against the judgment. It is pertinent to add, in amplification, that Applicant had pursuant thereto included the grounds for this Application.

It is clear from the contention of Chief Williams that applicant did not bring the application under Order 8, rule 16 Rules of the Supreme Court 1985. Of course none of the grounds alleged sought to correct accidental slips or clerical errors. As the application states, the application was brought under section 6(6) (b) of the Constitution 1979 and the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. It is therefore necessary for the purposes of this ruling to turn to section 6(6) (b) of the Constitution 1979, and also to consider the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.

Section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution 1979 provides-

"6      The judicial powers of the Federation shall be vested in the Courts to which this section relates, being courts established for the Federation

(6)     The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section-

(a)     shall extend notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law;

(b)     shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person."

It seems to me that Chief Williams is relying both on section 6(6)(a) and (b) for his application although the notice of motion referred only to s. 6(6)(b). This must be so because the inherent jurisdiction (powers) relied upon is in section 6(6)(a) of the Constitution 1979 reproduced above. I think there is an elementary but fundamental error in construing section 6 of the Constitution as referring to the exercise of jurisdiction. It is significant to observe that the word "jurisdiction" was not used in section 6(6)(a) or (b) which are relevant here. The word jurisdiction appears in section 6(5) created by the constitution 1979. It is therefore clear that the Constitution intended to draw and did make a clear distinction between the exercise of judicial powers in section 6(6), and the exercise of jurisdiction vested in courts established by the Constitution as in section 6(5) and by National Assembly as in s.6(5)(g) or the Houses of Assembly of States-s.6(4)(h). The Jurisdiction of the Courts created by the Constitution are provided for in sections 212, 213 for the Supreme Court, s.219 for the Court of Appeal, s.230 for the Federal High Court, 2.236 for the High Court of States, s.242 for the Sharia Court of Appeal, s.247 for the Customary Court of Appeal.

The exercise of jurisdiction is therefore clearly statutory-see Ugwuh v. Att.-General East Central State (1975) 6 S.C. 13 p. 16. Ikechukwu & Ors. v. Nwamkpa NMLR. 224 Attorney-General v. Sillem (1864) 10, N.L.C. Cas. 704.

It is clear from the wording of section 6(6) (a) of the Constitution 1979 that the exercise of judicial powers is intended to include all the powers and sanctions which a court of law ought to exercise in order to do justice and uphold its dignity. Thus the inherent powers of the Court can be invoked in the interest of justice to supplement the statutory jurisdiction where the exercise of such jurisdiction was likely to result in injustice. The inherent powers which a court is entitled to exercise merely because it is a court seems to me to be the exercise of an equitable jurisdiction which enables the Court to fulfil itself as a court and to do substantial justice where necessary in the particular case. Lord Morris has expressed it very succinctly in Connelly v. D.P.P. (1964) AC at p. 1301 when he said,

"There can be no doubt that a Court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. I would regard them as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction. A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process."

The misconception lies in the inappropriate description of the inherent power as akin to the exercise of jurisdiction. It is the common error of confusing the meanings of "power" and "jurisdiction" in relation to a proceeding in Court. The jurisdiction vested in the Court to hear and determine a matter before it is different from the exercise of power with respect to a matter within its jurisdiction. The Court has inherent power in respect of matters within its jurisdiction. It has no inherent power to assume jurisdiction in respect of a matter not within its jurisdiction. This in my view is the line of demarcation between the exercise of powers with respect to matters within jurisdiction and the assumption of jurisdiction-I have already reproduced in this ruling the grounds relied upon by the Applicants. Grounds II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII undoubtedly show that applicant is not satisfied with the reasons and conclusions leading to the judgment delivered on the 20th March, 1987, and accordingly applicant proposes to rely on the Record of Appeal filed, the briefs of argument filed by the parties in the appeal and a subsequent brief to be filed in support of the application in challenging that judgment.

