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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA

ON FRIDAY, THE 19TH DAY OF JUNE 1970

SC 78/1969

BETWEEN

JOSIAH ORUNGUA AND OTHERS ................................................... APPELLANTS

AND

THE STATE ........................................................... RESPONDENTS

BEFORE: Ademola, C.J.N. Lewis, Madarikan, JJ.S.C.

 

Criminal law-Practice and Procedure-Information filed by the Director of Public Prosecutions under section 340 (2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act without a preliminary investigation-Whether such procedure had been abolished by the Criminal Law Act, 1967; section 6(6) (England)-Criminal Procedure Act section 363.

Criminal Law-"Information' erroneously referred to as "Criminal Information'-Whether defect cured by provisions of section 22 of the Interpretation Act, 1964.

Appeal from the High Court of Lagos.

 

HELD:

(1)     Section 6(6) of the Criminal Law Act, 1967, which abolishes the power to commence proceedings by Criminal Information in England in no way affects the power of a judge in England to give consent that a bill of indictment be preferred under section 2(2) of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933. This section is in pari materia to section 340 (2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, save that in Nigeria what is preferred is an Information not an indictment.

(2)     The Chief Justice was acting within his powers under section 340(2)(b) in granting his consent to prefer the Information in this case. Even though the Information bore the heading-Criminal Information-yet there was no doubt that it was substantially in conformity with the form prescribed by section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

(3)     Furthermore, the error of referring to the "Information" as a "Criminal Information" was not identifying the Information here in Nigeria with the abolished Criminal Information in England.

(4)     The only defect complained of in the Information filed in this case had been cured by the provisions of section 22 of the Interpretation Act, 1964, which is designed to save forms which depart from those prescribed by an enactment provided the departure is not in a material particular and is not calculated to mislead.

(5)     It is trite law that an accused person is presumed to be innocent until the prosecution had established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. At the highest, the cumulative effect of the evidence against the 2nd accused on the 1st count raised grave suspicion, but it fell short of the quality of evidence which could establish his guilt because it was not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the 2nd accused knew that the 1st accused was not G.C.M. Onyiuke, the owner of the property in issue. On the 2nd count, there was no evidence of stealing by the 2nd accused. For these reasons, he was entitled to a verdict of acquittal on the first and 2nd counts.

(6)     For the reasons already stated when considering the appeal of the 2nd accused against his conviction on the 2nd count, the conviction of the 3rd accused on the 2nd count could not be supported. A similar consideration applied to the conviction of the 5th accused on the 2nd count as he was wrongly convicted on that count. He was also entitled to a verdict of acquittal on that count.

(7)     The 3rd accused who argued his appeal before the Supreme Court did not address argument of any substance as to why the findings of fact ought to be disturbed. The findings were fully supported by the evidence and on the overwhelming facts against the 3rd accused which were accepted by the trial Judge, the 3rd accused was rightly convicted on the 1st, 5th and 6th counts.

(8)     On the facts accepted by the trial Judge, he came to the right conclusion that the 5th accused was guilty of the charges laid in the 1st, 7th and 8th counts.

(9)     On the face of the facts, the findings of the lower court against the 6th accused were inescapable and he was rightly convicted on the 1st, 2nd, 7th and 8th counts.

Appeal allowed in part.

 

Acts referred to:

Criminal Code Sections 390(4)(f); 419; 467(2); 467(4)(b); 468; 484; 516.

Criminal Law Act, 1967, Section 6(6) (England).

Criminal Procedure Act, Sections 337; 340(2)(b).

 

Appeal from The High Court of Lagos.

Somefun for the 1st appellant.

Osisanya for the 4th appellant.

Ajose-Adeogun Principal State Counsel, for the respondent.

 

Madarikan, J.S.C. (delivering the judgment of the court):-The four appellants in this appeal were the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th accused persons respectively in the Lagos High Court where they were charged along with 3 other persons on an information which was amended at the trial to read as follows:-

"Statement of Offence-1st count

Conspiracy to commit felony, contrary to section 516 of the Criminal Code.

Particulars of Offence

1.      Josiah Orungua alias Gabriel Chike Michael Onyiuke alias Chico, 2. Michael Durojaiye, 3. John Chukwudi Oduah, 4. Mufutau Ajetunmobi, 5. Bolaji Alagba, 6. Thomas Olowa and 7. Bolaji Grillo in or about the month of April 1968, at Lagos in the Lagos Judicial Division, conspired together and with other persons unknown to commit felony to wit; obtaining money by false pretences.

Statement of Offence-2nd count

Stealing contrary to and punishable under section 390(4)(f) of the Criminal Code.

Particulars of Offence

1.      Josiah Orungua, alias Gabriel Chike Michael Onyiuke alias Chico, 2. Michael Durojaiye, 3. John Chukwudi Oduah, 4. Mufutau Ajetunmobi, 5. Bolaji Alagba, 6. Thomas Olowa and 7. Bolaji Grillo, in or about the month of April 1968 at Lagos, in the Lagos Judicial Division, stole a document to wit; the copy of a deed in respect of the property known as 35 Ogunlana Drive, Surulere and registered as No. 19 at page 19 in Volume 1071 and kept in the office of the Lagos Lands Registry.

Statement of Offence-3rd count

Personation contrary to section 484 of the Criminal Code.

Particulars of Offence

Josiah Orungua alias Gabriel Chike Michael Onyiuke alias Chico on or about the 13th day of April, 1968 at Lagos in the Lagos Judicial Division with intent to defraud Azariah Olusegun Ransome-Kuti falsely represented himself to be Gabriel Chike Michael Onyiuke the registered owner of the landed property known as No. 35 Ogunlana Drive, Surulere.

Statement of Offence-4th count

Obtaining money by false pretences, contrary to section 419 of the Criminal Code.

Particulars of Offence

Josiah Orungua, alias Gabriel Chike Onyiuke, alias Chico on or about the 13th day of April, 1968 at Lagos in the Lagos Judicial Division with intent to defraud obtained from Azariah Olusegun Ransome-Kuti the sum of £3,500 by false pretences to wit; by falsely pretending that he was Gabriel Chike Onyiuke, the registered owner of the landed property known as 35 Ogunlana Drive, Surulere, and thereby entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the said property.

Statement of Offence-5th count

Forgery, contrary to section 467(2)(d) of the Criminal Code.

Particulars of Offence

1.      Josiah Orungua, alias Gabriel Chike Michael Onyiuke, alias Chico, 2. John Chukwudi Oduah on or about the 13th day of April, 1968 at Lagos in the Lagos Judicial Division forged a document to wit; a deed of Conveyance in respect of the landed property known as 35 Ogunlana Drive, Surulere, purporting same to be signed by the registered owner, Gabriel Michael Onyiuke of 40 Modebe Avenue, Onitsha.

Statement of Offence-6th count

Uttering a false document, contrary to section 468 punishable under section 467(2) of the Criminal Code.

Particulars of Offence

1.      Josiah Orungua, alias Gabriel Chike Michael Onyiuke, alias Chico, 2. John Chukwudi Oduah, on or about the 13th day of April, 1968, at Lagos in the Lagos Judicia Division knowingly and fraudulently uttered a false document to wit; a deed of conveyance in respect of the landed property known as 35 Ogunlana Drive, purporting same to be signed by the registered owner Gabriel Chike Michael Onyiuke of 40 Modebe Avenue, Onitsha.

Statement of Offence-7th count

Forgery, contrary to section 467(4)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Particulars of Offence

1.      Josiah Orungua, alia Gabriel Chike Michael Onyiuke, alias Chico, 2. Bolaji Alagba, 3. Thomas Olowa, 4. Bolaji Grillo, on or about the 27th of April, 1968 at Lagos in the Lagos Judicial Division forged a document to wit; a Power of Attorney in respect of landed property known as plot No. 187 L.E.D.B., Itire Road Estate and registered as No. 19 at page 19 in Volume 1071 at the Lands Registry in the Office at Lagos purporting same to be signed by the registered owner of the said property, Gabriel Chike Michael Onyiuke of 40 Modebe Avenue, Onitsha, as the donor of the Power.

Statement of Offence-8th count

Uttering a false document, contrary to section 468 and punishable under section 467 (4) (b) of the Criminal Code.