I agree with Mr Boade, and chief Fawole, Counsel to the Respondents that the application amounts to asking this Court to sit as a Court of Appeal over its own judgment. This Court has in several cases decided that it has no such powers statutory or inherent. The finality of the judgments of this Court has a Constitutional backing. Section 215 of the Constitution provides as follows-

"Without prejudice to the powers of the President or of the Governor of a State with respect to prerogative of mercy, no appeal shall lie to any other body or person from any determination of the Supreme Courts"

Hence it is well settled that appellate jurisdiction is entirely statutory, see Ikeakwu v. Nwamkpa (1961) NMLR.224, 227 and there is no constitutional provision enabling appeal from our decisions, accordingly any question of reopening the decisions of this Court for further consideration does not arise-See Ashiyanbi v. Adeniji (1967) 1 All NLR. 82 Iro Ogbu v. Chief Urum (1981)4 SC.1 Minister of Lagos Affairs, etc. v. O.B. Akin-Olugbade (1974) 11 SC. 11. The judgment having been delivered this Court is functus officio except for certain purposes not concerned with the substance of the judgment,-See National Telephone Co. v. Post Master-General: (1913) A.C. 546, Savannah Bank v. Pan Atlantic & Shipping Transport Agencies Ltd; (1986) 5 NWKR,892, Cardoso v. Daniel (1986) 2 NWLR1,28 The word "shall" in s.215 and Order 8, rule 16 RSC. 1985 is in each case mandatory.

The provisions of Order 8r. 16 Rules of the Supreme Court 1985 beside confirming the constitutional provision precluding reviewing our judgments once given, only enables review of judgments "to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission, or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning and intention."

Applicant is not here in the grounds stated in the notice, seeking to correct clerical mistakes or accidental slips of omission in the judgment or to vary the judgment so as to give it its true meaning and effect. The applicant has not suggested that the judgment does not correctly represent what the Court decided. It seeks to set it aside in those areas challenged.

Chief Williams has referred us to English and American practice in this matter and has urged us to follow such practice by reopening a decision finally determined in the interest of justice. I think it is well to remind counsel that the Constitution is the fons et origo of our jurisdiction, and powers, and this Court does not derive any jurisdiction or exercise any powers outside it. It is true and helpful to consider the practice in other commonwealth jurisdictions in doubtful cases. In the end, and especially where the provision is clear, it is in our own Constitution and rules of practice that we must have recourse to-See Adegbenro v. Akintola (1963)3 All ER.552 Nafiu Rabiu v. Kano State (1980)8-11 S.C. 130. This Court has reached the stage where it does not regard differences from the highest English or other Commonwealth Court or other courts of Common law jurisdiction as necessarily suggesting that it is wrong-See Robins v. National Trust Co. (1927) AC. 515.

It is now well settled that where our own rules of practice cover the situation recourse to rules of Court in England is not necessary-See Laibru Ltd. v. Building and Civil Engineering Contractor (1962)1 All NLR.387 Resort to English practice is allowed where our rules are inadequate or where there is no local provision. I do not think reference to English and American practice is relevant in the matter before us. The provisions of section 215 of the Constitution and Order 8, rule 16, Rules of the Supreme Court 1985 adequately cover the situation. Besides, Varty v. British South African Company Ch. 508 referred to and relied upon was on oral judgment of the Court of Appeal in England, and the reversal of the judgment was made by the Court suo motu. The judgment sought to be reviewed in the application before us is a considered judgment of this Court which is the final Court of Appeal of the Nation. Moherman v. Nickels (supra) is not applicable.

The provisions relied upon by Chief Williams are not applicable to this case. The inherent powers of the court cannot be invoked so as to assume jurisdiction where there is none. Accordingly there is no jurisdiction, statutory or inherent, in this Court to review our decision once given, except in respect of the circumstances stated in Order 8, rule 16 Rules of the Supreme Court 1985. The principle interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium is the rationale behind this rule which has survived sustained assault in recent times and ought to be allowed to remain undisturbed. These are my reasons for dismissing this application.

Kawu, JSC. In the substantive case in the High Court, the plaintiffs' claim against the defendants jointly and severally were as follows-

"(1)    A declaration that by the customary law prevailing in Iwo, the Ogunmakinde Ande Ruling House is the only Ruling House from which appointment to the Oluwo of Iwo Chieftaincy is to be made.

(2)     A declaration that the instrument dated the 28th day of July, 1981,in so far as it purports to declare the customary law prevailing in Iwo with respect to the appointment to the Oluwo of Iwo Chieftaincy, is wrong and accordingly illegal and void.