Particulars of Offence

1.      Josiah Orungua, alias Gabriel Chike, Michael Onyiuke, alias Chico, 2. Bolaji Alagba, 3. Thomas Olowa, 4. Bolaji Grillo on or about the 1st day of May, 1968 at Lagos in the Lagos Judicial Division knowingly and fraudulently uttered a false document to wit; a Power of Attorney in respect of the landed property known as plot 187, L.E.D.B. Itire Road Estate and registered as No. 19 in Volume 1071 at the Lands Registry in the Office at Lagos; purporting same to be signed by the registered owner of the said property, Gabriel Chike Michael Onyiuke of 40 Modebe Avenue, Onitsha, as the donor of the Power."

It is convenient, at the outset, to consider the 1st ground of appeal argued on behalf of the 2nd accused. It reads as follows:-

"That the learned trial Judge erred in law by trying the appellant-Michael Durojaiye and others on a direct information filed before him by the Director of Public Prosecution under section 340(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act without a preliminary investigation being first held when such procedure had been abolished in the High Court of Justice in England by section 6(6) Criminal Law Act, 1967 in which case the procedure is also automatically abolished in Nigeria, pursuant to section 363 of the Criminal Procedure Act."

It was the contention of Counsel for the 2nd accused that the information on which the accused person stood trial was entitled "criminal information"; that the Criminal Procedure Act does not make provisions for the filing of "criminal information"; that by virtue of the provisions of section 363 of the Act, where there are no specific provisions in the Act, the procedure and practice for the time being in the High Court of Justice in England apply to the High Courts in Nigeria; and finally, that as "criminal information"; had been abolished in England by section 6(6) of the Criminal Law Act, 1967, the criminal information filed in the instant case was not permitted by law and it vitiated the whole proceedings.

Proceedings in this case were commenced in the Lagos High Court in the following manner. By a letter dated the 19th of October, 1968, addressed to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Lagos State by the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions, Lagos State, he sought the consent of the Chief Justice to prefer an information in accordance with the provisions of section 340(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and attached a copy of the information to the letter. He stated, inter alia, in the letter that:-

"2.     Owing to the circumstances in which the offences were committed and the time taken during the investigation, added to the fact that much publicity has been given to this matter and the like, it is my view, with respect, that an early trial in this form would meet the justice of this case.

3.      In order therefore to save time and expense, I have deemed it necessary to prefer an information with the consent of a judge instead of holding a preliminary inquiry first into the matter.

5.      In the absence of any rule of court in respect of the application as at present, I am making this application in compliance with section 6 of the Indictment Rules, 1933 in force in the High Court of Justice in England by virtue of section 363 of the Criminal Procedure Act."

He also attached to the letter, the proofs of the evidence of the witnesses he proposed to call at the trial, and stated that the facts disclosed in the proofs established a prima facie case against the accused persons.

On the 21st of October, 1968, the Chief Justice gave his consent under section 340 (2) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act to the information being preferred as proposed; and, on the following day, the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions filed the information in the High Court.

In our view, section 6 (6) of the Criminal Law Act, 1967, which abolishes the power to commence proceedings by criminal information in England in no way affects the power of a judge in England to give consent that a bill of indictment be preferred under section 2(2) of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933. The section reads as follows:-

"Subject as hereinafter provided no bill of indictment charging any person with an indictable offence shall be preferred unless either-

(a)                 ; or

(b)     the bill is preferred               by the direction or with the consent of a judge of the High Court          "

It will be observed that this section is in pari materia to section 340 (2) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act which also reads as follows:-

"Subject as hereinafter provided no information charging any person with an indictable offence shall be preferred unless either-

(a)                 ; or

(b)     the information is preferred by the direction or with the consent of a judge          "

save that in Nigeria what is preferred is an information not an indictment. We are satisfied that the Chief Justice was acting within his powers under section 340 (2) (b) in granting his consent to prefer the information in this case. Even though the information bears the heading-Criminal Information-yet we are in no doubt that it is substantially in conformity with the form prescribed by section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Act which provides that:-

"Every information shall bear date of the day when the same is signed and, with such modifications as shall be necessary to adapt it to the circumstances of each case, may commence in the following form:-

The Republic v. C.D.