(3)     An injunction restringing all servants, officers and agents of the government of Oyo State or of the Iwo Central Local Government from acting pursuant to or taking any steps to implement the aforesaid declaration registered on 29th July, 1981.

The plaintiffs lost both in the High Court and in the Court of Appeal. They appealed to the Supreme Court and their appeal was heard on the 12th day of January, 1987. In a reserved judgment delivered on the 20th of March, 1987, allowing their appeal in part, this Court concluded as follows-

"The appeal succeeds on the dismissal of claim No. 2 but fails in respect of the dismissal of claims 1 and 3. It is desirable that the appellants, i.e. Ogunmakinde Ande Ruling House along with others be heard in an inquiry to ascertain the relevant customary law. The decision of the Court of Appeal is hereby set aside and in its stead, I hereby order that

(1)     Claim 1 be dismissed; Ogunmakinde Ande has not been proved to be the only Ruling House at Iwo from which Oluwo of Iwo is apointed under the customary law of Iwo;

(2)     Claims 2 and 3 be granted.

Therefore, the Declaration of the Customary Law of Iwo regulating the appointment of Oluwo of contained in Exhibit K is hereby declared null and void.

A proper inquiry to be the basis of a new and proper declaration should be set in motion so that the stool vacancy can be filled within a minimum of delay"

On the 23rd day of March, 1987, a Motion On Notice, stated to have been brought under S.6(6) (b) of the 1979 Constitution and under the Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, was filed by the applicants for an order-

"(1)    that notwithstanding the provisions of Order 8, rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules this Honourable Court shall entertain the prayers contained in paragraph (ii) of this Motion on Notice

(2)     that the judgments delivered by the Justices of this Honourable Court on the 20th day of March 1987 be amended to read as if-

(a)     the decision to dismiss the first claim of the plaintiff (i.e. the claim for declaration that by the customary law prevailing in Iwo, the Ogunmakinde Ande Ruling House is the only Ruling House from which appointment to the Oluwo of Iwo Chieftaincy is to be made) were deleted and that there should be substituted therefore a decision granting the said declaration.

(b)     all references to orders (in the nature of mandatory or prohibitory injunction or of mandamus or otherwise howsoever) not included among the reliefs claimed by the Plaintiffs and directed against the said Plaintiffs or directed against any of the other parties to the action were deleted from the said judgments.

(3)     Such further or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make

AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that at the hearing of this Application the Plaintiffs/Appellants will rely on the Record of Appeal, the Briefs filed by all parties to the appeal and a brief to be filed in support of the Application as soon as practicable hereafter. The grounds of this application include the following-

(i) Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court rules ought not to be construed so as to deprive the Supreme Court of its undoubted inherent jurisdiction to correct errors drawn to correct errors drawn to its attention.

(ii) Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules is incapable of bearing a construction which has the effect of nullifying or rendering ineffective the provisions of Section 6(6)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979

(iii) In the premises it is competent for this Honourable Court to entertain prayers (ii) (a) and (b) of this Motion on Notice.

(iv) The learned Justices of this Honourable Court overlooked the effect of Section 9 of the Chiefs Law Cap. 21 laws of Oyo State and its impact on the Plaintiffs' first claim.

(v) Save as expressly stated in their Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs herein are not claiming any order or orders (in the nature of mandatory or prohibitory injunction or of mandamus or otherwise howsoever)against any of the other parties to this action and none of the defendants herein have filed a counterclaim to the plaintiffs' action.

(vi) The decision whether or not to hold an inquiry into a Chieftaincy declaration is regulated by Sections 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State and is purely one vested by law in the two tiers of the Executive Branch of the Government.

(vii) The decision whether to process the appointment of the next Oluwo of Iwo forthwith, or only after effect has been given to any decision to initiate and complete steps necessary to amend existing declaration relating to the Chieftaincy, is purely one for the Executive Branch of the Government.

(viii)In the premises neither the court of trial nor this Honourable Court can, as part of its final judgment in the action herein, properly make the orders restraining or dispensing with the operation of the chieftaincy declaration now currently in force or direct the Oyo State Government to hold an inquiry into any matter concerning the chieftaincy."

A careful perusal of the grounds on which this application was based shows clearly that what the applicants were really saying was that the decision of this Court given on the 20th March, 1987, was wrong, and that that decision should be reversed granting the declaration sought by the plaintiffs. In my view the application was in effect an invitation to this Court to sit on appeal over its decision, contrary to the provisions of S.215 of the 1979 Constitution. Has the Court jurisdiction to do so? I do not think it has. In the firs place, Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court rules 1985, which permits the Court to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission" does not empower the Court to vary its judgment or order when such judgment or order represents what the Court decided-See Ogbu v. Urum (1981)4 SC.1; T.A. Yonwuren v. Modern Signs (1985)1 N.W.L.R. (Part 2)244; Chukwuka v. Ezulike (1986)5 N.W.L.R. 892 at 899 and Oba Jacob Oyeyipo v. Chief J.O. Oyinloye (1987)1 N.W.L.R. (Part 50) 356. Furthermore, the provisions of S.215 of the Constitution make it abundantly clear that no appeal shall lie to any other body or person from any decision of this Court. Once a decision has been reached by this Court on an appeal, that decision is final.

I had the advantage of reading, in draft, the lead Reasons for ruling just delivered by my learned brother, Coker, J.S.C. I am incomplete agreement with those reasons and will respectfully adopt them as mine. It was for those reasons that I dismissed the applicants' Motion on the 6th day of April, 1987.

Oputa, JSC. On Friday, the 20th day of March, 1987, this Court delivered its judgment in the above-mentioned appeal. It was a reserved judgment. In the interest of peace in the area, the Court made the following consequential order-

"A proper inquiry to be the basis of a new and proper declaration should be set in motion so that the stool vacancy can be filled with minimum delay."

Three days after the delivery of that judgment, Chief Williams, SAN filed a Motion on behalf of the Plaintiffs for an Order-

"(1)    that notwithstanding the provisions of Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules this Honourable Court shall entertain the prayers contained in paragraph (ii) of this Motion on Notice

(2)     that the judgment delivered by the Justices of this Honourable Court on the 20th day of March 1986 be amended to read as if-

(a)     the decision to dismiss the first claim of the plaintiff (i.e. the claim for declaration that by the customary law prevailing him Iwo, the Ogunmakinde Ande Ruling House is the only Ruling House from which appointment to the Oluwo of Iwo Chieftaincy is to be made) were deleted and that there should be substituted therefore a decision granting the said declaration.

(b)     all references to orders (in the nature of mandatory or prohibitory injunction or of mandamus or otherwise howsoever) not included among the reliefs claimed by the Plaintiffs and directed against the said Plaintiffs or directed against any of the other parties to the action were deleted from the said judgments.

(3)     Such further or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make.

AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that at the hearing of this Application the Plaintiffs/Appellants will rely on the Record of Appeal, the Briefs filed by all parties to the appeal and a Brief to be filed in support of the Application as soon as practicable hereafter. The grounds of this application include the following-

(i) Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules ought not to be construed so as to deprive the Supreme Court of its undoubted inherent jurisdiction to correct errors drawn to its attention.

(ii) Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules is incapable of bearing a construction which has the effect of nullifying or rendering ineffective the provisions of Section 6(6)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.

(iii) In the premises it is competent for this Honourable Court to entertain prayers (ii)(a) and (b) of this Motion on Notice.

(iv) The learned Justice of this Honourable Court over-looked the effect of Section 9 of the Chiefs Law Cap. 21 laws of Oyo State and its impact on the Plaintiffs' first claim.

(v) Save as expressly stated in their Statement of claim, the Plaintiffs herein are not claiming any order or orders (in the nature of mandatory or prohibitory injunction or of mandamus or otherwise howsoever) against any of the other parties to this action and none of the defendants herein have filed a counterclaim to the plaintiff's action.

(vi) The decision whether or not to hold an inquiry into a Chieftaincy declaration is regulated by Sections, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State and is purely one vested by law in the two tiers of the Executive Branch of the Government.

(vii) The decision whether to process the appointment of the next Oluwo of Iwo forthwith, or only after effect has been given to any decision to initiate and complete steps necessary to amend existing declaration relating to the Chieftaincy, is purely one for the Executive Branch of the Government.