In the High Court of the Region

The                Judicial Division

The                day of , 19

At the sessions held at

on the        day of            19              , the court is informed by the Attorney-General of the Federation [or A.B.] on behalf of the Republic that C.D. is charged with the following offence [or offences]."

Furthermore, we are of the view that the error of referring to the "information" as a "criminal information" was not identifying the information here in Nigeria with the abolished criminal information in England. It is germane to this point to refer to section 22 of the Interpretation Act, 1964, which is designed to save forms which depart from those prescribed by an enactment provided the departure is not in a material particular and is not calculated to mislead. The section provides that:-

"Where a form is prescribed by an enactment, a form which differs from the prescribed form shall not be invalid for the purposes of the enactment by reason only of the difference if the difference is not in a material particular and is not calculated to mislead."

The only defect complained of in the information filed in this case has, in our view, been cured by the provisions of section 22 of the Interpretation Act.

At the trial of the case, the facts on which the prosecution relied were that one Gabriel Chike Michael Onyiuke of 40 Modebe Avenue, Onitsha, was the registered owner of No. 35 Ogumlana Drive, Surulere, which was offered for sale together with an uncompleted building on it. Throughout the transaction for the sale of the property, the 1st accused represented himself as G.C.M. Onyiuke, the registered owner of the property. Early in April, 1968, both the 1st and 2nd accused persons went to one Olatunde Laja (PW1), an estate agent. The 2nd accused introduced the 1st accused to PW1 as Mr G.C.M. Onyiuke and he (i.e. the 1st accused) requested PW1 to assist him to sell his property at No. 35 Ogunlana Drive, Surulere, and promised to pay a commission of 10 per cent of the purchase price to PW1. This agreement was reduced into writing on the 6th April, 1968, and the written agreement was marked as exhibit A at the trial. It reads as follows:-

Agreement

This agreement made this 6th day of April, 1968 Between Olatunde Laja the Director of Laja Real Estate Agencies of No. 11 Adesina Street, Mushin, Lagos State, Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as the agent of the one part) And Mr G.C.M. Onyiuke of 40 Modebe Avenue, Onitsha, Nigeria hereinafter referred to as the Principal. Whereby it is agreed as follows:-

1.      That the Principal has agreed to engage the services of the agent to sell him a landed property situate, lying and being at No. 35 Ogunlana Drive, Surulere, Lagos State.

2.      That the Agent has agreed to sell a landed property for the Principal.

3.      That the Principal hereby acknowledges the receipt of £50-0s-0d (Fifty pounds) only which he received from the Agent as Token deposit against final payment on the said property.

4.      That the Principal agrees to pay the Agent both the Token deposit and a commission of 10 per cent on the purchase price of the property on the spot, whether the principal sells through the Agent or not.

5.      That the Principal agrees to execute transfer of Title immediately the purchase price is paid to him through the Agent.

6.      That if the Principal fails to pay the deposit and the Commission, the Agent shall have the right to take lawful proceedings to recover the same.

Dated at Lagos this 6th day of April, 1968.

G.C.M. Onyiuke,

Principal Signature

Witness: Name: M.A. Durojaiye. Address: 20 Abayomi Street, Lawanson.

Occupation: Trader.

Address of Property: 35 Ogunlana Drive, Surulere, Lagos State. Selling Price: £3,500 (Three thousand five hundred pounds) only.

Both the Principal and the Agent agrees that this Agreement becomes Null and Void as from the 13th day of April, 1968, but that the Principal shall be only liable to refund the Token deposit to the Agent immediately."

The 1st accused gave PW1. a photostat copy of the deed of conveyance (exhibit B) of the property, PW1 in turn contacted Adeniran Olusanya (PW2) and asked him to assist in selling the property. PW2 later introduced Mr A.O. Ransome-Kuti (PW3) to PW1 as a prospective purchaser of the property. After inspecting the property, PW3 agreed to buy it for £3,500; and he instructed his lawyer, Mr A. Akindele (PW9), to prepare the necessary documents. He also went to the Lands Registry, Lagos, with another lawyer, Mr N.A.B. Kotoye (PW4) to investigate the title. After carrying out a search, Mr Kotoye was satisfied that the title of Onyiuke was genuine and he advised his client (PW3) accordingly. In consequence of the advice, PW3 paid the purchase price of £3,500 to another lawyer, Mr T. Alaka (PW6), who was then acting as Onyiuke's solicitor. Thereafter, the 1st accused executed a deed of conveyance (exhibit C) dated 13th of April, 1968, purporting to transfer the property to PW3.