(viii) In the premises neither the Court of trial nor this Honourable Court can, as part of its final judgment in the action herein, properly make the orders restraining or dispensing with the operation of the chieftaincy declaration now currently in force or direct the Oyo State Government to hold an inquiry into any matter concerning the chieftaincy."

The say the least the above is a very substantial and rather considerable application to make after a Court had delivered its considered and final judgment. An application "relying on the Record of Appeal, the Briefs filed by all parties to the appeal and brief to be filed" looks very much like re-arguing the appeal to put it mildly or else bluntly put like an appeal against this Court's decision delivered on the 20th March 1987 (to call a spade a spade). In view of the above the Court on the 6th day of April 1987 when the Motion was called up for hearing requested Chief Williams to satisfy it that this Court has the necessary jurisdiction to entertain his Motion.

Chief Williams in a spirited argument submitted that there is an inherent power or jurisdiction in this Court to amend and/or correct its judgments. He referred to Section 6(6) (a) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to buttress his argument that this inherent power of Courts of law has even received constitutional approval. On the rather delicate issue of the scope and extent of this inherent power Chief Williams was content to rely on the decision of this Court in Ashiyanbi & Ors. v. Adeniji (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 82. He also cited one English and one American decision to show that in common law jurisdictions, this inherent power has been preserved and exercised. Varty (Inspector of Taxes) v. British South Africa Co. (1965) Ch.D. 508 was the English decision and Moherman v. Nickels 143 A.L.R. 1177 the American decison. Chief Williams then referred to Order 8, rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985 and submitted that rule is merely supplementary to the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. It was not meant to derogate or detract from that jurisdiction. He further emphasised that Order 8, rule 16 above being a mere rule of court cannot over-ride the clear and constitutional provisions of Section 6(6) (a) of the 1979 Constitution. On the issue of the finality of decisions of this Court as provided by Section 215 of the Constitution, Chief Williams' reply was that the inherent power in Section 6(6) (a) of the 1979 Constitution was conferred "notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution."

In view of the above, it becomes an issue of vital importance to probe the meaning and nature of the inherent powers of Courts of law. Simply put, the inherent power of any Court is that power which is itself essential to the very existence of the Court as an institution and to its ability to function as such institution-namely as an institution charge with the dispensation of justice, such as the power to punish for contempt, the power to grant an adjournment in the interest of justice etc. An inherent power has to be inherent in the sense that it forms an essential and intrinsic element in the whole process of adjudication. It is innate in a Court, and is not a subject of specific grant by the Constitution or by legislation. That is why inherent powers of the Courts cannot be taken away or abridged by legislation for he who gave, he only can take away. This explains Section 6(6) (a) of the 1979 Constitution which merely recognised and state the obvious-that the inherent powers of a Court of law exist "notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution" for such powers were not granted by the Constitution. As soon as any Court is established, all its inherent powers adhere and attach to it. Inherent powers of the Court are therefore those powers that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice in the Court.

The inherent powers of Courts differ considerably from the appellate powers. Inherent powers of Courts are general powers; the power vested in any Court to hear and determine an appeal is rather a specific and special power; inherent powers are not conferred by legislation, appellate power are. No Court has inherent power to hear an appeal. Any appellate epower is traceable to a specific Statute. That statute will then define the limit of the appellate jurisdiction it conferred, the persons who can appeal, and procedure for such an appeal. Section 213 of the 1979 constitution conferred appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Nigeria and defined the limit of that jurisdiction. Section 215 of the same constitution specifically and in clear and unambiguous language stipulated-

"S. 215 Without prejudice to the powers of the President or of the Governor of a state with respect to the prerogative of mercy, no appeal shall lie to any other body or person from any determination of the Supreme Court" (the italics are mine).

From the above, once this Court has reached a determination in or of an appeal, that determination becomes final. I agree that under the doctrine of Precedent and the principle of Stare decisis our decision in this case may, in some future date, be reviewed, if it is then sought to apply the principles of the decision to a subsequent case. But that is an entirely different thing from asking the Supreme Court to reverse on the 23rd March 1987 the judgment it gave on the 20th March 1987. This, this Court cannot do either under Section 6 (6) (a) of the 1979 Constitution or under the rather nebulous umbrage of "Inherent jurisdiction."