A few days later, it came to light that the first accused had falsely represented himself as G.C.M. Onyiuke, as all efforts by PW3 to recover the purchase money of £3,500 from the first accused failed, the matter was reported to the Police and the accused persons were rounded up and arrested. That was the background to the case, but in considering the appeal of each of the appellants, we shall examine, in greater detail, the evidence which connected him with the crime.

With regard to the second accused, he was charged with conspiracy on the 1st count; and on the 2nd count, he was charged with stealing a copy of a deed of conveyance relating to No. 35 Ogunlana Drive, Surulere.

The learned trial Judge found him guilty of conspiracy for the following reasons:-

"1.     The 2nd accused introduced the 1st accused to PW1 as G.C.M. Onyiuke, the owner of No. 35 Ogunlana Drive, Surulere.

2.      In one of the statements which the 2nd accused made to the police (exhibit 5), he referred to the 1st accused as Mr Chike and not as Mr Onyiuke.

3.      The 2nd accused lied to PW2, and PW9 when he told them that the 1st accused was living in Apapa whereas he knew that the 1st accused was living at Ikate.

4.      A few days after the purported sale of the property to PW3, the 1st accused confessed to PW1 that he was not G.C.M. Onyiuke, the owner of the property, and both the 1st and 2nd accused begged Mr A.O. Ransome-Kuti (PW3) to be allowed time to refund the purchase money of £3,500.

5.      The 2nd accused told a lie to Mr Aibinu (PW5), a lawyer, and thereby got him to write a letter to Mr Kotoye (PW4) in which he promised that the purchase money of £3,500 would be refunded on "31-5-68 or thereabouts."

In conclusion, the learned judge said:-

"I ask myself why should the 2nd accused take upon himself to lie to both Mr Aibinu and Mr Kotoye about the sale of a property which never existed, especially as he knew that the sale of the house to Mr Kuti was not genuine, and considering the part which he played in the transaction. From the evidence before me I hold that the 2nd accused took part in the conspiracy to obtain the sum of £3,500 by false pretences."

On the count of stealing, the learned judge found as facts that the 1st accused was not G.C.M. Onyiuke, the owner of No. 35 Ogunlana Drive, Surulere; that the deed of conveyance (exhibit B1) was stolen by one of the officers of the Lands Registry; that it was on the strength of that deed of conveyance that the property was sold to PW3; that the 2nd accused witnessed the signature of the 1st accused on the deed of conveyance made in favour of PW3; and that the 2nd accused was present in the office of Mr Alaka when the transaction was finalised. And on these facts, he convicted the 2nd accused on the charge of stealing.

Chief Somefun has submitted on behalf of the 2nd accused that the learned trial Judge erred in convicting the 2nd accused of stealing when there was no evidence that he stole the deed of conveyance (exhibit B1) nor was there any evidence that he Counselled or procured anyone to steal it. On the count of conspiracy, it was Counsel's submission that evidence of conspiracy was completely lacking.

It is trite law that an accused person is presumed to be innocent until the prosecution has established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. At the highest, the cumulative effect of the evidence against the 2nd accused on the 1st count raises grave suspicion, but it falls short of the quality of evidence which could establish his guilt because we do not think it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the 2nd accused knew that the 1st accused was not G.C.M. Onyiuke, the owner of the property in issue. On the 2nd count, there is, in our view, no evidence of stealing by the 2nd accused. For these reasons, we have come to the conclusion that he is entitled to a verdict of acquittal on the 1st and 2nd counts.