Let me now review the cases cited to us during the argument of counsel on all sides. Chief Williams referred to the English case of Varty v. British South Africa Co. supra. There at p. 512 of the Report, the Court of Appeal in England after dismissing an appeal and granting leave to appeal to the house of Lords on April 28, 1964, took "the unusual course" of relisting the case for further argument "because on reading through and revising the oral judgment which had been delivered, the Court felt that it would like to hear the case further argued..." One would first like to know what the House of Lords said about the "unusual course" taken by Lord Denning in that case. Secondly it is a bit precarious to rely on an unusual event as a precedent. Thirdly the decision to re-open the appeal for further argument was taken by the Court itself. Fourthly the decision relied upon is that of the Court of Appeal. If it were a decision of the House of Lords, it would have been more persuasive. In any event, I do not regard Varty's case supra as an authority for the proposition that the Supreme Court of Nigeria after delivering a reserved and considered judgment (not an oral judgment) would, on a Motion by one of the parties, re-open the appeal to be re-argued "on Briefs filed and to be filed in support of the Application."

The second case relied upon by Chief Williams was Moherman v. Nickels supra. At p. 1177 of Vol. 143 A.L.R. reporting the case, it was stated inter alia-

"At common law, court of general jurisdiction has power to control its own orders and judgments during the term at which they are made or rendered, and the power, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to vacate or modify them... This is an inherent power of the Court independent of any statutory authority therefore.

So far so good. But what was it that actually happened in that case? The headnote to the case explains-"Limitation of Actions paragraph 228-amendment of pleading-re-instatement of dismissed defendant.

(1)     An amendment to a petition, in the interest of justice, reinstating a defendant who had been duly served with Summons within the statutory period of limited but had been alter dismissed, may be made after the expiration of the period within which the action may be brought provided the case of action set out in the petition is not materially changed by such amendment even though it results in making the party complaining the sole defendant in the action. Such amendment relates back to the time the action was commenced and the limitation is computed from that time."

From the above headnote it is quite clear the Moharman v. Nickels supra has no relationship whatsoever with the issue in dispute in this appeal. One dealt with amendment of pleadings in order to re-instate a dismissed defendant, the other (this Motion) deals with the re-arguing of an appeal already heard and judgment delivered. The issues are different and the principles different.

I now come to cases decided by our Courts:-

(1)     Ashiyanbi v. Adeniji supra mainly decided that:

(i)      "after the formal order is drawn up the Court may not whether in it inherent jurisdiction or under the rule of Court, apply the slip rule to vary a judgment or order which, as in this case, correctly represents the Court's decision nor may it vary the operative and substantial part of its judgment so as to substitute a different form."

(ii)     "The Court's inherent jurisdiction to amend an order already drawn up is limited to cases where the order as drawn up does not correctly state the actual decision and intention of the judgment."

Ashiyanbi's case above is definitely against Chief Williams' present contention. That decision, on the contrary, is a judicial restatement of Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985. In the following cases-

(1)     Minister of Lagos Affairs Mines & Power & Anor. v. Chief Akin-Olugbade & Ors. (1974) 11 SC. 11.

(2)     Chief Iro Ogbu & Ors. v. Chief Ogburu Urum (1981) 4 SC. 1.

(3)     T. A. Yonwuren v. Modern Signs (1985) 1 N.W.L.R. (Part 2) 244.

(4)     John Chukwuka & Ors. v. N. G. Ezulike (1986) 5 N.W.L.R. 892 (Part 45).

(5)     Oba Jacob Oyeyipo v. Chief J. O. Oyinloye (1987) 1 N.W.L.R. (Part 50) 356.

this Court had emphasised that it has no jurisdiction, statutory or inherent, to re-enter an appeal already heard and determined for further hearing other than as prescribed by Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985-namely to "correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission."

I have had a preview of the lead Reasons for Ruling just delivered by my learned brother Coker, J.S.C. and I am in full and complete agreement with those reasons which I now adopt as mine. It was for all the reasons given above that I, on the 6th day of April, 1987, dismissed the Motion on Notice brought by the Applicants.