The 3rd accused was charged along with the 2nd accused on the 2nd count, and it is convenient to deal with the case against him in so far as that count is concerned now. When considering the case against the 3rd accused in his judgment, the learned trial Judge said:-

"The evidence in support of the 2nd count is the same as the one led against the 2nd accused on that count."

and he convicted the 3rd accused of stealing as charged in the 2nd count. For the reasons that we have already stated when considering the appeal of the 2nd accused against his conviction on the 2nd count, we are of the opinion that the conviction of the 3rd accused on the 2nd count cannot be supported. He is therefore acquitted on this count. a similar consideration applies to the conviction of the 5th accused on the 2nd count as he was, in our view, wrongly convicted on that count. He is also entitled to a verdict of acquittal on that count.

The 3rd accused was also convicted on the 1st, 5th, and 6th counts. On the 1st count, he was convicted of conspiracy to commit a felony; on the 5th count, he was convicted of forging a deed of conveyance; and, on the 6th count, he was convicted of uttering the said deed of conveyance.

The evidence which was accepted by the learned trial Judge and on which he based the conviction of the 3rd accused may be summarised thus. He and the 1st accused lived in the same house at 11 Ikepo Street, Surulere. Instead of putting his correct address on exhibit C (i.e. the deed whereby the 1st accused purported to convey the property at No. 35 Ogunlana Drive, Surulere, to PW3) when he signed as a witness to the signature of the 1st accused, the 3rd accused gave a false address, namely, No. 14 Zamba Street, Ikate. The learned trial Judge obviously drew adverse inferences against the 3rd accused for giving a false address. Indeed, the 3rd accused chose to give no evidence to explain his conduct. Furthermore, the 3rd accused knew that the name of the 1st accused was Josiah, yet he witnessed the signature of the 1st accused in exhibit C where the name of the 1st accused is shown as Gabriel Chike Michael Onyiuke well knowing that the 1st accused was executing the document under a false name. Both the 1st and 3rd accused persons were going about cheek by jowl when the transaction for the sale of the property was in progress and until it was finalised and the purchase money was paid by PW3.

The 3rd accused who argued his appeal before us did not address argument of any substance to us why these findings of facts ought to be disturbed. We are satisfied that the findings were fully supported by the evidence, and that on the overwhelming facts against the 3rd accused which were accepted by the learned trial Judge, the 3rd accused was rightly convicted on the 1st, 5th and 6th counts.

The case against the 5th accused was somewhat similar to that against the 3rd accused and like the 3rd accused, the 5th accused chose to give no evidence to explain his conduct. Apart from the conviction of the 5th accused on the 2nd count which we have already considered in this judgment, he was also convicted on the 1st, 7th, and 8th counts. On the 1st count, he was convicted of conspiracy to commit a felony; on the 7th count, he was convicted of forging a Power of attorney; and, on the 8th count, he was convicted of uttering the said power of attorney. The power of attorney referred to in the 7th and 8th counts was marked as exhibit F at the trial. It was signed by the 1st accused as donor; and, in it he described himself as Gabriel Chike Michael Onyiuke, and appointed one Jonathan Okezie of No. 3 Nnewi Avenue, Ikate, Surulere, as his attorney for the purpose of receiving the purchase money on No. 35 Ogunlana Drive, Surulere. The 5th accused witnessed the signature of the 1st accused on exhibit F. Considering the case against the 5th accused, the learned trial Judge, rightly in our view, made the following observations in his judgment:-

"He signed Dorji instead of his own name, Bolaji Alagba, and gave a fictitious address, 27 Emordi, Ikate, which did not exist. His address is No. 3 Wuraola Street, Surulere. Why did he give a false name and a false address? It was in furtherance of the conspiracy. The 23rd prosecution witness, the handwriting analyst gave evidence that the 5th accused signed the name Dorji and also wrote the words "27 Emodi Ikate" and Trader" in exhibit F.

According to PW1, the 5th accused was one of those who shared £200 which was part of the purchase money of £3,500.

At the hearing of the appeal, the 5th accused who appeared in person addressed us briefly. In our view, on the facts accepted by the learned trial Judge, he came to the right conclusion that the 5th accused was guilty of the charges laid in the 1st, 7th and 8th counts.

Finally, we shall now consider the appeal of the 6th accused on whose behalf 4 grounds of appeal were filed. Of these, learned Counsel for the 6th accused was allowed to argue only the 3rd ground of appeal, as we ruled that the other grounds of appeal did not specify the misdirection's alleged. That ground of appeal reads as follows:-

"That the learned trial Judge erred in law by convicting me on uncorroborated evidence of the accomplices."

Arguing this ground of appeal before us, Counsel submitted that the 7th accused was an accomplice and that, in convicting the 6th accused, the learned trial Judge relied on the uncorroborated evidence of the 7th accused.

The case against the 6th accused was that, at all material times, he was a messenger in the Lands Registry and, in that capacity, he had access to the strong room where the deed (exhibit B1) was kept in the Registry; that the forged power of attorney (exhibit F) and 2 other documents were given to him by 3 men whom he introduced to the 7th accused; and that he handed the documents to the 7th accused.

The evidence of the 7th accused who was a clerk in the Lands Registry was that the 6th accused brought the power of attorney and 2 other documents to him and asked him to give them to Mr Dallas which he did. In our view, there was ample corroboration of the evidence of the 7th accused by both Mr A. O. Agbebi (PW13), an Assistant Registrar of Lands, and Mr J. A. Ojomo (PW20), Registrar of Titles. PW13 testified that:-

"Mr Dallas was called and he said 3 documents were given to him by one Mr Olowa and exhibit F was one of them. Olowa is the 6th accused. We sent for Olowa, and he told us that he got exhibit F from one who wanted to purchase the property referred to in exhibit F.

Mr Ojomo asked Mr Olowa to ask the men who gave him the document to come and see him in the Registry the following day. The following day we asked Olowa for the man and he said the man was out when he got to his house. I then kept the document with the hope that the owner of the power would come for it one day. The owner has never come. Mr Olowa has never produced the man, till now. Some weeks after the police came to make some investigation about certain matters including the property at 35 Ogunlana Drive and I handed exhibit F to him."

and, PW20 also testified that:-

"I went through the register and found that exhibit F was lodged with two other powers of attorney the same day and the three powers of attorney franked by one Mr Oyeyi, a lawyer. I asked him to produce the donor of the power of attorney, he told me he did not know the donor of the power of attorney and who prepared it, that it was Mr Dallas, the A.C.C. in the Registry who gave him the documents to frank. I pointed out the two other documents in the register. I asked Mr Dallas how he came by them. As a result of what Mr Dallas told me I called upon Mr Grillo. Mr Grillo said Mr Olowa gave it to him. I called upon Mr Olowa, he admitted he gave the document to Mr Grillo. this is the register I refer to, I seek to tender it, no objection, admitted and marked exhibit 14. Mr Olowa said some purchasers asked him to help them with the power of attorney. I asked if he could produce the people, he said yes, and promised to bring them the following day. The following day I asked him about these would-be-purchasers, he told me he went to their houses but could not find them.

I then directed that both the original and the counter-part of the power of attorney be retained in the Registry, until the alleged purchasers would come to collect them in the Registry. Till now no one showed up to collect them. Up till now Olowa has not brought the people."

This disposes of the only ground of appeal argued on behalf of the 6th accused.

On the face of the facts, we consider that the findings of the lower court against the 6th accused are inescapable and that he was rightly convicted on the 1st, 2nd, 7th and 8th counts.

In the result, we make the following orders:-

2nd accused: The appeal of the 2nd accused against his conviction on the 1st and 2nd counts is hereby allowed, the conviction of the 2nd accused is quashed and the sentences passed on him are hereby set aside. In their place, a verdict of acquittal and discharge is hereby entered.

3rd accused: The appeal of the 3rd accused on the 2nd count is hereby allowed; the conviction and sentence in respect of that count are hereby quashed; and, in their place, a verdict of acquittal and discharge is hereby entered.

His appeal on the 1st, 5th and 6th count is however dismissed.

5th accused: The appeal of the 5th accused on the 2nd count is hereby allowed; the conviction and sentence in respect of that count are hereby quashed; and, in their place, a verdict of acquittal and discharge is hereby entered.

His appeal on the 1st, 7th and 8th counts is however dismissed.

6th accused: The appeal of the 6th accused is hereby dismissed.

Appeal allowed in part.